Evidence Commons^™

Brain Scans As Evidence: Truths, Proofs, Lies, And Lessons, Owen D. Jones, Francis X. Shen

Owen Jones

This contribution to the Brain Sciences in the Courtroom Symposium identifies and discusses issues important to admissibility determinations when courts confront brain-scan evidence. Through the vehicle of the landmark 2010 federal criminal trial U.S. v. Semrau (which considered, for the first time, the admissibility of brain scans for lie detection purposes) this article highlights critical evidentiary issues involving: 1) experimental design; 2) ecological and external validity; 3) subject compliance with researcher instructions; 4) false positives; and 5) drawing inferences about individuals from group data. The article’s lessons are broadly applicable to the new wave of neurolaw cases now being seen …

The Forensic Community Can Educate Lawyers, Judges, Robert M. Sanger

Robert M. Sanger

Cell Phones, Brain Cancer, And Scientific Outliers In Murray V. Motorola, David H. Kaye

David Kaye

Pending before the District of Columbia's highest court in a case asking whether cell phones can cause cancer is whether to replace the jurisdiction's venerable Frye standard for reviewing the admissibility of scientific evidence with the approach adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow. The author analyzes one aspect of the two evidentiary standards that leads him to question the trial judge's suggestion in Murray v. Motorola that adopting the Daubert perspective would allow greater leeway in excluding the plaintiff's evidence.

Choice And Boundary Problems In Logerquist, Hummert, And Kumho Tire, David H. Kaye

David Kaye

This article, part of a symposium on the opinion of the Arizona Supreme Court in Logerquist v. McVey, questions that court’s rationales for refusing to apply heightened scrutiny to psychiatric testimony about the retrieval of repressed memories. It also challenges the court’s use of a “personal observations” exception to the heightened scrutiny standard of Frye v. United States. It proposes that a better solution to problems of scientific and expert evidence would be to adopt a sliding scale that attends to the use to which the evidence is put and the degree to which it has been shown to be …

Admissibility Of Scientific Evidence Under Daubert: The Fatal Flaws Of ‘Falsifiability’ And ‘Falsification’, Barbara P. Billauer Esq

barbara p billauer esq

Abstract: The Daubert mantra demands that judges, acting as gatekeepers, prevent para, pseudo or ‘bad’ science from infiltrating the courtroom. To do so, the Judges must first determine what “science” is? And then, what ‘good science’ is? It is submitted that Daubert is seriously polluted with the notions of Karl Popper who sets ‘falsifiability’ and ‘falsification’ as the demarcation line for that determination. This inapt philosophy has intractably infected case law, leading to bad decisions immortalized as stare decisis. Among other problems, is the intolerance of Popper’s system for multiple causation, a key component of toxic- torts. Thus, the primary …

Experts, Statistics, Science & Bad Science, Curtis E.A. Karnow

Curtis E.A. Karnow

Articles, books, and other online resources relating to expert testimony with a specific focus on problems with peer review, bad science, and statistics

Daubert Debunked: A History Of Legal Retrogression A History Of Legal Retrogression And The Need To Reassess ‘Scientific Admissibility’, Barbara P. Billauer Esq

barbara p billauer esq

Abstract: With ‘novel’ scientific discoveries accelerating at an unrelenting pace, the need for accessible and implementable standards for evaluating the legal admissibility of scientific evidence becomes more and more crucial. As science changes, legal standards for evaluating ‘novel’ science must be plastic enough to respond to fast-moving changes. This, ostensibly, was the Daubert objective. Since it was decided in 1993, however, Daubert’s impact has been hotly contested -- with plaintiffs and defendants each claiming the decision unfairly favors the other side. New approaches are constantly suggested to deal with the perceived impact, although there is no uniform consensus of exactly …

Dumping Daubert, Popping Popper And Falsifying Falsifiability: A Re-Assessment Of First Principles, Barbara P. Billauer Esq

barbara p billauer esq

Abstract: The Daubert mantra demands that judges, acting as gatekeepers, prevent para, pseudo or bad science from infiltrating the courtroom. To do so, the Judges must first determine what is ‘science’ and what is ‘good science.’ It is submitted that Daubert is deeply polluted with the notions of Karl Popper who sets ‘falsifiability’ and ‘falsification’ as the demarcation line for that determination. This philosophy has intractably infected case law, leading to bad decisions immortalized as stare decisis, and an unworkable system of decision-making, which negatively impacts litigant expectations. Among other problems is the intolerance of Popper’s system for multiple causation, …

Empiricism In Daubert And The California Supreme Court In Sargon, Robert Sanger

Robert M. Sanger

California has become a Daubert state. In Sargon v. The University of Southern California, the California Supreme Court held that judges are the “gatekeepers” with regard to expert or scientific evidence in this state, just as has been the case in the federal system (and many other states) since the decision in Daubert. Now that California is avowedly a Daubert state, it is important to understand why courtroom evidence – scientific, expert or, for that matter, otherwise – is properly grounded in empiricism. Empiricism is the theory that knowledge is derived from experience. Understanding this empirical basis for both Daubert …

Trances, Trials, And Tribulations; Symposium Comparing New York And Federal Evidence Law, Gary Shaw

Gary M. Shaw

A transcript of the author’s remarks at a 1994 symposium comparing New York and Federal Laws regarding hypnosis and witness testimony.

Schultz V. Akzo Nobel Paints: “The Rest Of The Story” Reveals Limited Impact Of Expert Testimony Decision, Richard O. Faulk

Richard Faulk

Certainly, a number of lawyers from both sides of the bar believe that the Schultz decision is important. A review of the record in Schultz, however, reveals a relatively easy explanation for the decision—one that undermines its value as precedent. To understand why this is so, we must go back to the district court’s decision to grant Akzo Nobel’s motion for summary judgment and, with apologies to Paul Harvey, appreciate the “rest of the story.”

Kumho Tire Co. V. Carmichael: The Supreme Court Follows Up On The Daubert Test, Martin A. Schwartz

Martin A. Schwartz

No abstract provided.

Testing The Admissibility Of Trademark Surveys After Daubert, Artemio Rivera

Artemio Rivera

To be admissible, a survey must apply the principles of survey research to the target population in a reliable manner, and base its results upon sufficient interviews and responses. These requirements make clear that the existence of flaws in a survey is not simply a matter of weight to be resolved by the fact finder, but an issue of admissibility that must be determined by the courts as part of their gate keeping duties.

Why Legal Scholars Get Daubert Wrong: A Contextualist Explanation Of Law's Epistemology, Alani Golanski

Alani Golanski

Daubert requires the court to make judgments about scientific evidence. But judges, like jurors, are lay persons in relation to such evidence. So Daubert has been criticized as requiring too much of the court, and such alternatives as blue ribbon panels have been proposed. This article shows that, notwithstanding any problems that Daubert itself might have, the Daubert scholarship is significantly hampered by the way legal scholars categorize knowledge. A "contextualist" (as opposed to "invariantist") theory of knowledge is both philosophically best, and makes sense of law's relation to science.