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Presumptions, Edmund M. Morgan
Presumptions, Edmund M. Morgan
Washington Law Review
Every writer of sufficient intelligence to appreciate the difficulties of the subject-matter has approached the topic of presumptions with a sense of hopelessness and has left it with a feeling of despair. The great Thayer attempted to bring order out of chaos by reducing the entire doctrine to a simple formula, for which he had very little authority in the judicial decisions, and which for a long time received no real judicial sanction but which later received much lip-service and recently has been rigorously applied in a few cases. Wigmore has been content to accept Thayer almost without qualification. Both …
Admissions, Edmund M. Morgan
Admissions, Edmund M. Morgan
Washington Law Review
In Greenleaf's first edition, he adopted the dictum of Mascardus that an admission is not evidence but a substitute for proof. This was repeated in the first fourteen editions following, was copied by Taylor, was accepted by Wharton, apparently acquiesced in by Thayer, and later strenuously insisted upon by Professor Gifford at Columbia. Unless the dictum be given the interpretation put upon it by Gifford, that it takes the place of proof so long as the jury does not disbelieve it, it would seem to mean that an extra-judicial admission stands on the same basis as an admission made in …
Res Gestae, Edmund M. Morgan
Res Gestae, Edmund M. Morgan
Washington Law Review
A multitude of cases creates chaos in this subject. Even so great a scholar and lawyer as Simon Greenleaf was unable to clarify the topic when the decisions were fewer and simpler. Mr. (afterwards Mr. Justice) Pitt Taylor, the author of Taylor on Evidence, copied Greenleaf word for word; but when in controversy with Mr. Chief Justice Cockburn over Bedinglield's case, had to confess that his text consisted of words "full of sound, signifying nothing". He insisted, however, that the definition which the Chief Justice had framed left him "enveloped in a fog, dense as that by which I am …
The Hearsay Rule, Edmund M. Morgan
The Hearsay Rule, Edmund M. Morgan
Washington Law Review
Any attempt to define a legal concept makes advisable an inquiry into its origin and evolution. If it be a substantive law concept, the social purpose that is designed to serve—whether the avoidance of evils or the creation or furtherance of positive benefits—must be considered. If it be a concept of procedural law, the functions it is, or is thought to be, designed to perform in the process of reaching the factual and legal bases for satisfactory determination of disputes between litigants must be examined. It is proposed, therefore, first to look briefly at the causes which brought the hearsay …