Evidence Commons^™

Using Prior Consistent Statements To Rehabilitate Credibility Or To Prove Substantive Assertions Before And After The 2014 Amendment Of Federal Rule Of Evidence 801(D)(1)(B), Floralynn Einesman

Faculty Scholarship

The Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) expanded the non-hearsay category of admissible prior consistent statements with FRE 801(d)(1)(B)(ii) to include any statements counsel uses to rehabilitate a declarant’s credibility after that credibility has been attacked. FREV 801(d)(1)(B)(i) and (ii) require that a declarant testify and be subjected to cross-examination about the prior consistent statement. Under these rules, the time at which the declarant made the consistent statement and her reason for making it are critical.

When the declarant does not testify, however, under FRE 806 opposing counsel may still attack the declarant’s credibility. Under these circumstances, it is often challenging …

Why Federal Rule Of Evidence 403 Is Unconstitutional, And Why That Matters, Kenneth S. Klein

Faculty Scholarship

It might seem at best quixotic, and at worst absurd, to assert that Federal Rule of Evidence 403-an iconic evidentiary exclusionary rule providing that relevant evidence can be excluded if it is too time-consuming or distracting-is unconstitutional. Yet, if the Sixth and Seventh Amendments to the Constitution-respectively preserving the right to a criminal jury and a civil jury- are to be taken seriously, that conclusion not only is plausible, but perhaps inescapable. More surprisingly and consequentially, deep thinking about the constitutionality of FRE 403 exposes that there may be constitutional concerns with large swaths of the Federal Rules of Evidence, …

The Enduring Quality Of An Alluring Mistake: Why One Person’S Intentions Cannot—And Never Could—Be Evidence Of Another Person’S Conduct, Kenneth S. Klein

Faculty Scholarship

For over a century, some courts—relying upon the landmark Supreme Court opinion in Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York v. Hillmon— have admitted one person’s intentions as evidence of what another person did. But Hillmon is wrong. The Supreme Court made an analytical error in its analysis. This Article seeks to expose and explain the error and therefore demonstrate that the state of mind exception to the general rule of exclusion of hearsay evidence should never support admission of one person’s stated intentions as evidence of what another person later did.