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Articles 1 - 11 of 11

Full-Text Articles in Evidence

Due Process People V. Scott (Decided June 5, 1996) Jul 2019

Due Process People V. Scott (Decided June 5, 1996)

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.


Policing In The Era Of Permissiveness: Mitigating Misconduct Through Third-Party Standing, Julian A. Cook Iii Jan 2016

Policing In The Era Of Permissiveness: Mitigating Misconduct Through Third-Party Standing, Julian A. Cook Iii

Brooklyn Law Review

On April 4, 2015, Walter L. Scott was driving his vehicle when he was stopped by Officer Michael T. Slager of the North Charleston, South Carolina, police department for a broken taillight. A dash cam video from the officer’s vehicle showed the two men engaged in what appeared to be a rather routine verbal exchange. Sometime after Slager returned to his vehicle, Scott exited his car and ran away from Slager, prompting the officer to pursue him on foot. After he caught up with Scott in a grassy field near a muffler establishment, a scuffle between the men ensued, purportedly …


Evidence Laundering In A Post-Herring World, Kay L. Levine, Jenia I. Turner, Ronald F. Wright Jan 2016

Evidence Laundering In A Post-Herring World, Kay L. Levine, Jenia I. Turner, Ronald F. Wright

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

The Supreme Court’s decision in Herring v. United States authorizes police to defeat the Fourth Amendment’s protections through a process we call evidence laundering. Evidence laundering occurs when one police officer makes a constitutional mistake when gathering evidence and then passes that evidence along to a second officer, who develops it further and then delivers it to prosecutors for use in a criminal case. When courts admit the evidence based on the good faith of the second officer, the original constitutional taint disappears in the wash.

In the years since Herring was decided, courts have allowed evidence laundering in a …


Lawyers Judging Experts: Oversimplifying Science And Undervaluing Advocacy To Construct An Ethical Duty?, David S. Caudill Jul 2013

Lawyers Judging Experts: Oversimplifying Science And Undervaluing Advocacy To Construct An Ethical Duty?, David S. Caudill

David S Caudill

My focus is on an apparent trend at the intersection of the fields of evidentiary standards for expert admissibility and professional responsibility, namely the eagerness to place more ethical responsibilities on lawyers to vet their proffered expertise to ensure its reliability. My reservations about this trend are not only based on its troubling implications for the lawyer’s duty as a zealous advocate, which already has obvious limitations (because of lawyers’ conflicting duties to the court), but are also based on the problematic aspects of many reliability determinations. To expect attorneys - and this is what the proponents of a duty …


Admissibility Of Illegally Seized Evidence In Civil Cases: Could This Be The Path Out Of The Labyrinth Of The Exclusionary Rule?, Richard J. Hanscom Feb 2013

Admissibility Of Illegally Seized Evidence In Civil Cases: Could This Be The Path Out Of The Labyrinth Of The Exclusionary Rule?, Richard J. Hanscom

Pepperdine Law Review

The use of the exclusionary rule in criminal cases has been the subject of extensive debate since its inception. Although most efforts to modify the rule have been deemed unworkable, the author proposes a modification that is both workable and sensible. Modification would be accomplished by legislation which admits the results of illegal searches by law enforcement officers who acted in good faith, and, at the same time, provide fixed monetary sanctions against the governmental agencies whose officers conducted the search. The author proposes a good faith balancing test to determine evidence admissibility and administrative type proceedings to determine monetary …


Lawyers Judging Experts: Oversimplifying Science And Undervaluing Advocacy To Construct An Ethical Duty?, David S. Caudill Jan 2012

Lawyers Judging Experts: Oversimplifying Science And Undervaluing Advocacy To Construct An Ethical Duty?, David S. Caudill

Pepperdine Law Review

My focus is on an apparent trend at the intersection of the fields of evidentiary standards for expert admissibility and professional responsibility, namely the eagerness to place more ethical responsibilities on lawyers to vet their proffered expertise to ensure its reliability. My reservations about this trend are not only based on its troubling implications for the lawyer’s duty as a zealous advocate, which already has obvious limitations (because of lawyers’ conflicting duties to the court), but are also based on the problematic aspects of many reliability determinations. To expect attorneys - and this is what the proponents of a duty …


'Comparative Reprehensibility' And The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, Yale Kamisar Oct 1987

'Comparative Reprehensibility' And The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, Yale Kamisar

Articles

It is not . . . easy to see what the shock-the-conscience test adds, or should be allowed to add, to the deterrent function of exclusionary rules. Where no deterrence of unconstitutional police behavior is possible, a decision to exclude probative evidence with the result that a criminal goes free to prey upon the public should shock the judicial conscience even more than admitting the evidence. So spoke Judge Robert H. Bork, concurring in a ruling that the fourth amendment exclusionary rule does not apply to foreign searches conducted exclusively by foreign officials. A short time thereafter, when an interviewer …


Assaults On The Exclusionary Rule: Good Faith Limitations And Damage Remedies, Pierre J. Schlag Jan 1982

Assaults On The Exclusionary Rule: Good Faith Limitations And Damage Remedies, Pierre J. Schlag

Publications

No abstract provided.


The Effects Of Tucker On The Fruits Of Illegally Obtained Statements, Jeffery P. Reinhard Jan 1975

The Effects Of Tucker On The Fruits Of Illegally Obtained Statements, Jeffery P. Reinhard

Cleveland State Law Review

Although the Court has been careful to point out that illegally obtained statements are not admissible in the prosecution's case in chief, Michigan v. Tucker has done much to erode even that principle. In Tucker, the Court found admissible the testimony of a witness whose identity was learned solely on the basis of a statement obtained from the defendant in violation of the guidelines set forth in Miranda. Despite the Court's statement that it was significant that the interrogation preceded Miranda, and notwithstanding its reiteration of the principle that the defendant's statements would not have been admissible in the prosecution's …


Evidence--Criminal Law--Cross-Examination Of Accused's Character Witness Concerning Accused's Prior Arrest, C. C. Grunewald S. Ed. Apr 1949

Evidence--Criminal Law--Cross-Examination Of Accused's Character Witness Concerning Accused's Prior Arrest, C. C. Grunewald S. Ed.

Michigan Law Review

On trial in a district court for bribing a federal revenue agent, defendant called five witnesses to testify to his good reputation. During cross-examination by the district attorney, the character witnesses were asked: ''Did you ever hear that on October 11, 1920, the defendant was arrested for receiving stolen goods?" The trial judge overruled the objection to the question, and the witnesses answered in the negative. The prosecutor exhibited a paper record of this arrest to the court. The judge instructed the jury that the question was to test the standard of the character evidence only, not to establish the …


Evidence -Admissibility Of Statements Of Fact Made During Negotiation For Compromise, John E. Tracy Jan 1936

Evidence -Admissibility Of Statements Of Fact Made During Negotiation For Compromise, John E. Tracy

Michigan Law Review

At present, the various jurisdictions hold with comparative uniformity that while offers to settle a dispute are not admissible in evidence, statements of independent fact made during such compromise negotiation are admissible. The routes of logic by which the courts arrive at this similarity in result are marked by some fundamental differences, as will be shown later, but the result is the same under any theory. The question therefore presents itself, whether the distinction made by the courts between the admissibility of offers to compromise and statements of fact made during compromise negotiations can be justified under a system of …