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Full-Text Articles in Evidence

The Dignitary Confrontation Clause, Erin Sheley Mar 2022

The Dignitary Confrontation Clause, Erin Sheley

Washington Law Review

For seventeen years, the Supreme Court’s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence has been confused and confusing. In Crawford v. Washington (2004), the Court overruled prior precedent and held that “testimonial” out-of-court statements could not be admitted at trial unless the defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, even when the statement would be otherwise admissible as particularly reliable under an exception to the rule against hearsay. In a series of contradictory opinions over the next several years, the Court proceeded to expand and then seemingly roll back this holding, leading to widespread chaos in common types of cases, particularly those involving …


Assertion And Hearsay, Richard Lloret Jan 2021

Assertion And Hearsay, Richard Lloret

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

This article explores the characteristics and functions of assertion and considers how the term influences the definition of hearsay under Federal Rule of Evidence 801. Rule 801(a) defines hearsay by limiting it to words and conduct intended as an assertion, but the rule does not define the term assertion. Courts and legal scholars have focused relatively little attention on the nature and definition of assertion. That is unfortunate, because assertion is a robust concept that has been the subject of intense philosophic study over recent decades. Assertion is not a mere cypher standing in for whatever speech or conduct one …


Why Do We Admit Criminal Confessions Into Evidence?, David Crump Sep 2019

Why Do We Admit Criminal Confessions Into Evidence?, David Crump

Seattle University Law Review

There is an enormous literature about the admissibility of criminal confessions. But almost all of it deals with issues related to self-incrimination or, to a lesser extent, with hearsay or accuracy concerns. As a result, the question whether we ever admit criminal confessions into evidence has not been the subject of much analysis. This gap is odd, since confessions are implicitly disfavored by a proportion of the literature and they often collide with exclusionary doctrines. Furthermore, the self-incrimination issue sometimes is resolved by balancing, and it would help if we knew what we were balancing. Therefore, one might ask: Why …


Can You Hear Me Now: The Impacts Of Prosecutorial Call Monitoring On Defendants' Access To Justice, Hope L. Demer Jul 2019

Can You Hear Me Now: The Impacts Of Prosecutorial Call Monitoring On Defendants' Access To Justice, Hope L. Demer

South Carolina Law Review

No abstract provided.


Hearsay In The Smiley Face: Analyzing The Use Of Emojis As Evidence, Erin Janssen Jun 2018

Hearsay In The Smiley Face: Analyzing The Use Of Emojis As Evidence, Erin Janssen

St. Mary's Law Journal

Abstract forthcoming


Supreme Court, New York County, People V. Vasquez, Jessica Goodwin Nov 2014

Supreme Court, New York County, People V. Vasquez, Jessica Goodwin

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.


The Admissibility Of Cell Site Location Information In Washington Courts, Ryan W. Dumm May 2013

The Admissibility Of Cell Site Location Information In Washington Courts, Ryan W. Dumm

Seattle University Law Review

This Comment principally explores when and how a party can successfully admit cell cite location information into evidence. Beginning with the threshold inquiry of relevance, Part III examines when cell site location information is relevant and in what circumstances the information, though relevant, could be unfairly prejudicial, cumulative, or confusing. Part IV provides the bulk of the analysis, which centers on the substantive foundation necessary to establish the information’s credibility and authenticity. Part V looks at three ancillary issues: hearsay, a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment confrontation rights, and the introduction of a summary of voluminous records. Finally, Part VI offers …


Someone Call 911, Crawford Is Dying - People V. Duhs, Caroline Knoepffler Mar 2013

Someone Call 911, Crawford Is Dying - People V. Duhs, Caroline Knoepffler

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.


Testimonial Statements: The Death Of Dying Declarations? - People V. Clay, Sarah R. Gitomer Aug 2012

Testimonial Statements: The Death Of Dying Declarations? - People V. Clay, Sarah R. Gitomer

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.


Accomplice Confessions And The Confrontation Clause: Crawford V. Washington Confronts Past Issues With A New Rule, Kjirstin Graham Mar 2012

Accomplice Confessions And The Confrontation Clause: Crawford V. Washington Confronts Past Issues With A New Rule, Kjirstin Graham

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.


Melendez-Diaz And The Right To Confrontation, Craig M. Bradley Dec 2009

Melendez-Diaz And The Right To Confrontation, Craig M. Bradley

Chicago-Kent Law Review

In Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court overruled Ohio v. Roberts and adopted new law concerning the use of hearsay testimony at criminal trials. This was based on the Sixth Amendment's command that "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him .. " On its face this provision seems to say that the accused has the right to cross-examine anybody who testifies for the prosecution at trial, whether as a live witness or through hearsay. The Supreme Court acknowledged much of this in Crawford, but …


Davis And Hammon: A Step Forward, Or A Step Back?, Tom Lininger Jan 2006

Davis And Hammon: A Step Forward, Or A Step Back?, Tom Lininger

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

Prosecutors, defense attorneys, and lower court judges hoped that the Supreme Court’s ruling in the consolidated cases of Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana (hereafter simply Davis) would provide a primer on testimonial hearsay. In retrospect, these hopes were somewhat unrealistic. The Davis ruling could not possibly clear up all the confusion that followed Crawford v. Washington, the landmark 2004 case in which the Court strengthened the right of the accused to confront declarants of testimonial hearsay. In Davis, the Court focused on the facts under review and developed a taxonomy that will be useful in similar cases, but …


Circling Around The Confrontation Clause: Redefined Reach But Not A Robust Right, Lisa Kern Griffin Jan 2006

Circling Around The Confrontation Clause: Redefined Reach But Not A Robust Right, Lisa Kern Griffin

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

The Supreme Court’s consolidated ruling in United States v. Davis and United States v. Hammon is a classic of the genre of consensus opinions to which the Roberts Court aspired in its first, transitional term. The opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, contains practical accommodations unusual in a decision by the Court’s fiercest proponent of first principles. The restraint that characterized the term is, of course, more about considerations of logistics (including the desire to avoid re-arguments after the mid-term replacement of Justice O’Connor) than about the alignment of logic. Because it reflects temporary institutional constraints rather than intellectual agreement, the …


Davis/Hammon, Domestic Violence, And The Supreme Court: The Case For Cautious Optimism, Joan S. Meier Jan 2006

Davis/Hammon, Domestic Violence, And The Supreme Court: The Case For Cautious Optimism, Joan S. Meier

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

The Supreme Court’s consolidated decision in Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana offers something for everyone: by “splitting the difference” between the two cases—affirming one and reversing the other—the opinion provides much grist for advocates’ mills on both sides of this issue. While advocates for defendants’ rights are celebrating the opinion’s continued revitalization of the right to confrontation, which began in Crawford v. Washington, advocates for victims have cause for celebration as well: the decision is notable for its reflection of the Court’s growing—albeit incomplete— awareness and understanding of the dynamics of domestic violence and their implications for justice. …


Still "Left In The Dark": The Confrontation Clause And Child Abuse Cases After Davis V. Washington, Anthony J. Franze, Jacob E. Smiles Jan 2006

Still "Left In The Dark": The Confrontation Clause And Child Abuse Cases After Davis V. Washington, Anthony J. Franze, Jacob E. Smiles

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

In his concurring opinion in Crawford v. Washington, Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized the majority for holding that the Confrontation Clause applies to “testimonial” statements but leaving for “another day” any effort to define sufficiently what “testimonial” means. Prosecutors and defendants, he said, “should not be left in the dark in this manner.” Over the next two years, both sides grappled with the meaning of testimonial, each gleaning import from sections of Crawford that seemingly proved their test was the right one. When the Court granted certiorari in Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana (hereinafter Davis), hopes were high that …


Davis V. Washington And Hammon V. Indiana: Beating Expectations, Robert P. Mosteller Jan 2006

Davis V. Washington And Hammon V. Indiana: Beating Expectations, Robert P. Mosteller

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

I begin with a question of effectiveness: does the new Confrontation Clause doctrine effectively protect defendants with respect to the most im-portant types of problematic out-of-court statements? Although they leave much room for the introduction of hearsay in the immediate aftermath of crime generally, Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana (together hereinafter Davis) are better opinions from that broad perspective than I had feared. The new doctrine now covers and provides substantial procedural protection for a very important class of problematic hearsay—statements made to government agents investigating past crime.


Refining Crawford: The Confrontation Claus After Davis V. Washington And Hammon V. Indiana, Andrew C. Fine Jan 2006

Refining Crawford: The Confrontation Claus After Davis V. Washington And Hammon V. Indiana, Andrew C. Fine

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

Clarification of the Supreme Court’s newly minted interpretation of the Confrontation Clause was desperately needed, and Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana promised to provide it. Two terms earlier, in Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court had worked a revolutionary transformation of Confrontation Clause analysis by overruling Ohio v. Roberts and severing the link between hearsay jurisprudence and the Clause. Crawford was hailed by the criminal defense bar, since it seemed to presage a sharp reduction in the frequency of so-called “victimless” trials by holding that “testimonial” hearsay, no matter how reliable, was constitutionally inadmissible in the absence of …


Evidence—Sixth Amendment And The Confrontation Clause—Testimonial Trumps Reliable: The United States Supreme Court Reconsiders Its Approach To The Confrontation Clause. Crawford V. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)., Kristen Sluyter Jan 2005

Evidence—Sixth Amendment And The Confrontation Clause—Testimonial Trumps Reliable: The United States Supreme Court Reconsiders Its Approach To The Confrontation Clause. Crawford V. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)., Kristen Sluyter

University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review

No abstract provided.


Reconceiving The Right To Present Witnesses, Richard A. Nagareda Mar 1999

Reconceiving The Right To Present Witnesses, Richard A. Nagareda

Michigan Law Review

Modem American law is, in a sense, a system of compartments. For understandable curricular reasons, legal education sharply distinguishes the law of evidence from both constitutional law and criminal procedure. In fact, the lines of demarcation between these three subjects extend well beyond law school to the organization of the leading treatises and case headnotes to which practicing lawyers routinely refer in their trade. Many of the most interesting questions in the law, however, do not rest squarely within a single compartment; instead, they concern the content and legitimacy of the lines of demarcation themselves. This article explores a significant, …


Successful Shadowboxing: The Art Of Impeaching Hearsay Declarants, The Honorable Anthony M. Brannon Jan 1991

Successful Shadowboxing: The Art Of Impeaching Hearsay Declarants, The Honorable Anthony M. Brannon

Campbell Law Review

Using the nine modes of impeachment recognized by the common law, I will examine some of the possibilities for impeaching hearsay declarants. As I explore each mode, I will discuss whether extrinsic, as well as intrinsic, evidence may be used to impeach the hearsay evidence.


Testing The Reliability Of Coconspirators' Statements Admitted Under Federal Rule Of Evidence 801(D)(2)(E): Putting The Claws Back In The Confrontation Clause, Daniel R. Rizzolo Jan 1985

Testing The Reliability Of Coconspirators' Statements Admitted Under Federal Rule Of Evidence 801(D)(2)(E): Putting The Claws Back In The Confrontation Clause, Daniel R. Rizzolo

Villanova Law Review

No abstract provided.


The Future Of Confrontation, Peter K. Westen May 1979

The Future Of Confrontation, Peter K. Westen

Michigan Law Review

The Supreme Court seems to be setting the stage for a long-awaited examination of the confrontation clause. It has been ten years since the Court endeavored in Dutton v. Evans to reconcile the evidentiary rules of hearsay with the constitutional commands of confrontation. Dutton came at the tail end of a string of confrontation cases that the Court had resolved without apparent difficulty. Not surprisingly, the Court approached Dutton in the evident belief that it could resolve the constitutional problems of hearsay once and for all. Instead, after oral argument in 1969 and a rehearing in 1970, the Court found …


Impeachment Of One's Own Witness By Prior Inconsistent Statements Under The Federal And Arkansas Rules Of Evidence, Samuel A. Perroni Oct 1978

Impeachment Of One's Own Witness By Prior Inconsistent Statements Under The Federal And Arkansas Rules Of Evidence, Samuel A. Perroni

University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review

No abstract provided.


The Psychiatrist As An Expert Witness: Some Ruminations And Speculations, Bernard L. Diamond, David W. Louisell Jun 1965

The Psychiatrist As An Expert Witness: Some Ruminations And Speculations, Bernard L. Diamond, David W. Louisell

Michigan Law Review

Consider the difference between the expert testimony of an orthopedic surgeon in a personal injury suit and the testimony of a psychiatrist in a murder trial in which some elements of the mens rea are at issue. In both instances an expert opinion is received in evidence, providing the trier of fact with technical, specialized information which must, or should, be available in order to permit a rational decision-making process. Well-established rules govern the nature of expert evidence and its mode of presentation. In legal theory, the orthopedic surgeon and the psychiatrist are both experts-physicians-who perform comparable functions in the …


Evidence - Rules Of Evidence In Disbarment, Habeas Corpus, And Grand Jury Proceedings, Paul S. Gerding S.Ed. Jun 1960

Evidence - Rules Of Evidence In Disbarment, Habeas Corpus, And Grand Jury Proceedings, Paul S. Gerding S.Ed.

Michigan Law Review

It is the purpose of this comment to examine three common-law proceedings in which rules of evidence are generally not governed by statute, to determine whether the liberalism expressed in administrative hearings has extended to non-statutory areas. Specifically, to what extent have the exclusionary rules of evidence, which rest on the theory of preventing the jury from being misled (the "jury theory"), been abandoned in disbarment, habeas corpus, and grand jury proceedings?


Evidence - Rules Of Evidence In Disbarment, Habeas Corpus, And Grand Jury Proceedings, Paul S. Gerding S.Ed. Jun 1960

Evidence - Rules Of Evidence In Disbarment, Habeas Corpus, And Grand Jury Proceedings, Paul S. Gerding S.Ed.

Michigan Law Review

It is the purpose of this comment to examine three common-law proceedings in which rules of evidence are generally not governed by statute, to determine whether the liberalism expressed in administrative hearings has extended to non-statutory areas. Specifically, to what extent have the exclusionary rules of evidence, which rest on the theory of preventing the jury from being misled (the "jury theory"), been abandoned in disbarment, habeas corpus, and grand jury proceedings?