Evidence Commons^™

Is There A Georgia Supreme Court, Problem? Analyzing The Georgia Supreme Court’S New Peculiar Approach Towards Breathalyzers And Implied Consent Law, Brian Fussell Jr.

Mercer Law Review

Alcohol and criminal behavior often accompany each other as anyone with any experience with the justice system (or intoxicated people in general) can attest to. A significant percentage of the population would probably say their worst decisions and mistakes came about while under the influence of booze or other intoxicants, and crime statistics would back this up. Alcohol-related crime statistics in the United States compiled by AlcoRehab show around 500,000 cases of alcohol related violence every year and also demonstrate that an incredible 86% of homicides and 60% of sexual abuse or rape cases were committed under the influence of …

Lyrics For Lockups: Using Rap Lyrics To Prosecute In America, Briana Carter

Mercer Law Review

Bob Marley once sang, "I shot the sheriff, but I did not shoot the deputy." Yet, he never went to jail for shooting that sheriff (possibly because he did not shoot the deputy). Instead, this line became known as the starting phrase of one of his most popular songs. While it may make sense to some why Marley's lyrics were art and not a confession to shooting his hometown sheriff, in some states, an artist's lyrics can be used as evidence to prosecute. More specifically, states have differed on the admissibility of a rap artist's lyrics as evidence for prosecution. …

Federal Criminal Discovery Reform: A Legislative Approach, Bruce A. Green

Mercer Law Review

Suppose that federal prosecutors have conducted an investigation culminating in an indictment. Although the prosecutors believe that they have enough evidence to secure a conviction and are personally convinced that the defendant is guilty, some of the evidence they have collected is favorable to the defendant, because it tends to show that the defendant is innocent or that prosecution witnesses should not be believed. Must prosecutors disclose the favorable evidence to defense counsel to use in investigating, advising the defendant, plea negotiations, or trial? Under current federal law, the answer is generally "no." Unless favorable evidence falls within one of …

Subverting Brady V. Maryland And Denying A Fair Trial: Studying The Schuelke Report, Bennett L. Gershman

Mercer Law Review

The Schuelke Report about the ill-fated federal prosecution of the late-Senator Ted Stevens is an extraordinary contribution to criminal procedure. No other official documentation or investigative study of a criminal prosecution, to my knowledge, has dissected and analyzed as carefully and thoroughly the sordid and clandestine actions of a team of prosecutors who zealously wanted to win a criminal conviction at all costs. In examining this Report, one gets the feeling that as the investigation and prosecution of Senator Stevens unfolded and the prosecution's theory of guilt unraveled, the prosecutors became indifferent to the defendant's guilt or innocence. They just …

The Proposed Fairness In Disclosure Of Evidence Act Of 2012: More Cons Than Pros With Proposed Disclosure Requirements In Federal Criminal Cases, Jacquelyn Smith

Mercer Law Review

The proposed Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence Act of 2012 (the Act) is a proposal of uniform standards for disclosing evidence in federal criminal cases that was introduced on March 15, 2012 by Senator Lisa Murkowski of Alaska.' The Act's stated purpose is: "To require the attorney for the Government to disclose favorable information to the defendant in criminal prosecutions brought by the United States, and for

Prosecutorial Disclosure Violations: Punishment Vs. Treatment, Kevin C. Mcmunigal

Mercer Law Review

Recent scholarship on prosecutorial disclosure violations proposes preventing violations through understanding and remedying the causes of violations, such as cognitive error. Scholars who adopt this view-what I call here the "treatment perspective"-often call for greater transparency and cooperation from prosecutors. A frequently unacknowledged tension exists between such a treatment perspective and a more traditional perspective-what I call here the "punishment perspective"-that seeks to deter disclosure violations through greater use of sanctions such as professional discipline.

The tension arises because increasing the certainty and severity of sanctions, as the punishment perspective urges, creates a powerful disincentive for individual prosecutors and prosecutor …

No Witness? No Admission: The Tale Of Testimonial Statements And Melendez-Diaz V. Massachusetts, Jody L. Sellers

Mercer Law Review

In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, the United States Supreme Court held that the Massachusetts trial court's admission into evidence of forensic "certificates of analysis" violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Following Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court held that the accused has a right to be confronted with the forensic analysts at trial unless "the analysts [are] unavailable to testify at trial" and the accused "had a prior opportunity to cross-examine" the analysts. Melendez-Diaz will have an important impact on criminal evidence procedure, specifically in regard to the potential growth of notice-and-demand statutes.

Lilly V. Virginia: Answering The Williamson Question—Is The Statement Against Penal Interest Exception "Firmly Rooted" Under Confrontation Clause Analysis?, Kim Mark Minix

Mercer Law Review

In Lilly v. Virginia the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that the statement against penal interest exception to the hearsay rule is too large a class for effective Confrontation Clause analysis. However, the Court held that confessional statements made by an accomplice that incriminate a criminal defendant, a subcategory of this exception, are not within a "firmly rooted" exception as recognized under the Confrontation Clause.

Kumho Tire Co. V. Carmichael: Daubert'S Gatekeeping Method Expanded To Apply To All Expert Testimony, Jeanne Wiggins

Mercer Law Review

In Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, the United States Supreme Court held that while the Daubert factors for determining the admissibility of expert testimony are neither determinative nor exhaustive, the gatekeeping function articulated in Daubert requires an examination of the reliability of all types of expert testimony and is not limited in application to scientific expert testimony.

Arizona V. Evans: Carving Out Another Good-Faith Exception To The Exclusionary Rule, Sara Gilbert

Mercer Law Review

In Arizona v. Evans, the United States Supreme Court considered whether the exclusionary rule requires suppression of evidence seized incident to an arrest, when the arrest resulted from inaccurate computer data created by court personnel. In January 1991, police arrested Isaac Evans during a routine traffic stop because the patrol car's computer indicated he was the subject of an outstanding misdemeanor warrant. While being handcuffed, Evans dropped a marijuana cigarette. A subsequent search of the vehicle revealed a bag of marijuana hidden under the passenger seat, and Evans was charged with possession. Upon notifying the justice court of the …

United States V. Williams: The Good Faith Exception To The Exclusionary Rule, Patricia Walker Bass

Mercer Law Review

In an opinion with two alternative holdings, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided en banc United States v. Williams on July 31, 1980. The court first held that, because Ms. Williams' arrest was legal, the incriminating evidence found as a result of the search incident to arrest could be used against her at trial. Alternatively, the court ruled that evidence should not be excluded when it is discovered by officers acting in good faith despite the fact that they are mistaken in thinking that their actions are lawful. This note focuses on the second holding that purports to establish …

'Materiality' Limits Prosecutors' Duty To Disclose Exculpatory Evidence To Defense, James K. Knight Jr.

Mercer Law Review

In United States v. Agurs, the U.S. Supreme Court held for the first time that criminal prosecutors have a constitutional duty to voluntarily disclose exculpatory evidence to a defendant even when the defense doesn't request such evidence. The Court, however, limited the scope of this new obligation by narrowly defining the category of material evidence to which it applies. It held that the duty arises only when the exculpatory evidence is so material that had it been disclosed, its use at trial would have created a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt that did not otherwise exist.

Respondent Agurs …