Evidence Commons^™

The Liar’S Mark: Character And Forfeiture In Federal Rule Of Evidence 609(A)(2), Jesse Schupack

Michigan Law Review

Rule 609(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Evidence is an outlier. The Rule mandates admission of impeaching evidence of a witness’s past convictions for crimes of dishonesty. It is the only place in the Rules where judges are denied their usual discretion to exclude evidence on the grounds that its admission would be more prejudicial than probative. This Note analyzes three assumptions underlying this unusual Rule: (1) that there is a coherently definable category of crimes of dishonesty, (2) that convictions for crimes of dishonesty are uniquely probative of a person’s character, and (3) that an assessment of moral character …

Reliability Of Expert Evidence In International Disputes, Matthew W. Swinehart

Michigan Journal of International Law

Part I of this article traces the historical trends in the use of expert evidence in international disputes, from the scattered reliance on experts in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to the ubiquity of experts in modern disputes. With that perspective, Part II examines how decision makers have attempted to ensure reliability of the expert evidence that is flooding the evidentiary records of international disputes, while Part III outlines the many problems that still remain. Finally, Part IV proposes a non-exhaustive and nonbinding checklist of questions for analyzing the reliability of any type of expert evidence.

Gatekeeping Science: Using The Structure Of Scientific Research To Distinguish Between Admissibility And Weight In Expert Testimony, David L. Faigman, Christopher Slobogin, John Monahan

Northwestern University Law Review

Fundamental to all evidence rules is the division of responsibility between the judge, who determines the admissibility of evidence, and the jury, which gauges its weight. In most evidentiary contexts, such as those involving hearsay and character, threshold admissibility obligations are clear and relatively uncontroversial. The same is not true for scientific evidence. The complex nature of scientific inference, and in particular the challenges of reasoning from group data to individual cases, has bedeviled courts. As a result, courts vary considerably on how they define the judge’s gatekeeping task under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and its state equivalents.

This …

A Model For Fixing Identification Evidence After Perry V. New Hampshire, Robert Couch

Michigan Law Review

Mistaken eyewitness identifications are the leading cause of wrongful convictions. In 1977, a time when the problems with eyewitness identifications had been acknowledged but were not yet completely understood, the Supreme Court announced a test designed to exclude unreliable eyewitness evidence. This standard has proven inadequate to protect against mistaken identifications. Despite voluminous scientific studies on the failings of eyewitness identification evidence and the growing number of DNA exonerations, the Supreme Court's outdated reliability test remains in place today. In 2012, in Perry v. New Hampshire, the Supreme Court commented on its standard for evaluating eyewitness evidence for the first …

Bayes' Law, Sequential Uncertainties, And Evidence Of Causation In Toxic Tort Cases, Neal C. Stout, Peter A. Valberg

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Judges are the gatekeepers of evidence. Arguably, the most difficult duty for a judicial gatekeeper is to screen the reliability of expert opinions in scientific fields such as medicine that are beyond the ken of most judges. Yet, judges have a duty to scrutinize such expert opinion evidence to determine its reliability and admissibility. In toxic tort cases, the issue of causation-whether the alleged exposures actually caused the plaintiffs injury-is nearly always the central dispute, and determining admissibility of expert causation opinion is a daunting challenge for most judges. We present a comprehensive review of the courts' struggles with the …

Daubert's Backwash: Litigation-Generated Science, William L. Anderson, Barry M. Parsons, Drummond Rennie

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

In the 1993 landmark case Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, the United States Supreme Court articulated its position on the admissibility of scientific evidence. The Court reasoned that federal judges should rely on the processes scientists use to identify unreliable research, including the process of peer review, to determine when scientific evidence should be inadmissible. In response, lawyers and their clients, seeking to rely on such evidence, have begun funding and publishing their own research with the primary intention of providing support to cases they are litigating. This Article examines the phenomenon of litigation-generated science, how it potentially undermines …

Kumho Tire Co. V. Carmichael: The Supreme Court Follows Up On The Daubert Test, Martin A. Schwartz

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Rule 803(18): Learned Treatises

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Admissibility Of Dna Evidence

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Rule 803(1): Present Sense Impression

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Expert Testimony, Barry C. Scheck

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Supreme Court Rules On Statements Against Interest, Michael M. Martin

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.