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Articles 1 - 30 of 142
Full-Text Articles in Evidence
Milkovich V. Lorain Journal Twenty-Five Years Later: The Slow, Quiet, And Troubled Demise Of Liar Libel, Leonard Niehoff, Ashley Messenger
Milkovich V. Lorain Journal Twenty-Five Years Later: The Slow, Quiet, And Troubled Demise Of Liar Libel, Leonard Niehoff, Ashley Messenger
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., the Supreme Court held that there is no separate constitutional protection for statements of opinion. It also held that an accusation that an individual lied is a statement of fact actionable in defamation. Lower courts have, correctly in our view, essentially ignored both holdings. In Part I we discuss Milkovich and the infirmities in its reasoning. In Part II we discuss the complex nature of lies and accusations of lies and argue that Milkovich failed to account for that complexity. In Part III we discuss the strategies the lower courts have used to …
Face-To-Face With Facial Recognition Evidence: Admissibility Under The Post-Crawford Confrontation Clause, Joseph Clarke Celentino
Face-To-Face With Facial Recognition Evidence: Admissibility Under The Post-Crawford Confrontation Clause, Joseph Clarke Celentino
Michigan Law Review
In Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court announced a major change in Confrontation Clause doctrine, abandoning a decades-old framework that focused on the common law principles of hearsay analysis: necessity and reliability. The new doctrine, grounded in an originalist interpretation of the Sixth Amendment, requires courts to determine whether a particular statement is testimonial. But the Court has struggled to present a coherent definition of the term testimonial. In its subsequent decisions, the Court illustrated that its new Confrontation Clause doctrine could be used to bar forensic evidence, including laboratory test results, if the government failed to produce the …
Making The Right Call For Confrontation At Felony Sentencing, Shaakirrah R. Sanders
Making The Right Call For Confrontation At Felony Sentencing, Shaakirrah R. Sanders
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Felony sentencing courts have discretion to increase punishment based on un-cross-examined testimonial statements about several categories of uncharged, dismissed, or otherwise unproven criminal conduct. Denying defendants an opportunity to cross-examine these categories of sentencing evidence undermines a core principle of natural law as adopted in the Sixth Amendment: those accused of felony crimes have the right to confront adversarial witnesses. This Article contributes to the scholarship surrounding confrontation rights at felony sentencing by cautioning against continued adherence to the most historic Supreme Court case on this issue, Williams v. New York. This Article does so for reasons beyond the unacknowledged …
The Legality Of Deliberate Miranda Violations: How Two-Step National Security Interrogations Undermine Miranda And Destabilize Fifth Amendment Protections, Lee Ross Crain
Michigan Law Review
As part of the global “War on Terror,” federal agents intentionally delay issuing Miranda warnings to terrorism suspects during custodial interrogations. They delay the warnings presuming that unwarned suspects will more freely offer vital national security intelligence. After a suspect offers the information he has, agents administer Miranda warnings and attempt to elicit confessions that prosecutors can use at the suspect’s trial. No court has ruled on the constitutionality of this two-step national security interrogation process to determine whether admitting the second, warned confession is allowed under Miranda v. Arizona and its progeny. A fragmented Supreme Court examined two-step interrogations …
Counsel's Control Over The Presentation Of Mitigating Evidence During Capital Sentencing, James Michael Blakemore
Counsel's Control Over The Presentation Of Mitigating Evidence During Capital Sentencing, James Michael Blakemore
Michigan Law Review
The Sixth Amendment gives a defendant the right to control his defense and the right to a lawyer's assistance. A lawyer's assistance, however, sometimes interferes with a defendant's control over his case. As a result, the Supreme Court, over time, has had to delineate the spheres of authority that pertain to counsel and defendant respectively. The Court has not yet decisively assigned control over mitigating evidence to either counsel or defendant. This Note argues that counsel should control the presentation of mitigating evidence during capital sentencing. First, and most importantly, decisions concerning the presentation of mitigating evidence are best characterized …
Empty Promises: Miranda Warnings In Noncustodial Interrogations, Aurora Maoz
Empty Promises: Miranda Warnings In Noncustodial Interrogations, Aurora Maoz
Michigan Law Review
You have the right to remain silent; anything you say can be used against you in a court of law. You have the right to an attorney; if you cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided to you at the state's expense. In 2010, the Supreme Court declined an opportunity to resolve the question of what courts should do when officers administer Miranda warnings in a situation where a suspect is not already in custody-in other words, when officers are not constitutionally required to give or honor these warnings. While most courts have found a superfluous warning to be …
J.D.B. V. North Carolina And The Reasonable Person, Christopher Jackson
J.D.B. V. North Carolina And The Reasonable Person, Christopher Jackson
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
This Term, the Supreme Court was presented with a prime opportunity to provide some much-needed clarification on a "backdrop" issue of law-one of many topics that arises in a variety of legal contexts, but is rarely analyzed on its own terms. In J.D.B. v. North Carolina, the Court considered whether age was a relevant factor in determining if a suspect is "in custody" for Miranda purposes, and thus must have her rights read to her before being questioned by the police. Miranda, like dozens of other areas of law, employs a reasonable person test on the custodial question: it asks …
Confrontation And Domestic Violence Post-Davis: Is There And Should There Be A Doctrinal Exception, Eleanor Simon
Confrontation And Domestic Violence Post-Davis: Is There And Should There Be A Doctrinal Exception, Eleanor Simon
Michigan Journal of Gender & Law
Close to five million intimate partner rapes and physical assaults are perpetrated against women in the United States annually. Domestic violence accounts for twenty percent of all non-fatal crime experienced by women in this county. Despite these statistics, many have argued that in the past six years the Supreme Court has "put a target on [the] back" of the domestic violence victim, has "significantly eroded offender accountability in domestic violence prosecutions," and has directly instigated a substantial decline in domestic violence prosecutions. The asserted cause is the Court's complete and groundbreaking re-conceptualization of the Sixth Amendment right of a criminal …
"An Opportunity For Effective Cross-Examination": Limits On The Confrontation Right Of The Pro Se Defendant, Alanna Clair
"An Opportunity For Effective Cross-Examination": Limits On The Confrontation Right Of The Pro Se Defendant, Alanna Clair
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
The rights of a defendant to confront his accusers and conduct his defense without the assistance of counsel are sacrosanct in the American judicial system. The rights of the defendant are even sometimes exalted at the expense of the rights of the public or of victims of crime. This Note examines the problem of a pro se defendant using his confrontation right to intimidate or harass his alleged victims testifying against him. It is well-established that the confrontation right is not unconditional. The problem comes in determining whether the courts can place limits on the confrontation right of a pro …
Davis And Hammon: A Step Forward, Or A Step Back?, Tom Lininger
Davis And Hammon: A Step Forward, Or A Step Back?, Tom Lininger
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
Prosecutors, defense attorneys, and lower court judges hoped that the Supreme Court’s ruling in the consolidated cases of Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana (hereafter simply Davis) would provide a primer on testimonial hearsay. In retrospect, these hopes were somewhat unrealistic. The Davis ruling could not possibly clear up all the confusion that followed Crawford v. Washington, the landmark 2004 case in which the Court strengthened the right of the accused to confront declarants of testimonial hearsay. In Davis, the Court focused on the facts under review and developed a taxonomy that will be useful in similar cases, but …
Circling Around The Confrontation Clause: Redefined Reach But Not A Robust Right, Lisa Kern Griffin
Circling Around The Confrontation Clause: Redefined Reach But Not A Robust Right, Lisa Kern Griffin
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
The Supreme Court’s consolidated ruling in United States v. Davis and United States v. Hammon is a classic of the genre of consensus opinions to which the Roberts Court aspired in its first, transitional term. The opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, contains practical accommodations unusual in a decision by the Court’s fiercest proponent of first principles. The restraint that characterized the term is, of course, more about considerations of logistics (including the desire to avoid re-arguments after the mid-term replacement of Justice O’Connor) than about the alignment of logic. Because it reflects temporary institutional constraints rather than intellectual agreement, the …
Davis/Hammon, Domestic Violence, And The Supreme Court: The Case For Cautious Optimism, Joan S. Meier
Davis/Hammon, Domestic Violence, And The Supreme Court: The Case For Cautious Optimism, Joan S. Meier
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
The Supreme Court’s consolidated decision in Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana offers something for everyone: by “splitting the difference” between the two cases—affirming one and reversing the other—the opinion provides much grist for advocates’ mills on both sides of this issue. While advocates for defendants’ rights are celebrating the opinion’s continued revitalization of the right to confrontation, which began in Crawford v. Washington, advocates for victims have cause for celebration as well: the decision is notable for its reflection of the Court’s growing—albeit incomplete— awareness and understanding of the dynamics of domestic violence and their implications for justice. …
Still "Left In The Dark": The Confrontation Clause And Child Abuse Cases After Davis V. Washington, Anthony J. Franze, Jacob E. Smiles
Still "Left In The Dark": The Confrontation Clause And Child Abuse Cases After Davis V. Washington, Anthony J. Franze, Jacob E. Smiles
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
In his concurring opinion in Crawford v. Washington, Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized the majority for holding that the Confrontation Clause applies to “testimonial” statements but leaving for “another day” any effort to define sufficiently what “testimonial” means. Prosecutors and defendants, he said, “should not be left in the dark in this manner.” Over the next two years, both sides grappled with the meaning of testimonial, each gleaning import from sections of Crawford that seemingly proved their test was the right one. When the Court granted certiorari in Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana (hereinafter Davis), hopes were high that …
Davis V. Washington And Hammon V. Indiana: Beating Expectations, Robert P. Mosteller
Davis V. Washington And Hammon V. Indiana: Beating Expectations, Robert P. Mosteller
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
I begin with a question of effectiveness: does the new Confrontation Clause doctrine effectively protect defendants with respect to the most im-portant types of problematic out-of-court statements? Although they leave much room for the introduction of hearsay in the immediate aftermath of crime generally, Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana (together hereinafter Davis) are better opinions from that broad perspective than I had feared. The new doctrine now covers and provides substantial procedural protection for a very important class of problematic hearsay—statements made to government agents investigating past crime.
Refining Crawford: The Confrontation Claus After Davis V. Washington And Hammon V. Indiana, Andrew C. Fine
Refining Crawford: The Confrontation Claus After Davis V. Washington And Hammon V. Indiana, Andrew C. Fine
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
Clarification of the Supreme Court’s newly minted interpretation of the Confrontation Clause was desperately needed, and Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana promised to provide it. Two terms earlier, in Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court had worked a revolutionary transformation of Confrontation Clause analysis by overruling Ohio v. Roberts and severing the link between hearsay jurisprudence and the Clause. Crawford was hailed by the criminal defense bar, since it seemed to presage a sharp reduction in the frequency of so-called “victimless” trials by holding that “testimonial” hearsay, no matter how reliable, was constitutionally inadmissible in the absence of …
Proposed Amendments To Fed. R. Crim. P. 26: An Exchange: Remote Testimony - A Prosecutor's Perspective, Lynn Helland
Proposed Amendments To Fed. R. Crim. P. 26: An Exchange: Remote Testimony - A Prosecutor's Perspective, Lynn Helland
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Although the Supreme Court has declined, for now, to endorse the Judicial Conference proposal to add a Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to permit live video testimony under limited circumstances, I agree with Professor Friedman that the matter is far from over. This is both because the potential benefits to be realized from the use of remote video testimony are too large to ignore and because, on closer inspection, any Confrontation Clause concerns that might underlie the Court's hesitation to adopt the proposal are not warranted. My purpose in writing is to summarize some of the …
Establishing Inevitability Without Active Pursuit: Defining The Inevitable Discovery Exception To The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, Stephen E. Hessler
Establishing Inevitability Without Active Pursuit: Defining The Inevitable Discovery Exception To The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, Stephen E. Hessler
Michigan Law Review
Few doctrines of constitutional criminal procedure generate as much controversy as the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. Beyond the basic mandate of the rule - that evidence obtained in violation of an individual's right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure is inadmissible in a criminal proceeding - little else is agreed upon. The precise date of the exclusionary rule's inception is uncertain, but it has been applied by the judiciary for over eight decades. While the Supreme Court has emphasized that the rule is a "judicially created remedy," and not a "personal constitutional right," this characterization provokes argument as …
Reconceiving The Right To Present Witnesses, Richard A. Nagareda
Reconceiving The Right To Present Witnesses, Richard A. Nagareda
Michigan Law Review
Modem American law is, in a sense, a system of compartments. For understandable curricular reasons, legal education sharply distinguishes the law of evidence from both constitutional law and criminal procedure. In fact, the lines of demarcation between these three subjects extend well beyond law school to the organization of the leading treatises and case headnotes to which practicing lawyers routinely refer in their trade. Many of the most interesting questions in the law, however, do not rest squarely within a single compartment; instead, they concern the content and legitimacy of the lines of demarcation themselves. This article explores a significant, …
Extradition Law At The Crossroads: The Trend Toward Extending Greater Constitutional Procedural Protections To Fugitives Fighting Extradition From The United States, Lis Wiehl
Michigan Journal of International Law
Part I of this article will describe the historical evolution of U.S. extradition law as a field parallel to, but separate from, domestic criminal procedure. Part II of this article describes the Parretti case and the Ninth Circuit's holding that the federal extradition statutory scheme of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3184, violates the Fourth Amendment to the extent that it authorizes the issuance of a provisional arrest warrant by a court without a prior evidentiary showing of probable cause to believe that the fugitive committed the crime charged abroad. Part III explores some of the implications and effects …
Police-Obtained Evidence And The Constitution: Distinguishing Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence From Unconstitutionally Used Evidence, Arnold H. Loewy
Police-Obtained Evidence And The Constitution: Distinguishing Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence From Unconstitutionally Used Evidence, Arnold H. Loewy
Michigan Law Review
The article will consider four different types of police-obtained evidence: evidence obtained from an unconstitutional search and seizure, evidence obtained from a Miranda violation, confessions and lineup identifications obtained in violation of the sixth amendment right to counsel, and coerced confessions. My conclusions are that evidence obtained from an unconstitutional search and seizure is excluded because of the police misconduct by which it was obtained. On the other hand, evidence obtained from a Miranda violation is (or ought to be) excluded because use of that evidence compromises the defendant's procedural right not to be compelled to be a witness against …
Confusing The Fifth Amendment With The Sixth: Lower Court Misapplication Of The Innis Definition Of Interrogation, Jonathan L. Marks
Confusing The Fifth Amendment With The Sixth: Lower Court Misapplication Of The Innis Definition Of Interrogation, Jonathan L. Marks
Michigan Law Review
This Note examines how these courts have applied or misapplied Innis, and concludes that, while many of these decisions are consistent with Miranda and Innis, too many others are not. In order to evaluate these cases, it is first necessary to understand the meaning and significance of Innis. Part I thus considers Innis and its background. Part II then examines lower court decisions applying the Innis test, dividing these decisions into six groups based on the most common factual scenarios. Because the cases deal with factually specific police practices, this method constitutes the most useful way to …
The Admissibility Of Prior Silence To Impeach The Testimony Of Criminal Defendants, Rex A. Sharp
The Admissibility Of Prior Silence To Impeach The Testimony Of Criminal Defendants, Rex A. Sharp
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
This Note focuses on whether a defendant who was called as a witness at the prior, severed trial of a codefendant and refused to testify by invoking the fifth amendment can subsequently be impeached by this silence at his own trial. In addition to the obvious implications this issue has for severed criminal trials, the factors considered when deciding whether impeachment by silence should be allowed generally are in sharpest focus in this factual setting. Thus, the analysis of the constitutional and evidentiary questions this Note enlists to argue that impeachment by silence in this context is permissible applies as …
Constitutional Constraints On The Admissibility Of Grand Jury Testimony: The Unavailable Witness, Confrontation, And Due Process, Barbara L. Strack
Constitutional Constraints On The Admissibility Of Grand Jury Testimony: The Unavailable Witness, Confrontation, And Due Process, Barbara L. Strack
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Defendants, however, have raised serious constitutional objections to the introduction of grand jury testimony when the witness is unavailable to testify at trial. These claims have focused on the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment and the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Defendants have contended that the introduction of testimony from a grand jury proceeding which cannot be subjected to cross-examination fatally compromises the defendant's right to a fair trial. Lower courts are split over admitting grand jury testimony in these circumstances, and the Supreme Court has yet to rule on the issue. As a result, …
Reflections On Alfred Hill's "Testimonial Privilege And Fair Trial", Peter Westen
Reflections On Alfred Hill's "Testimonial Privilege And Fair Trial", Peter Westen
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
I have learned a great deal from "Testimonial Privilege and Fair Trial"-as I always do from Professor Hill's work. Indeed, he has changed my way of thinking in this area in several important respects. At the same time, I come to rather different conclusions than he regarding each of his three major topics. Part I of this article examines the problem of finding a "remedy" for testimonial privileges that violate a defendant's right to a fair trial. Part II discusses the problem of determining when a defendant is entitled to assert that the "right" has been violated. Finally, Part III …
The Future Of Confrontation, Peter K. Westen
The Future Of Confrontation, Peter K. Westen
Michigan Law Review
The Supreme Court seems to be setting the stage for a long-awaited examination of the confrontation clause. It has been ten years since the Court endeavored in Dutton v. Evans to reconcile the evidentiary rules of hearsay with the constitutional commands of confrontation. Dutton came at the tail end of a string of confrontation cases that the Court had resolved without apparent difficulty. Not surprisingly, the Court approached Dutton in the evident belief that it could resolve the constitutional problems of hearsay once and for all. Instead, after oral argument in 1969 and a rehearing in 1970, the Court found …
Compulsory Process Ii, Peter Westen
Compulsory Process Ii, Peter Westen
Michigan Law Review
This Article examines the validity of the conventional wisdom. It draws support for its analysis from the constitutional principles of compulsory process, and, in their absence, from related doctrine in the areas of a defendant's right to confront witnesses against him and his right to a fair trial. Part I of the article defines the constitutional standard that governs the simple case of a nonindigent defendant who makes a timely application to produce a witness from within the territory of the jurisdiction. Parts II through IV, in turn, examine that standard in the light of complicating factors such as the …
Constitutional Restraints On The Exclusion Of Evidence In The Defendant's Favor: The Implications Of Davis V. Alaska, Michigan Law Review
Constitutional Restraints On The Exclusion Of Evidence In The Defendant's Favor: The Implications Of Davis V. Alaska, Michigan Law Review
Michigan Law Review
This Note, first, examines the Davis methodology for determining whether a foreclosed line of cross-examination warrants protection by the confrontation clause, and suggests a test employable by reviewing courts for making that determination. Then, the Note sketches the contours of the clash, prefigured by Davis, between the right of confrontation and the limitations on cross-examination that result from both the assertion of testimonial privileges and trial court relevance rulings.
The Compulsory Process Clause, Peter Westen
The Compulsory Process Clause, Peter Westen
Michigan Law Review
Part I of this article traces the history of compulsory process, from its origin in the English transition from an inquisitional to an adversary system of procedure to its eventual adoption in the American Bill of Rights. Part II examines the Supreme Court's seminal decision in Washington v. Texas, which recognized after a century and a half of silence that the compulsory process clause was designed to enable the defendant not only to produce witnesses, but to put them on the stand and have them heard. Part III studies the implications of compulsory process for the defendant's case, from the …
The Use Of In Camera Hearings In Ruling On The Informer Privilege, Ronald E. Levine
The Use Of In Camera Hearings In Ruling On The Informer Privilege, Ronald E. Levine
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
The thesis of this article is that most of the problems of defining the scope of the privilege in a particular case are due to the paucity of information available to the trial judge who must rule on the issue. Furthermore, many of the formulas presently used are conceptually and functionally inadequate. Both of these problems can be solved by the use of in camera hearings, for such proceedings not only will provide the trial judge with sufficient information to make a fair and rational decision, but will also alleviate the present necessity to rule only on the basis of …
The Confrontation Clause And The Scope Of The Unavailability Requirement, Jerry J. Phillips
The Confrontation Clause And The Scope Of The Unavailability Requirement, Jerry J. Phillips
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
The confrontation clause is that language of the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution which provides, "[I]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right… to be confronted with the witnesses against him." Despite the seemingly absolute language of the confrontation clause, which would suggest that no hearsay evidence may be admitted against an accused in a criminal proceeding, its guarantee has been subject to exception. For example, when either a witness to an event or his testimony is shown to be unavailable, others will be allowed to testify as to the information which the declarant-witness has related …