Evidence Commons^™

The Silliness Of Magical Realism, Kevin M. Clermont

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Relative plausibility, even after countless explanatory articles, remains an underdeveloped model bereft of underlying theory. Multivalent logic, a fully developed and accepted system of logic, comes to the same endpoint as relative plausibility. Multivalent logic would thus provide the missing theory, while it would resolve all the old problems of using traditional probability theory to explain the standards of proof as well as the new problems raised by the relative plausibility model. For example, multivalent logic resolves the infamous ‘conjunction paradox’ that traditional probability creates for itself, and which relative plausibility tries to sweep under the rug.

Yet Professors Allen …

Common Sense On Standards Of Proof, Kevin M. Clermont

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The law speaks clearly on the standards of proof, but listeners often misunderstand its words. This article tries, with some common sense and a modicum of multivalent logic, to explain how the law expects its standards to be applied, and then to show how the law thereby avoids such complications as the conjunction paradox.

First, in accordance with belief function theory, the factfinder should start at zero belief. Given imperfect evidence, the factfinder will end up retaining a fair amount of uncommitted belief. As evidence comes in, though, the factfinder will form a belief in the truth of the disputed …

Death Of Paradox: The Killer Logic Beneath The Standards Of Proof, Kevin M. Clermont

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The prevailing but contested view of proof standards is that factfinders should determine facts by probabilistic reasoning. Given imperfect evidence, they should ask themselves what they think the chances are that the burdened party would be right if the truth were to become known; they then compare those chances to the applicable standard of proof.

I contend that for understanding the standards of proof, the modern versions of logic — in particular, fuzzy logic and belief functions — work better than classical probability. This modern logic suggests that factfinders view evidence of an imprecisely perceived and described reality to form …

Convicting Lennie: Mental Retardation, Wrongful Convictions, And The Right To A Fair Trial, John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Susan E. Millor

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

"Lennie" refers to Lennie Small, the intellectually disabled character in John Steinbeck's famous novella Of Mice and Men, which tells the story of two Depression-era wandering farmhands, George and Lennie, who dream of getting their own stake and living "off the fat of the land." Their dream dies hard when Lennie accidently kills the young, beautiful, and flirtatious wife of a ranch owner's son and then tries to cover it up because he realizes that he has "done a bad thing." George, in turn, kills Lennie to prevent him from being lynched or tried for murder.

Lennie was doomed …

Recent Evaluative Research On Jury Trial Innovations, B. Michael Dann, Valerie P. Hans

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

During the past decade, state jury reform commissions, many individual federal and state judges, and jury scholars have advocated the adoption of a variety of innovative trial procedures to assist jurors in trials. Many jury trial reforms reflect growing awareness of best practices in education and communication as well as research documenting that jurors take an active rather than a passive approach to their decision-making task. Traditional adversary jury trial procedures often appear to assume that jurors are blank slates, who will passively wait until the end of the trial and the start of jury deliberations to form opinions about …

"Speaking Rights": Evaluating Juror Discussions During Civil Trials, Paula Hannaford-Agor, Valerie P. Hans, G. Thomas Munsterman

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Permitting jurors to discuss evidence during civil trials may facilitate understanding and provide an outlet for their thoughts and questions, and does not appear to lead to prejudgment or prejudice.

Evidence: 1999-2000 Survey Of New York Law, Faust Rossi

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Permitting Jury Discussions During Trial: Impact Of The Arizona Reform, Paula Hannaford-Agor, Valerie P. Hans, G. Thomas Munsterman

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

A field experiment tested the effect of an Arizona civil jury reform that allows jurors to discuss evidence among themselves during the trial. Judges, jurors, attorneys, and litigants completed questionnaires in trials randomly assigned to either a Trial Discussions condition, in which jurors were permitted to discuss the evidence during trial, or a No Discussions condition, in which jurors were prohibited from discussing evidence during trial according to traditional admonitions. Judicial agreement with jury verdicts did not differ between conditions. Permitting jurors to discuss the evidence did affect the degree of certainty that jurors reported about their preferences at the …

The Timing Of Opinion Formation By Jurors In Civil Cases: An Empirical Examination, Paula Hannaford-Agor, Valerie P. Hans, Nicole L. Mott, G. Thomas Munsterman

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The question of when and how jurors form opinions about evidence presented at trial has been the focus of seemingly endless speculation. For lawyers, the question is how to capture the attention and approval of the jury at the earliest possible point in the trial. Their goal is to maximize the persuasiveness of their arguments--or at least to minimize the persuasiveness of those of the opposing side. Judges, in contrast, are more concerned about prejudgment. They regularly admonish jurors to suspend judgment until after all the evidence has been presented and after the jurors have been instructed on the law. …

Evidence: 1998-1999 Survey Of New York Law, Faust Rossi

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

The Arizona Jury Reform Permitting Civil Jury Trial Discussions: The View Of Trial Participants, Judges, And Jurors, Valerie P. Hans, Paula Hannaford-Agor, G. Thomas Munsterman

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

In 1995, the Arizona Supreme Court reformed the jury trial process by allowing civil jurors to discuss the evidence presented during trial prior to their formal deliberations. This Article examines the theoretical, legal, and policy issues raised by this reform and presents the early results of a field experiment that tested the impact of trial discussions. Jurors, judges, attorneys, and litigants in civil jury trials in Arizona were questioned regarding their observations, experiences, and reactions during trial as well as what they perceived to be the benefits and drawback of juror discussions. The data revealed that the majority of judges …

Evidence: 1997-1998 Survey Of New York Law, Faust Rossi

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Evidence: 1996-1997 Survey Of New York Law, Faust Rossi

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

The Federal Rules Of Evidence--Past, Present, And Future: A Twenty-Year Perspective, Faust Rossi

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

This Essay surveys three major transformations in state and federal rules of evidence since the introduction of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Rules have not only inspired a movement toward codification in the states, they have also liberalized the admission of expert testimony and hearsay. This partially explains thirteen states' reluctance to codify. Judges have furthered this trend by admitting far more discretionary hearsay evidence than Congress intended. Professor Rossi doubts this expansion of the hearsay exceptions would have occurred without the adoption of the FRE and suggests that the newly formed Advisory Committee will produce greater substantive changes …

Procedure's Magical Number Three: Psychological Bases For Standards Of Decision, Kevin M. Clermont

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

So many procedural doctrines appear, after research and teaching, to trifurcate. An obvious example is that kind of standard of decision known as the standard of proof: what in theory might have been a continuum of standards divides in practice into the three distinct standards of preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing evidence, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Other examples suggest both that I am not imagining the prominence of three and that more than coincidence is at work.

Part I of this essay describes the role of the number three in procedure, with particular regard to standards …

Modern Evidence And The Expert Witness, Faust Rossi

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Surveying Work Product, Kevin M. Clermont

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Work product is the legal doctrine that central casting would send over. First, it boasts profundities, arising as it does from the colliding thrusts of our discovery and trial processes and from conflicting currents in our modified adversary system. Second, it will surface frequently, because the protected materials are commonly created by each side but uncommonly useful to the opponent. Third, it has generated a small mountain of lower-court case law, with the foothills forming a labyrinth of rules and wrinkles. In short, work product has for a couple of generations dramatically bewitched academics, bothered practitioners, and bewildered students.

Significant …

The Silent Revolution, Faust Rossi

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Civil Procedure: Commentary, Faust Rossi

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.