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The Incompetent Spouse's Election: A Pecuniary Approach, Susan P. Barnabeo Jun 1985

The Incompetent Spouse's Election: A Pecuniary Approach, Susan P. Barnabeo

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Although many state legislatures have preserved the incompetent widow's right of election, these states have developed only general guidelines to govern such an election. These guidelines merely direct the court to act in the "best interests" of the incompetent widow. Courts of the various jurisdictions differ in their approach to determining the "best interests" of the incompetent. Most courts examine all surrounding circumstances regarding the incompetent widow's situation, such as the intent of both the wife prior to her incompetency and of the testator, and the adequacy of the will's provision for the incompetent widow. A minority of jurisdictions, however, …


Perpetuities: A Perspective On Wait-And-See, Lawrence W. Waggoner Jan 1985

Perpetuities: A Perspective On Wait-And-See, Lawrence W. Waggoner

Articles

Professor Dukeminier and I agree on most of the important points concerning perpetuity law and perpetuity reform. We agree that the Rule Against Perpetuities still serves a socially useful function of limiting dead hand control, and should not be abolished. We also agree that the common law Rule is needlessly harsh and should be softened. Finally, we agree on the type of reform that is most desirable-waitand- see. Our only disagreeihent-concerns the best method of marking off the wait-and-see perpetuity pe]iqod-the period of time during which dispositions that would have been invalid under the common law Rule are to be …


A Rejoinder By Professor Waggoner, Lawrence W. Waggoner Jan 1985

A Rejoinder By Professor Waggoner, Lawrence W. Waggoner

Articles

Since the patience of the reader and the space in this issue of the Law Review are nearing their limits, I wish to publish only two points in response to what Professor Dukeminier has written.. These points further support my position that Dukeminier's proposed statute would lead almost anyone to conclude that A, not X, is the causal relationship measuring life in Example 1 of my article.1 By implication, these points, along with the others made in my article, corroborate my overall thesis: Professor Dukeminier's proposed one-sentence statute2 cannot be counted a responsible way of identifying the measuring lives for …