Environmental Law Commons^™

Tradable Pollution Permits And The Regulatory Game, Jason S. Johnston

All Faculty Scholarship

This paper analyzes polluters' incentives to move from a traditional command and control (CAC) environmental regulatory regime to a tradable permits (TPP) regime. Existing work in environmental economics does not model how firms contest and bargain over actual regulatory implementation in CAC regimes, and therefore fail to compare TPP regimes with any CAC regime that is actually observed. This paper models CAC environmental regulation as a bargaining game over pollution entitlements. Using a reduced form model of the regulatory contest, it shows that CAC regulatory bargaining likely generates a regulatory status quo under which firms with the highest compliance costs …

Day 2: Thursday, 18 August 2005: Upper Colorado River Endangered Fish Recovery Program, Bob Muth, Tom Pitts, Dan Luecke

Endangered Species Act Congressional Field Tour (August 17-19)

58 pages (includes illustrations and maps).

Contains references.

Agenda: Endangered Species Act Congressional Field Tour, University Of Colorado Boulder. Natural Resources Law Center

Endangered Species Act Congressional Field Tour (August 17-19)

The Center sponsored its third annual field tour for staff members of the United States Congress, the United States Environmental Protection Agency, and the Colorado state legislature.

Day 1: Wednesday, 17 August 2005: Biodiversity And Critical Habitat, Charles Bedford, Federico Cheever, Tim Sullivan

Endangered Species Act Congressional Field Tour (August 17-19)

6 pages (includes color illustration).

Contains references.

Day 1: Wednesday, 17 August 2005: Science And The Esa, Joy Nicholopoulos, William Lewis

Endangered Species Act Congressional Field Tour (August 17-19)

43 pages (includes illustrations and map).

Contains references.

Soft Regulators, Tough Judges, Gerrit De Geest, Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci

George Mason University School of Law Working Papers Series

Judges have a tendency to be more demanding than regulators. In the United States, a majority of the courts has adopted the rule that the unexcused violation of a statutory standard is negligence per se. However, the converse does not hold: compliance with regulation does not relieve the injurer of tort liability. In most European legal systems, the outcome is similar. We use a framework in which, on the one hand, the effects of tort law are undermined by insolvency and evidence problems and, on the other hand, regulation is expensive in terms of monitoring and information gathering. We show …

Disappearing Defendants V. Judgment Proof Injurers: Upgrading The Theory Of Tort Law Failures, Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Barbara Mangan

George Mason University School of Law Working Papers Series

Do injurers’ insolvency and victims’ reluctance to sue affect accident prevention in the same way? Are these circumstances less of a problem under the negligence rule than under strict liability? We argue, contrary to the literature, that the answer is, in most cases, negative and make three main points. First, the judgment proof problem and the disappearing defendant problem are shown to have different effects on injurers’ behavior and hence yield dissimilar levels of social welfare. Second, when these two problems occur simultaneously they may have offsetting effects. Third, the negligence rule is superior to strict liability only under some …

The Rule Of Capture And The Economic Dynamics Of Natural Resource Use And Survival Under Open Access Management Regimes, Jason S. Johnston

All Faculty Scholarship

By reviewing the bioeconomic dynamics of natural resource harvest under open access/rule of capture management, this article demonstrates the falsity of the widely held contemporary view that market incentives lead to unsustainable natural resource use. The formal bioeconomic models teach that it is the relative speed of market versus natural dynamics that determines when and if open access harvest leads to resource collapse. If the rate at which harvesters exit from the harvest industry when harvests are low is rapid relative to the natural rate of growth in the harvested stock, the level of both the resource stock and harvest …

The Law And Economics Of Development And Environment: An Introduction To The Symposium, Daniel H. Cole

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.

Environmental Trade Measures, The Shrimp-Turtle Rulings, And The Ordinary Meaning Of The Text Of The Gatt, Howard F. Chang

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.