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Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons™
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Articles 1 - 8 of 8
Full-Text Articles in Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law
Sharing Stupid $H*T With Friends And Followers: The First Amendment Rights Of College Athletes To Use Social Media, Meg Penrose
Sharing Stupid $H*T With Friends And Followers: The First Amendment Rights Of College Athletes To Use Social Media, Meg Penrose
Meg Penrose
This paper takes a closer look at the First Amendment rights of college athletes to access social media while simultaneously participating in intercollegiate athletics. The question posed is quite simple: can a coach or athletic department at a public university legally restrict a student-athlete's use of social media? If so, does the First Amendment provide any restraints on the type or length of restrictions that can be imposed? Thus far, neither question has been presented to a court for resolution. However, the answers are vital, as college coaches and athletic directors seek to regulate their athletes in a constitutional manner.
Tinkering With Success: College Athletes, Social Media And The First Amendment, Meg Penrose
Tinkering With Success: College Athletes, Social Media And The First Amendment, Meg Penrose
Meg Penrose
Good law does not always make good policy. This article seeks to provide a legal assessment, not a policy directive. The policy choices made by individual institutions and athletic departments should be guided by law, but absolutely left to institutional discretion. Many articles written on college student-athletes' social media usage attempt to urge policy directives clothed in constitutional analysis. In this author's opinion, these articles have lost perspective-constitutional perspective. This article seeks primarily to provide a legal and constitutional assessment so that schools and their athletic departments will have ample information to then make their own policy choices.
A Constitutinal Analysis Of The Ncaa’S New Autonomous Governance Model And Its Effects On Student Athletes, Non-Athletes, And Professors – Is The Termination Of Uab’S Football Program Just The Beginning Of Things To Come?, Tyler N. Wilson
Tyler N Wilson
No abstract provided.
Ex Post Modernism: How The First Amendment Framed Nonrepresentational Art, Sonya G. Bonneau
Ex Post Modernism: How The First Amendment Framed Nonrepresentational Art, Sonya G. Bonneau
Sonya G Bonneau
Nonrepresentational art repeatedly surfaces in legal discourse as an example of highly valued First Amendment speech. It is also systematically described in constitutionally valueless terms: nonlinguistic, noncognitive, and apolitical. Why does law talk about nonrepresentational art at all, much less treat it as a constitutional precept? What are the implications for conceptualizing artistic expression as free speech?
This article contends that the source of nonrepresentational art’s presumptive First Amendment value is the same source of its utter lack thereof: modernism. Specifically, a symbolic alliance between abstraction and freedom of expression was forged in the mid-twentieth century, informed by social and …
Games Are Not Coffee Mugs: Games And The Right Of Publicity, 29 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 1 (2012), William K. Ford, Raizel Liebler
Games Are Not Coffee Mugs: Games And The Right Of Publicity, 29 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 1 (2012), William K. Ford, Raizel Liebler
William K. Ford
Are games more like coffee mugs, posters, and T-shirts, or are they more like books, magazines, and films? For purposes of the right of publicity, the answer matters. The critical question is whether games should be treated as merchandise or as expression. Three classic judicial decisions, decided in 1967, 1970, and 1973, held that the defendants needed permission to use the plaintiffs' names in their board games. These decisions judicially confirmed that games are merchandise, not something equivalent to more traditional media of expression. As merchandise, games are not like books; instead, they are akin to celebrity-embossed coffee mugs. To …
Antidiscrimination Laws & Artistic Expression, Steven H. Shiffrin, Gregory R. Smith
Antidiscrimination Laws & Artistic Expression, Steven H. Shiffrin, Gregory R. Smith
Steven H. Shiffrin
No abstract provided.
Nsfw: An Empirical Study Of Scandalous Trademarks, Megan M. Carpenter
Nsfw: An Empirical Study Of Scandalous Trademarks, Megan M. Carpenter
Megan M Carpenter
This project is an empirical analysis of trademarks that have received rejections based on the judgment that they are “scandalous." It is the first of its kind. The Lanham Act bars registration for trademarks that are “scandalous” and “immoral.” While much has been written on the morality provisions in the Lanham Act generally, this piece is the first scholarly project that engages an empirical analysis of 2(a) rejections based on scandalousness; it contains a look behind the scenes at how the morality provisions are applied throughout the trademark registration process. We study which marks are being rejected, what evidence is …
Definitions, Religion, And Free Exercise Guarantees, Mark Strasser
Definitions, Religion, And Free Exercise Guarantees, Mark Strasser
Mark Strasser
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the free exercise of religion. Non-religious practices do not receive those same protections, which makes the ability to distinguish between religious and non-religious practices important. Regrettably, members of the Court have been unable to agree about how to distinguish the religious from the non-religious—sometimes, the implicit criteria focus on the sincerity of the beliefs, sometimes the strength of the beliefs or the role that they play in an individual’s life, and sometimes the kind of beliefs. In short, the Court has virtually guaranteed an incoherent jurisprudence by sending contradictory signals with …