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- Comparative Law; Judges; Transnational Law (2)
- Arrow Theorem (1)
- Central American Integration (1)
- Collective irrationality (1)
- Condorcet cycling (1)
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- Constitutional Identity; Judicial Dialogue; Constitutional Borrowing (1)
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Articles 1 - 6 of 6
Full-Text Articles in Election Law
The Central American Constitutional Identity. A Study Of The Constitutional Imitation Phenomenon In The Integration Process Of The Region, Prof. Michele Carducci
The Central American Constitutional Identity. A Study Of The Constitutional Imitation Phenomenon In The Integration Process Of The Region, Prof. Michele Carducci
Michele Carducci Prof.
No abstract provided.
The Central American Constitutional Identity, Prof. Michele Carducci
The Central American Constitutional Identity, Prof. Michele Carducci
Michele Carducci Prof.
No abstract provided.
Is “Transnational” Constitutional Law Possible?, Prof. Michele Carducci
Is “Transnational” Constitutional Law Possible?, Prof. Michele Carducci
Michele Carducci Prof.
No abstract provided.
Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz
Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz
Justin Schwartz
This short nontechnical article reviews the Arrow Impossibility Theorem and its implications for rational democratic decisionmaking. In the 1950s, economist Kenneth J. Arrow proved that no method for producing a unique social choice involving at least three choices and three actors could satisfy four seemingly obvious constraints that are practically constitutive of democratic decisionmaking. Any such method must violate such a constraint and risks leading to disturbingly irrational results such and Condorcet cycling. I explain the theorem in plain, nonmathematical language, and discuss the history, range, and prospects of avoiding what seems like a fundamental theoretical challenge to the possibility …
If Not A Commercial Republic? Political Economy In The United States After Citizens United, David A. Westbrook
If Not A Commercial Republic? Political Economy In The United States After Citizens United, David A. Westbrook
Journal Articles
In
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission , a majority of the Supreme Court conceived the United States to be an oligarchy and ruled accordingly. What this decision might come to mean for political economy in the United States is explored through three interrelated responses to the decision. In the first,
Citizens United is a turning point for constitutional law scholarship, and by extension, for what is expected from our legal system. After
Citizens United , legal scholars may abandon the idea that the Court takes legal argument seriously, and that law thereby constrains, as well as expresses, social privilege. …
Small-Donor Public Financing In The Post-Citizens United Era, 44 J. Marshall L. Rev. 619 (2011), Monica Youn
Small-Donor Public Financing In The Post-Citizens United Era, 44 J. Marshall L. Rev. 619 (2011), Monica Youn
UIC Law Review
No abstract provided.