Criminal Procedure Commons^™

Sentencing Roulette: How Virginia’S Criminal Sentencing System Is Imposing An Unconstitutional Trial Penalty That Suppresses The Rights Of Criminal Defendants To A Jury Trial, Caleb R. Stone

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

No abstract provided.

Jury Voting Paradoxes, Jason Iuliano

Michigan Law Review

The special verdict is plagued by two philosophical paradoxes: the discursive dilemma and the lottery paradox. Although widely discussed in the philosophical literature, these paradoxes have never been applied to jury decision making. In this Essay, I use the paradoxes to show that the special verdict’s vote-reporting procedures can lead judges to render verdicts that the jurors themselves would reject. This outcome constitutes a systemic breakdown that should not be tolerated in a legal system that prides itself on the fairness of its jury decision-making process. Ultimately, I argue that, because the general verdict with answers to written questions does …

The Demographic Dilemma In Death Qualification Of Capital Jurors, J. Thomas Sullivan

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

You Can't Handle The Truth! Trial Juries And Credibility, Renée Hutchins

Renée M. Hutchins

Every now and again, we get a look, usually no more than a glimpse, at how the justice system really works. What we see—before the sanitizing curtain is drawn abruptly down—is a process full of human fallibility and error, sometimes noble, more often unfair, rarely evil but frequently unequal. The central question, vital to our adjudicative model, is: How well can we expect a jury to determine credibility through the ordinary adversary processes of live testimony and vigorous impeachment? The answer, from all I have been able to see is: not very well.

Solving Batson, Tania Tetlow

Tania Tetlow

The Supreme Court faced an important ideological choice when it banned the racial use of peremptory challenges in Batson v. Kentucky. It could either ground the rule in equality rights designed to protect potential jurors from stereotyping, or it could base the rule on the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to an “impartial jury” drawn from a fair cross-section of the community. By choosing Equal Protection analysis, the Court turned away from the defendant and the fair functioning of the criminal justice system and instead focused on protecting potential jurors. The Court thus built fatal error into the Batson rule, a …

Gideon V. Wainwright A Half Century Later, Yale Kamisar

Reviews

When he was nearing the end of his distinguished career, one of my former law professors observed that a dramatic story of a specific case "has the same advantages that a play or a novel has over a general discussion of ethics or political theory." Ms. Houppert illustrates this point in her very first chapter.

You Can't Handle The Truth! Trial Juries And Credibility, Renée M. Hutchins

Faculty Scholarship

Every now and again, we get a look, usually no more than a glimpse, at how the justice system really works. What we see—before the sanitizing curtain is drawn abruptly down—is a process full of human fallibility and error, sometimes noble, more often unfair, rarely evil but frequently unequal.

The central question, vital to our adjudicative model, is: How well can we expect a jury to determine credibility through the ordinary adversary processes of live testimony and vigorous impeachment? The answer, from all I have been able to see is: not very well.

Juror Internet Misconduct: A Survey Of New Hampshire Superior Court Judges, Brooke Lovett Shilo

The University of New Hampshire Law Review

[Excerpt] “The Constitution guarantees criminal defendants the right to a fair trial before an impartial jury and the right to confront the evidence against them. When a juror improperly accesses the Internet during a criminal trial, the defendant is denied these constitutional rights. The problem of outside information entering the courtroom is as old as our judicial system. As early as 1907, Justice Holmes observed that, “The theory of our [criminal justice] system is that the conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside influence, …

Juries, Lay Judges, And Trials, Toby S. Goldbach, Valerie P. Hans

Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers

“Juries, Lay Judges, and Trials” describes the widespread practice of including ordinary citizens as legal decision makers in the criminal trial. In some countries, lay persons serve as jurors and determine the guilt and occasionally the punishment of the accused. In others, citizens decide cases together with professional judges in mixed decision-making bodies. What is more, a number of countries have introduced or reintroduced systems employing juries or lay judges, often as part of comprehensive reform in emerging democracies. Becoming familiar with the job of the juror or lay citizen in a criminal trial is thus essential for understanding contemporary …

Juries And The Criminal Constitution, Meghan J. Ryan

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

Judges are regularly deciding criminal constitutional issues based on changing societal values. For example, they are determining whether police officer conduct has violated society’s "reasonable expectations of privacy" under the Fourth Amendment and whether a criminal punishment fails to comport with the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society" under the Eighth Amendment. Yet judges are not trained to assess societal values, nor do they, in assessing them, ordinarily consult data to determine what those values are. Instead, judges turn inward, to their own intuitions, morals, and values, to determine these matters. But judges’ internal …