Criminal Procedure Commons^™

Mirror, Mirror, On The Wall—Biased Impartiality, Appearances, And The Need For Recusal Reform, Zygmont A. Pines

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

The article focuses on a troubling aspect of contemporary judicial morality.

Impartiality—and the appearance of impartiality—are the foundation of judicial decision-making, judicial morality, and the public’s trust in the rule of law. Recusal, in which a jurist voluntarily removes himself or herself from participating in a case, is a process that attempts to preserve and promote the substance and the appearance of judicial impartiality. Nevertheless, the traditional common law recusal process, prevalent in many of our state court systems, manifestly subverts basic legal and ethical norms.

Today’s recusal practice—whether rooted in unintentional hypocrisy, wishful thinking, or a pathological cognitive dissonance— …

True Blue? Whether Police Should Be Allowed To Use Trickery And Deception To Extract Confessions, Laure Hoffman Roppe

San Diego Law Review

This Comment addresses whether or not, and if so, to what extent, police should be allowed to use trickery and deception to extract confessions from criminal suspects. It surveys the deceitful interrogation tactics included in the term "trickery" and summarizes the psychology of confessions. Major developments in the law regarding coerced confessions are analyzed and the author explores the policy arguments for and against the use of deception in police interrogations. The author recommends the prohibition of specific forms of trickery and offers an analytical approach as to whether a confession is admissible.

Deference, Tolerance, And Numbers: A Response To Professor Wright's View Of The Sentencing Commission, Kevin Cole

San Diego Law Review

The United States Sentencing Commission promulgates the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which greatly constrain judicial discretion in choosing the sentence for federal crimes. One commentator, Professor Ronald Wright, has argued that the willingness of the courts and Congress to defer to a guideline promulgated by the Commission should depend on whether the Commission has justified the guideline by reference to empirical evidence. This Article explores the theoretical and practical difficulties of giving such effect to empirical justifications.