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Full-Text Articles in Criminal Procedure
“Progressive” Prosecutors And “Proper” Punishments, Benjamin Levin
“Progressive” Prosecutors And “Proper” Punishments, Benjamin Levin
Scholarship@WashULaw
After decades of relative inattention to prosecutorial elections, academics and activists recently have focused on “progressive prosecutors” as a promising avenue for criminal justice reform. That said, the growing literature on progressive prosecutors reflects little clarity about what makes a prosecutor “progressive.” Recent campaigns suggest disparate visions of how to operationalize “progressive prosecution.” In this chapter, I describe four ideal types of progressive prosecutor: (1) the progressive who prosecutes, (2) the proceduralist prosecutor, (3) the prosecutorial progressive, and (4) the anti-carceral prosecutor. Looking to sentencing policy as a case study, I examine how these different ideal types illustrate different visions …
Prosecuting The Crisis, Benjamin Levin
Prosecuting The Crisis, Benjamin Levin
Scholarship@WashULaw
Over the past decade, activists and academics have celebrated the rise of the so-called “progressive prosecutor” movement. District attorney candidates—often former public defenders or civil rights lawyers—have promised to use prosecutorial discretion to address the injustices of the criminal system. A proliferation of such campaigns, and the electoral successes of some of these candidates have raised questions about progressive prosecution: what does it actually mean to be a progressive prosecutor? Does progressive prosecution work? Do progressive candidates follow through on campaign promises? And, how enthusiastic should defense attorneys, reformers, and critics of the carceral state be about progressive prosecution? The …
Collusive Prosecution, Ben A. Mcjunkin, J.J. Prescott
Collusive Prosecution, Ben A. Mcjunkin, J.J. Prescott
Articles
In this Article, we argue that increasingly harsh collateral consequences have surfaced an underappreciated and undertheorized dynamic of criminal plea bargaining. Collateral consequences that mostly or entirely benefit third parties (such as other communities or other states) create an interest asymmetry that prosecutors and defendants can exploit in plea negotiations. In particular, if a prosecutor and a defendant can control the offense of conviction (often through what some term a “fictional plea”), they can work together to evade otherwise applicable collateral consequences, such as deportation or sex-offender registration and notification. Both parties arguably benefit: Prosecutors can leverage collateral consequences to …