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Criminal Law Commons

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Articles 1 - 12 of 12

Full-Text Articles in Criminal Law

Detection Avoidance, Chris William Sanchirico Nov 2005

Detection Avoidance, Chris William Sanchirico

ExpressO

In practice, the problem of law enforcement is half a matter of what the government does to catch violators and half a matter of what violators do to avoid getting caught. In the theory of law enforcement, however, although the state’s efforts at "detection" play a decisive role, offenders’ efforts at "detection avoidance" are largely ignored. Always problematic, this imbalance has become critical in recent years as episodes of corporate misconduct spur new interest in punishing process crimes like obstruction of justice and perjury. This article adds detection avoidance to the existing theoretical frame with an eye toward informing the …


Password Theft: Rethinking An Old Crime In A New Era, Daniel S. Shamah Nov 2005

Password Theft: Rethinking An Old Crime In A New Era, Daniel S. Shamah

ExpressO

This is a discussion of the legal and economic ramifications of password theft.


A Law And Economics Perspective On Terrorism, Nuno M. Garoupa , Jonathan Klick, Francesco Parisi Sep 2005

A Law And Economics Perspective On Terrorism, Nuno M. Garoupa , Jonathan Klick, Francesco Parisi

George Mason University School of Law Working Papers Series

This paper reviews the existing law and economics literature on crime, noting where various models might apply to the terror context. Specifically, it focuses on two strands of the literature, deterrence and incapacitation. Challenging the conventional application of the basic rational agent model of crime in the context of terrorism, it considers anti-terror measures enacted by different countries, highlighting how the details of the laws correspond to the insights from economic models of crime. In conclusion, the paper proposes an efficient sorting mechanism in which individuals will be provided with adequate incentives to reveal their type to law enforcement authorities.


Breaking The Bank: Revisiting Central Bank Of Denver After Enron And Sarbanes-Oxley, Celia Taylor Sep 2005

Breaking The Bank: Revisiting Central Bank Of Denver After Enron And Sarbanes-Oxley, Celia Taylor

ExpressO

No abstract provided.


Prisons Of The Mind: Social Value And Economic Inefficiency In The Criminal Justice Response To Mental Illness, Amanda C. Pustilnik Aug 2005

Prisons Of The Mind: Social Value And Economic Inefficiency In The Criminal Justice Response To Mental Illness, Amanda C. Pustilnik

ExpressO

This Article employs a “New Chicago School” law and economics analysis to examine why the staggering economic and human costs of channeling non-violent mentally ill adults and children into the criminal system not only are countenanced but embraced by voters and lawmakers. Analyzing legislation, statements by lawmakers and jurors, and historical sources, the Article contends that certain social value is created through the incarceration of this marginalized group. That is, there is a taste for the punishment of these people that incarceration satisfies but that therapeutic alternatives would not. The willingness to pay for this contestable taste keeps entrenched this …


Life V. Death: Or Why The Death Penalty Should Marginally Deter, Charles N. W. Keckler Aug 2005

Life V. Death: Or Why The Death Penalty Should Marginally Deter, Charles N. W. Keckler

George Mason University School of Law Working Papers Series

Econometric measures of the effect of capital punishment have increasingly provided evidence that it deters homicides. However, most researchers on both sides of the death penalty debate continue to rely on rather simple assumptions about criminal behavior. I attempt to provide a more nuanced and predictive rational choice model of the incentives and disincentives to kill, with the aim of assessing to what extent the statistical findings of deterrence are in line with theoretical expectations. In particular, I examine whether it is plausible to suppose there is a marginal increase in deterrence created by increasing the penalty from life imprisonment …


Deterring Roper’S Juveniles: Why Immature Criminal Youth Require The Death Penalty More Than Adults – A Law & Economics Approach, Moin A. Yahya Aug 2005

Deterring Roper’S Juveniles: Why Immature Criminal Youth Require The Death Penalty More Than Adults – A Law & Economics Approach, Moin A. Yahya

ExpressO

In Roper v. Simmons, the United States Supreme Court declared the death penalty for juveniles unconstitutional. It relied on three reasons, one of which concerns this article, namely the theory that juveniles are less culpable and deterrable than adults. The Court relied on the American Medical Association’s amicus brief which purported to show scientifically that juveniles had less developed brains than adults. The Court characterized juveniles as being risk-lovers who highly preferred the present over the future, who loved gains no matter how risky but did not care for losses, and who could not engage in proper cost-benefit analysis, because …


Partial Ban On Plea Bargains, Oren Gazal Aug 2005

Partial Ban On Plea Bargains, Oren Gazal

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009

The influence of the plea bargaining system on innocent defendants is fiercely debated. Many scholars call for a ban on plea bargaining, arguing that the practice coerces innocent defendants to plead guilty. Proponents of plea bargaining respond that even an innocent defendant is better off when he choose to plea bargain in order to assure a lenient result, if he concludes that the risk of wrongful trial conviction is too high. They claim that since plea bargaining is only an option, it cannot harm the defendant whether he is guilty or innocent. This paper argues that the both supporters and …


An Economic Analysis Of The Private And Social Costs Of The Provision Of Cybersecurity And Other Public Security Goods, Bruce H. Kobayashi Apr 2005

An Economic Analysis Of The Private And Social Costs Of The Provision Of Cybersecurity And Other Public Security Goods, Bruce H. Kobayashi

George Mason University School of Law Working Papers Series

This paper examines the incentives of private actors to invest in cybersecurity. Prior analyses have examined investments in security goods, such as locks or safes that have the characteristics of private goods. The analysis in this paper extends this analysis to examine expenditures on security goods, such as information, that have the characteristics of public goods. In contrast to the private goods case, where individual uncoordinated security expenditures can lead to an overproduction of security, the public goods case can result in the underproduction of security expenditures, and incentives to free ride. Thus, the formation of collective organizations may be …


The New Deterrence: Crime And Policy In The Age Of Globalization, Patrick Keenan Apr 2005

The New Deterrence: Crime And Policy In The Age Of Globalization, Patrick Keenan

ExpressO

Globalization has made it much easier for criminal activity to cross borders, but deterrence theory has not kept up with this changed reality. I draw insights from both law-and-economics and criminology literature to enrich our understanding of deterrence. I ground my theoretical discussion in the real-world problem of sex tourism as an example of the kind of unwanted activity that now crosses borders and has complicated our understanding of deterrence. I focus on two issues central to deterrence that have not gotten sufficient scholarly attention: the phenomenon of displacement and the role of status. I argue that informal sanctions, as …


Organizational Misconduct: Beyond The Principal-Agent Model, Kimberly D. Krawiec Feb 2005

Organizational Misconduct: Beyond The Principal-Agent Model, Kimberly D. Krawiec

ExpressO

This article demonstrates that, at least since the adoption of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines in 1991, the United States legal regime has been moving away from a system of strict vicarious liability toward a system of duty-based organizational liability. Under this system, organizational liability for agent misconduct is dependant on whether or not the organization has exercised due care to avoid the harm in question, rather than under traditional agency principles of respondeat superior. Courts and agencies typically evaluate the level of care exercised by the organization by inquiring whether the organization had in place internal compliance structures ostensibly designed …


Knowledge And Power In The Mechanical Firm: Planning For Profit In Austrian Perspective, Richard Adelstein Dec 2004

Knowledge And Power In The Mechanical Firm: Planning For Profit In Austrian Perspective, Richard Adelstein

Richard Adelstein

A theory of central planning employing Austrian themes and applied to private firms and Taylorism.