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Full-Text Articles in Criminal Law
Minnesota's Distortion Of Rule 609, Ted Sampsell-Jones
Minnesota's Distortion Of Rule 609, Ted Sampsell-Jones
Faculty Scholarship
Rule of Evidence 609, which governs the admission of prior convictions of a witness for purposes of impeachment, occupies an important place in the day to day operation of American criminal trials. The rule is a compromise that reflects these competing values. It admits some prior convictions but not all. Crimen falsi offenses such as perjury and fraud are automatically admissible under 609(a)(2). All other felonies are analyzed under the balancing test of 609(a)(1), which allows the admission of a defendant-witness's crimes if the “probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused.” The rule seeks …
Windfall Justice: Sentences At The Mercy Of Hypertechnicality, Jack Nordby
Windfall Justice: Sentences At The Mercy Of Hypertechnicality, Jack Nordby
William Mitchell Law Review
Once upon a time (a time not so remote as to be beyond the memories of many of us who still toil in the vineyards of justice), the severity of a criminal sentence was determined largely at the whim of the trial judge, who was guided only by vague considerations of suitability. Non-premeditated murder, for example, might be punished by anything from probation to forty years in prison. A parole board exercised a similarly subjective power to temper the term with early release. Then, about a quarter century ago, the legislature created a commission to establish sentencing “guidelines,” said to …
Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error, A. Kimberley Dayton
Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error, A. Kimberley Dayton
Faculty Scholarship
This article examines the increasing role of the Chapman Rule and its effect on the harmless error doctrine and outlines a coherent doctrine of constitutional error responsive to the purposes of the various constitutional protections afforded criminal defendants. Part I evaluates the Court's existing harmless error jurisprudence. Part II proposes a harmless error doctrine that, unlike the Court's approach, responds to constitutional values unrelated to truth determination. The last two parts of the Article address two problems precipitated by the use of outcome-oriented rules to define and remedy constitutional error. Part III discusses when such a rule should be used …