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Articles 1 - 6 of 6
Full-Text Articles in Criminal Law
Neuroscientists In Court, Owen D. Jones, Anthony D. Wagner, David L. Faigman, Marcus E. Raichle
Neuroscientists In Court, Owen D. Jones, Anthony D. Wagner, David L. Faigman, Marcus E. Raichle
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Neuroscientific evidence is increasingly being offered in court cases. Consequently, the legal system needs neuroscientists to act as expert witnesses who can explain the limitations and interpretations of neuroscientific findings so that judges and jurors can make informed and appropriate inferences. The growing role of neuroscientists in court means that neuroscientists should be aware of important differences between the scientific and legal fields, and, especially, how scientific facts can be easily misunderstood by non-scientists,including judges and jurors.
This article describes similarities, as well as key differences, of legal and scientific cultures. And it explains six key principles about neuroscience that …
Reconceptualizing The Burden Of Proof, Edward K. Cheng
Reconceptualizing The Burden Of Proof, Edward K. Cheng
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
The preponderance standard is conventionally described as an absolute probability threshold of 0.5. This Essay argues that this absolute characterization of the burden of proof is wrong. Rather than focusing on an absolute threshold, the Essay reconceptualizes the preponderance standard as a probability ratio and shows how doing so eliminates many of the classical problems associated with probabilistic theories of evidence. Using probability ratios eliminates the so-called Conjunction Paradox, and developing the ratio tests under a Bayesian perspective further explains the Blue Bus problem and other puzzles surrounding statistical evidence. By harmonizing probabilistic theories of proof with recent critiques advocating …
Brain Scans As Evidence: Truths, Proofs, Lies, And Lessons, Owen D. Jones, Francis X. Shen
Brain Scans As Evidence: Truths, Proofs, Lies, And Lessons, Owen D. Jones, Francis X. Shen
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
This contribution to the Brain Sciences in the Courtroom Symposium identifies and discusses issues important to admissibility determinations when courts confront brain-scan evidence. Through the vehicle of the landmark 2010 federal criminal trial U.S. v. Semrau (which considered, for the first time, the admissibility of brain scans for lie detection purposes) this article highlights critical evidentiary issues involving: 1) experimental design; 2) ecological and external validity; 3) subject compliance with researcher instructions; 4) false positives; and 5) drawing inferences about individuals from group data. The article’s lessons are broadly applicable to the new wave of neurolaw cases now being seen …
Experts, Mental States, And Acts, Christopher Slobogin
Experts, Mental States, And Acts, Christopher Slobogin
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
This article, written for a symposium on "Guilt v. Guiltiness: Are the Right Rules for Trying Factual Innocence Inevitably the Wrong Rules for Trying Culpability?," argues that the definition of expertise in the criminal justice system, derived in the federal courts and in most states from Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Co., should vary depending on whether the issue involved is past mental state or past conduct. While expert psychological testimony about past acts ought to be based on scientifically verifiable assertions, expert psychological testimony about subjective mental states relevant to criminal responsibility need not meet the same threshold. This …
The Perils Of Evidentiary Manipulation, Edward K. Cheng
The Perils Of Evidentiary Manipulation, Edward K. Cheng
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
The use of evidentiary rules to achieve substantive goals strikes me as a Faustian bargain, and, given Bierschbach and Stein's acknowledgedly tentative position, I hope to dissuade them of the virtues of the practice. My goal therefore is to explore briefly the potential dark side of specialized evidentiary rules. The concerns of injecting substantive goals into evidence law extend far beyond the narrow legitimacy concerns Bierschbach and Stein raise. It is not simply the question of whether we aspire to a pluralistic or majority-take-all democratic society. Rather, evidentiary manipulation threatens the legitimacy of criminal and evidence law... Bierschbach and Stein's …
Reenvisioning Law Through The Dna Lens, Edward K. Cheng
Reenvisioning Law Through The Dna Lens, Edward K. Cheng
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
In recent times, no development has transformed the practice of criminal justice as much as DNA evidence. In little over fifteen years, DNA profiling has produced nothing short of a paradigm shift.1 For police and prosecutors, DNA has become a potent weapon for identifying and convicting criminals. Trace biological material left at a crime scene now provides critical evidence for generating leads through "cold searches" of DNA databases and for convicting defendants at trial. At the same time, for defense attorneys, DNA has become an invaluable tool for seeking exonerations, because just as DNA can link defendants to crimes, it …