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Foreword, Seattle University Law Review

Seattle University Law Review

Foreword.

Marissa Jackson Sow’S “Whiteness As Contract”, Marissa Jackson Sow

Seattle University Law Review

Marissa Jackson Sow’s “Whiteness as Contract.”

Closing Remarks, Dontay Proctor-Mills

Seattle University Law Review

Closing Remarks.

Introductory Remarks, Michael Rogers, Hannah Hamley, Rayshaun D. Williams

Seattle University Law Review

Introductory Remarks.

The Deans' Roundtable, Dean Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Dean Danielle Conway, Dean Tamara Lawson, Dean Mario Barnes, Dean L. Song Richardson

Seattle University Law Review

The Deans' Roundtable.

A Call For Judicial Scrutiny: How Increased Judicial Discretion Has Led To Disparity And Unpredictability In Federal Sentencings For Child Pornography, Loren Rigsby

Seattle University Law Review

The United States Sentencing Commission (USSC) has made child pornography related crimes among the most harshly punishable federal offenses. Nevertheless, sentencing judges have regained the right to depart from the recommended Federal Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines). The Guideline range for child pornography reflects sound and clear congressional intent to impose harsh penalties on defendants to deter, and ultimately eliminate, the market for child pornography. For this reason, this Comment argues that sentences that fall outside the Guidelines range should be reviewed with much greater scrutiny and should not be used solely to reflect a judge’s view that the advised sentence is …

Double Jeopardy—Civil Forfeitures And Criminal Punishment: Who Determines What Punishments Fit The Crime, Barbara A. Mack

Seattle University Law Review

This Article will attempt to distill from this confusion a meaningful double jeopardy policy, applicable to parallel civil and criminal proceedings, that takes into account the history of double jeopardy, recent changes in statutory law, and the contemporary chaotic state of parallel civil and criminal proceedings. Under current law, double jeopardy protects against three abuses: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense. This Article will show that the multiple punishments prong has little basis in law, other than reliance …

Preface: Double Jeopardy In Washington And Beyond, Justice Philip A. Talmadge

Seattle University Law Review

The prohibition against double jeopardy is of ancient lineage in western civilization. In a ringing and scholarly dissent that rewards reflection, Justice Hugo Black said:

Fear and abhorrence of governmental power to try people twice for the same conduct is one of the oldest ideas found in western civilization. Its roots run deep into Greek and Roman times. Even in the Dark Ages, when so many other principles of justice were lost, the idea that one trial and one punishment were enough remained alive through the canon law and the teachings of the early Christian writers. By the thirteenth century …

The Double Jeopardy Implications Of In Rem Forfeiture Of Crime-Related Property: The Gradual Realization Of A Constitutional Violation, Andrew L. Subin

Seattle University Law Review

Over the past decade, the government has escalated its "war on drugs." Although the "war" has not decreased drug use or limited the availability of drugs on the street, the government continues to sacrifice the constitutional rights of its citizens in an effort to escalate the hostility. Since the "zero tolerance" policy of the Reagan Administration, the government has relied heavily on the forfeiture of property related to drug crimes as a tool to deter and punish the illegal distribution of drugs. The federal forfeiture statute, 21 U.S.C. § 881, allows the government to seize any property used to facilitate …

Appellate Review Of Unclear State Law In The Ninth Circuit After In Re Mclinn, Daniel L. Brewster

Seattle University Law Review

In McLinn, the Ninth Circuit significantly departed from the practice of the other circuits, and from its own prior practice, when it rejected the deferential standard of review normally applied to a federal district court's interpretation of state law. This Note discusses the Ninth Circuit's decision in McLinn and examines the deferential standard employed in the other circuits and in the United States Supreme Court. The Note takes the position that McLinn was correct in rejecting the former practice of accepting a district court's interpretations of state law unless clearly wrong, but that McLinn went too far in holding …