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Are Rules Effective Before Publication? Reflections On The D.C. Circuit’S Decision In Humane Society V. Usda, Jack M. Beermann Oct 2022

Are Rules Effective Before Publication? Reflections On The D.C. Circuit’S Decision In Humane Society V. Usda, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

Since at least 1980, there has been a documented increase in regulatory activity at the end of presidential terms, especially in the post-election period when the outgoing President’s successor is from the other party. This phenomenon has come to be known as “midnight regulation,” and the products of end-of-term legislative rulemaking are referred to as “midnight rules.” While a study I conducted for the Administrative Conference of the United States revealed that most midnight rules are routine,[1] some are not and are designed to project the agenda of the outgoing administration into the future and force the incoming administration …


The Right To Counsel In A Neoliberal Age, Zohra Ahmed Apr 2022

The Right To Counsel In A Neoliberal Age, Zohra Ahmed

Faculty Scholarship

Legal scholarship tends to obscure how changes in criminal process relate to broader changes in the political and economic terrain. This Article offers a modest corrective to this tendency. By studying the U.S. Supreme Court’s right to counsel jurisprudence, as it has developed since the mid-70s, I show the pervasive impact of the concurrent rise of neoliberalism on relationships between defendants and their attorneys. Since 1975, the Court has emphasized two concerns in its rulings regarding the right to counsel: choice and autonomy. These, of course, are nominally good things for defendants to have. But by paying close attention to …


Selling And Abandoning Legal Rights, Keith N. Hylton Mar 2022

Selling And Abandoning Legal Rights, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

Legal rights impose concomitant legal burdens. This paper considers the valuation and disposition of legal rights, and legal burdens, when courts cannot be relied upon to perfectly enforce rights. Because courts do not perfectly enforce rights, victims suffer some loss in the value of their rights depending on the degree of underenforcement. The welfare implications of trading away and abandoning rights are examined. Victims do not necessarily trade away rights when and only when such trade is socially desirable. Relatively pessimistic victims (who believe
their rights are weaker than injurers do) trade away rights too cheaply. Extremely pessimistic victims abandon …