Courts Commons^™

"Presumptions And Burdens Of Proof As Tools For Legal Stability And Change, Tamar Frankel

Faculty Scholarship

Presumptions and burdens of proof are used, among other purposes, to maintain legal stability and at the same time effect change. By imposing the burden of proof on the party asserting a certain outcome, courts can calibrate burdens of proof and substantive rules until experience points to rule retention or amendment. As agents of change, presumptions and burdens of proof are far more flexible and less brittle than rules.¹

This Article tells the story of presumptions and burdens of proof in litigation between corporate shareholders and managements. This litigation is replete with volatile presumptions and innovative burdens of proof, …

Must Carry And The Courts: Bleak House, The Sequel, Nick Allard

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

On The Federalization Of The Administration Of Civil And Criminal Justice, William W. Schwarzer, Russell R. Wheeler

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

New Mexico's Summary Calendar For Disposition Of Crimnal Appeals: An Invitation To Inefficiency, Ineffectiveness And Injustice, J. Thomas Sullivan

Faculty Scholarship

As increasing appellate caseloads strain judicial and support resources available to appellate courts, the incentive for streamlining and expediting the appellate process to accommodate the needs of courts, counsel and litigants also increases. Traditional means for increasing work output, such as addition of judgeships and legal and clerical support staff, are often compromised by general funding problems facing many state jurisdictions, as well as the federal government. As a consequence, alternative means for expediting are sought, including reduction of judicial time involved for review of individual cases, restriction of oral argument and limitations on discretionary review. At the same time, …

Character Evidence, James L. Kainen

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

By Reason Of Their Sex: Feminist Theory Postmodernism And Justice , Tracy E. Higgins

Faculty Scholarship

Both the Supreme Court's jurisprudence of gender and feminist legal theory have generally assumed that some identifiable and describable category of woman exists prior to the construction of legal categories. For the Court, this woman-whose characteristics admittedly have changed over time-serves as the standard against which gendered legal classifications are measured. For feminism, her existence has served a different but equally important purpose as the subject for whom political goals are pursued. To the extent that the definitions of the category diverge, the differences among definitions are played out in feminist critiques of the Court's gender jurisprudence, and, occasionally, in …

Of Laws And Men: An Essay On Justice Marshall's View Of Criminal Procedure, Bruce A. Green, Daniel C. Richman

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

A Modest Proposal For A Political Court, Thomas W. Merrill

Faculty Scholarship

I offer a modest proposal. You can decide for yourself whether it is offered in the spirit of Jonathan Swift, or whether I mean it to be taken seriously.

Brecht V. Abrahamson: Harmful Error In Habeas Corpus Law, James S. Liebman, Randy Hertz

Faculty Scholarship

For the past two and one-half decades, the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have applied the same rule for assessing the harmlessness of constitutional error in habeas corpus proceedings as they have applied on direct appeal of both state and federal convictions. Under that rule, which applied to all constitutional errors except those deemed per se prejudicial or per se reversible, the state could avoid reversal upon a finding of error only by proving that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court adopted this stringent standard in Chapman v. California to fulfill the federal …

Shouting Down The Voice Of The People: Political Parties, Powerful Pac's And Concerns About Corruption, Clarisa Long

Faculty Scholarship

The Federal Election Campaign Act limits the amount of financial support that political parties may give to candidates for federal office. Clarisa Long argues that these restrictions violate political parties' First Amendment rights of speech and association. Because the flow of money in the political process is a proxy for speech, the First Amendment requires that political actors have access to at least one unrestricted avenue of communication. While individuals' and PACs' First Amendment rights are protected because they may make unrestricted independent expenditures, parties do not have this opportunity. Courts have failed to protect party speech, rationalizing that the …

Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, John C. Coffee Jr., Bernard S. Black

Faculty Scholarship

A central puzzle in understanding the governance of large American public firms is why most institutional shareholders are passive. Why would they rather sell than fight? Until recently, the Berle-Means paradigm – the belief that separation of ownership and control naturally characterizes the modern corporation – reigned supreme. Shareholder passivity was seen as an inevitable result of the scale of modern industrial enterprise and of the collective action problems that face shareholders, each of whom owns only a small fraction of a large firm's shares.

A paradigm shift may be in the making, however. Rival hypotheses have recently been offered …