Courts Commons^™

Submerged Precedent, Elizabeth Mccuskey

Faculty Scholarship

Numerous studies have pointed to the skewed picture of trial courts' workload, management, and disposition of cases that exists from examining Westlaw and Lexis opinions alone, akin to navigating the iceberg from its tip.⁴ But submerged precedent pushes docketology in an uncharted direction by identifying a mass of reasoned opinions-putative precedent and not mere evidence of decision-making-that exist only on dockets. Submerged precedent thus raises the specter that docket-based research may be necessary in some areas to ascertain an accurate picture of the law itself not just trial courts' administration of it.

The existence of a submerged body …

When Is An Agency A Court? A Modified Functional Approach To State Agency Removal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, Nicholas Jackson

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This Note argues that courts should interpret 28 U.S.C. § 1441, which permits removal from state court to federal court, to allow removal from state administrative agencies when the agency performs “court-like functions.” Circuits that apply a literal interpretation of the statute and forbid removal from state agencies should adopt this “functional” approach. The functional approach, which this Note calls the McCullion-Floeter test, should be modified to comport with legislative intent and public policy considerations: first, state agency adjudications should not be removable when the adjudication requires technical expertise, which federal courts cannot obtain because they adjudicate cases in a …

How Congress Should Fix Personal Jurisdiction, Stephen E. Sachs

Faculty Scholarship

Personal jurisdiction is a mess, and only Congress can fix it. The field is a morass, filled with buzzwords of nebulous origin and application. Courts have sought a single doctrine that simultaneously guarantees convenience for plaintiffs, fairness for defendants, and legitimate authority for the tribunal. Caught between these goals, we've let each new fact pattern pull precedent in a different direction, robbing litigants of certainty and blunting the force of our substantive law.

Solving the problem starts with reframing it. Rather than ask where a case may be heard, we should ask who may hear it. If the parties are …

Exhuming The “Diversity Explanation” Of The Eleventh Amendment, Thomas D. Rowe Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

This essay, in a symposium honoring the scholarship of Ninth Circuit Judge William A. Fletcher, explores the “diversity explanation” of the Eleventh Amendment that he had advanced in articles while he was a UC-Berkeley law professor. That explanation, contrary to existing Supreme Court doctrine that heavily constitutionalizes state sovereign immunity from suits by private parties and foreign countries, would view the Eleventh Amendment as having solely to do with federal courts’ constitutional jurisdiction and nothing to do with states’ sovereign immunity. The essay notes the cleanness of interpretation provided by the diversity explanation, in contrast with the convoluted nature of …

Introduction, Paul Finkelman

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Jurisdictional Conflicts Over Counterclaims Against The United States, David G. Swenson

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This article first discusses the different approaches that courts have used in determining district court jurisdiction over counterclaims and the differing limits that are imposed upon the size of the counterclaim. Second, it examines the relationship between the Court of Claims and the district courts in cases where the defendant cannot counterclaim for full relief in a district court. The article concludes with several legislative proposals that could lessen the uncertainty and lack of uniformity among the courts currently facing a defendant who wants to counterclaim against the government.

Swift To Erie/York, Hanna And Beyond: Proposed Solutions For A Major Problem Of Diversity Jurisdiction, E. Blythe Stason Jr.

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

There are four purposes of this article: First, to expose more fully the nature and dimensions of the difficult problem of determining whether a particular rule is "substantive" or "procedural"; Second, to discuss the various judicial attempts to solve it; Third, to show the shortcomings of those attempts, as manifested in both established doctrine and current federal judicial opinions; and, Fourth, to propose some solutions. It should be made clear that we are involved here with a question of allocating power within our federal union. Diversity characterization functions as an unintended device allocating power between state …