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Consumer Protection Law Commons

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Full-Text Articles in Consumer Protection Law

Consumer Preferences For Performance Defaults, Franklin G. Snyder, Ann M. Mirabito Oct 2016

Consumer Preferences For Performance Defaults, Franklin G. Snyder, Ann M. Mirabito

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

Commercial law in the United States is designed to facilitate private transactions, and thus to enforce the presumed intent of the parties, who generally are free to negotiate the terms they choose. But these contracts inevitably have gaps, both because the parties cannot anticipate every situation that might arise from their relationship, and because negotiation is not costless. When courts are faced with these gaps in a litigation context, they supply default terms to fill them. These defaults usually are set to reflect what courts believe similar parties would have agreed to if they had addressed the issue. These “majoritarian” …


Revisiting The Accredited Investor Standard, Syed Haq Feb 2016

Revisiting The Accredited Investor Standard, Syed Haq

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

The passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) and the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act provided the impetus for several changes in the financial regulatory regime. In the securities markets, Dodd-Frank included provisions that lifted a ban on general solicitation and mandated a review of the accredited investor standard. These changes, while intended to increase capital formation within our private markets, also brought to light serious investor protection issues. This note advocates for a new accredited investor standard that more accurately reflects the risks associated with investing in the private markets.


Debunking Humphrey's Executor, Daniel A. Crane Jan 2016

Debunking Humphrey's Executor, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

The Supreme Court’s 1935 Humphrey’s Executor decision paved the way for the modern administrative state by holding that Congress could constitutionally limit the President’s powers to remove heads of regulatory agencies. The Court articulated a quartet of features of the Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC”) statutory design that ostensibly justified the Commission’s constitutional independence. It was to be nonpartisan and apolitical, uniquely expert, and performing quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial, rather than executive, functions. In recent years, the staying power of Humphrey’s Executor has been called into question as a matter of constitutional design. This Essay reconsiders Humphrey’s Executor from a different angle. …