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Articles 1 - 4 of 4
Full-Text Articles in Consumer Protection Law
Wealth Transfers As The Original And Primary Concern Of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, Robert H. Lande
Wealth Transfers As The Original And Primary Concern Of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, Robert H. Lande
All Faculty Scholarship
Chicago School antitrust policy rests upon the premise that the sole purpose of antitrust is to promote economic efficiency. This article shows that this foundation is flawed. The fundamental purpose of antitrust is to protect consumers. To protect purchasers from paying supracompetitive prices when they buy goods or services. This is the "wealth transfer," "theft", "consumer welfare" or "purchaser protection" explanation for antitrust.
The article shows that the efficiency view originated in a detailed analysis of the legislative history of the Sherman Act undertaken by Robert Bork. Bork purported to show that Congress only cared about enhancing economic efficiency.
To …
The At&T Agreement: Reorganization Of The Telecommunications Industry And Conflicts With Illinois Law, 15 J. Marshall L. Rev. 563 (1982), Frederic D. Tennenbaum, Michael P. Hurst
The At&T Agreement: Reorganization Of The Telecommunications Industry And Conflicts With Illinois Law, 15 J. Marshall L. Rev. 563 (1982), Frederic D. Tennenbaum, Michael P. Hurst
UIC Law Review
No abstract provided.
Trademarks And Competition: The Ives Cases, 15 J. Marshall L. Rev. 319 (1982), Vincent N. Palladino
Trademarks And Competition: The Ives Cases, 15 J. Marshall L. Rev. 319 (1982), Vincent N. Palladino
UIC Law Review
No abstract provided.
Price Discrimination Law And Economic Efficiency, Edward H. Cooper
Price Discrimination Law And Economic Efficiency, Edward H. Cooper
Articles
The Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act (15 U.S.C. § 13), undertakes to outlaw price "discrimination" upon proof of threatened injury to competition, and subject to specified defenses. Lawyers often bewail the fact that administration of this statute frequently fails to conform to an economist's notion of discrimination. For the most part, the complaints are addressed to the clear fact that, as drafted and interpreted, the statute wreaks unnecessary damage. In the name of protecting competition, competition and economic efficiency are often curtailed.