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Articles 1 - 8 of 8
Full-Text Articles in Consumer Protection Law
Returning To The Statutory Text: Why The Language Of Section 13(B) Requires Courts To Narrowly Construe The Ftc’S Ability To Obtain Injunctive Relief, Christopher Halm
Returning To The Statutory Text: Why The Language Of Section 13(B) Requires Courts To Narrowly Construe The Ftc’S Ability To Obtain Injunctive Relief, Christopher Halm
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) enforces over 70 laws in the areas of antitrust and consumer protection, and one valuable tool to support their enforcement is Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“Section 13(b)”). Section 13(b), among other features, grants the FTC authority to seek an injunction in district court against any defendant that is “about to violate” one or more of those laws. For the past three decades, courts have adopted a permissive judicial interpretation of that language, authorizing injunctions against defendants when the allegedly impending violations were only “likely to recur” based on past misconduct. This …
Amazon And Platform Antitrust, Ben Bloodstein
Amazon And Platform Antitrust, Ben Bloodstein
Fordham Law Review
With its decision in Ohio v. American Express, the U.S. Supreme Court for the first time embraced the recently developed, yet increasingly prolific, concept of the two-sided platform. Through advances in technology, platforms, which serve as intermediaries allowing two groups to transact, are increasingly ubiquitous, and many of the biggest tech companies operate in this fashion. Amazon Marketplace, for example, provides a platform for third-party vendors to sell directly to consumers through Amazon’s web and mobile interfaces. At the same time that platforms and their scholarship have evolved, a burgeoning antitrust movement has also developed which focuses on the …
Quality Collusion: News, If It Ain’T Broke, Why Fix It?, Mark Mcmillan
Quality Collusion: News, If It Ain’T Broke, Why Fix It?, Mark Mcmillan
Fordham Urban Law Journal
No abstract provided.
Burning Down The House Or Simply Rolling The Dice: A Comment On Section 621 Of The Dodd-Frank Act And Recommendation For Its Implementation, Joshua R. Rosenthal
Burning Down The House Or Simply Rolling The Dice: A Comment On Section 621 Of The Dodd-Frank Act And Recommendation For Its Implementation, Joshua R. Rosenthal
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
Section 621 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act modifies the Securities Act of 1933 to prohibit the underwriter, placement agent, initial purchaser, or sponsor, or any affiliate or subsidiary of any such entity of an asset-backed financial product from betting against that very product for one year after the product’s initial sale. The rule prohibits anyone who structures or sells an asset-backed security or a product composed of asset-backed securities from going short, in the specified timeframe, on what they have sold, and labels such transactions as presenting material conflicts of interest. This Comment discusses traces …
Standardization Of Standard-Form Contracts: Competition And Contract Implications, Mark R. Patterson
Standardization Of Standard-Form Contracts: Competition And Contract Implications, Mark R. Patterson
Faculty Scholarship
Standard-form contracts are a common feature of commercial relationships because they offer the advantage of lower transaction costs. This advantage of standard contracts is increased when there is a second layer of standardization under which multiple firms agree on a standard contract. Trade associations and similar entities often effect standardization of this kind through collective agreement on a standard contract, sometimes under the aegis of state actors. Multifirm contract standardization can provide not only the usual transaction-cost advantages of standard-form contracts, but also increased competition among firms, because a standard contract makes comparison among firms’ offerings easier. But standardization among …
Antitrust And The Costs Of Standard-Setting: A Commentary On Teece & (And) Sherry Symposium: The Interface Between Intellectual Property Law And Antitrust Law: Commentary, Mark R. Patterson
Antitrust And The Costs Of Standard-Setting: A Commentary On Teece & (And) Sherry Symposium: The Interface Between Intellectual Property Law And Antitrust Law: Commentary, Mark R. Patterson
Faculty Scholarship
The creation of an industry standard is a process that has much in common with the creation of a patented invention. Indeed, if standards are not patentable, it is only because of certain doctrinal peculiarities of patent law. It is therefore important to preserve the incentives for organizations to incur the costs of standard-setting activity, so that society may gain the benefits of the resulting standards. The law can preserve those incentives by treating the contributions of industry standards as distinct from those of inventions that are incorporated in them. More specifically, antitrust law should ensure that the patentees of …
When Is Property Intellectual: The Leveraging Problem Essays, Mark R. Patterson
When Is Property Intellectual: The Leveraging Problem Essays, Mark R. Patterson
Faculty Scholarship
Patents and copyrights protect inventions and expression; they do not protect products. This distinction, I argue in this essay, is a key to the antitrust problem of the "leveraging" of intellectual property. In a typical leveraging case, the manufacturer of a durable good, like a copier or computer, refuses to sell replacement parts for its equipment unless the purchaser also hires the manufacturer to service the equipment. Such a practice can be illegal under antitrust law, but when the leveraging products-in this example, replacement parts-are protected by patent or copyright, the manufacturer will often claim that the leveraging is a …
Product Definition, Product Information, And Market Power: Kodak In Perspective, Mark R. Patterson
Product Definition, Product Information, And Market Power: Kodak In Perspective, Mark R. Patterson
Faculty Scholarship
In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., product information, market costs, market information the United States Supreme Court held that market power sufficient to impose an illegal tying arrangement can, at least in theory, derive from buyers' uncertainty regarding a product's costs and quality. Although commentators disagree on the implications of the Kodak decision, all seem to agree that the opinion's emphasis on product information costs is a departure from previously accepted economic analysis of antitrust law. In this Article, Mark R. Patterson argues that the Kodak decision is, in fact, economically reasonable, incorporating into antitrust law previously …