Constitutional Law Commons^™

Special Justifications, Randy J. Kozel

Randy J Kozel

The Supreme Court commonly asks whether there is a “special justification” for departing from precedent. In this Response, which is part of a Constitutional Commentary symposium on Settled Versus Right: A Theory of Precedent, I examine the existing law of special justifications and describe its areas of uncertainty. I also compare the Court’s current doctrine with a revised approach to special justifications designed to separate the question of overruling from deeper disagreements about legal interpretation. The aspiration is to establish precedent as a unifying force that enhances the impersonality of the Court and of the law, promoting values the Justices …

Comparing Supreme Court Jurisprudence In Obergefell V. Hodges And Town Of Castle Rock V. Gonzales: A Watershed Moment For Due Process Liberty, Jill C. Engle

Jill Engle

“The nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in our own times. The generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment did not presume to know the extent of freedom in all of its dimensions, and so they entrusted to future generations a charter protecting the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning. When new insight reveals discord between the Constitution’s central protections and a received legal stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed.” -- Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, …

Establishment Of Religion Supreme Court Appellate Division Third Department

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Equal Protection Supreme Court Appellate Division Third Department

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Due Process Supreme Court Rockland County

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Due Process Supreme Court Appellate Division Second Department

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Due Process Supreme Court Appellate Division

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Due Process People V. Scott (Decided June 5, 1996)

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Supreme Court Queens County

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Double Jeopardy

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Double Jeopardy Supreme Court Appellate Division Second Department

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Double Jeopardy

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Past And The Present: Stare Decisis In Wisconsin Law, Daniel R. Suhr, Kevin Leroy

Marquette Law Review

None

Judicial Deference And Political Power In Fourteenth Amendment And Dormant Commerce Clause Cases, F. Italia Patti

San Diego Law Review

The Supreme Court lacks a coherent approach to deciding how much to defer to state legislatures when reviewing allegedly unconstitutional legislation. The Court grants very little deference to state legislatures in dormant Commerce Clause cases but significant deference to state legislatures in Fourteenth Amendment cases. The Court has never acknowledged this divergence, let alone justified it. Scholars have also failed to note this divergence or explore whether it can be justified. By ignoring this divergence, the Court and scholars have ignored a situation that exacerbates existing power imbalances and fails to recognize a more promising approach to judicial deference.

This …

Dying Constitutionalism And The Fourteenth Amendment, Ernest A. Young

Marquette Law Review

None

Deconstitutionalizing Dewey, Aaron J. Saiger

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

"I'M Leavin' It (All) Up To You": Gundy And The (Sort-Of) Resurrection Of The Subdelegation Doctrine, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

In 2000, Cass Sunstein quipped that the conventional nondelegation doctrine, which holds that there are judicially enforceable constitutional limits on the extent to which Congress can confer discretion on other actors to determine the content of federal law, “has had one good year, and 211 bad ones (and counting).”1 The “one good year,” he said, was 1935, when the Court twice held unconstitutional certain provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act that gave the president power to approve or create codes of conduct for essentially all American businesses, subject only to very vague, and often contradictory, statutory exhortations to pursue …

Revisionist History? Responding To Gun Violence Under Historical Limitations, Michael Ulrich

Faculty Scholarship

In the D.C. Circuit case Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), Judge Kavanaugh wrote that “Heller and McDonald leave little doubt that courts are to assess gun bans and regulations based on text, history, and tradition, not by a balancing test such as strict or intermediate scrutiny.” Now Justice Kavanaugh, will he find support on the highest court for what was then a dissenting view? Chief Justice Roberts, during oral arguments for Heller I, asked “Isn’t it enough to…look at the various regulations that were available at the time…and determine how these—how this restriction and the scope of this …

Aedpa As Forum Allocation: The Textual And Structural Case For Overruling Williams V. Taylor, Carlos Manuel Vázquez

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In Williams v. Taylor, the Supreme Court read a section of the Anti- Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) to change the long-prevailing de novo standard of review of federal habeas petitions by state prisoners. In holding that Congress had denied the lower federal courts the power to grant habeas relief to prisoners in custody pursuant to wrong but reasonable state court decisions, the Court departed from the provision’s text and relied instead on its perception of a generalized congressional purpose to cut back on habeas relief and on the non-redundancy canon of statutory construction. On both scores, …