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Full-Text Articles in Constitutional Law

Administrative Balance, David Russell Aug 2019

Administrative Balance, David Russell

Arkansas Law Review

Two of the most discussed administrative-law theories in contemporary discussion are executive preemption and big waiver. Executive preemption is the idea that agency regulations preempt state law by extension of the federal statutes the agencies are charged with enforcing. Big waiver is the idea that Congress delegates, to administrative agencies, the power to waive statutory provisions. The constitutional questions raised by executive preemption and big waiver can be put in the following terms. Executive preemption raises constitutional issues as regulatory agencies go farther and farther away from the “clear statement” of a given statute. Thus, one wonders whether agencies are …


Recent Developments, Raelynn J. Hillhouse Jul 2019

Recent Developments, Raelynn J. Hillhouse

Arkansas Law Review

No abstract provided.


A Constellation Of Benefits And A Universe Of Equal Protection: The Extension Of The Right To Marry Under Pavan V. Smith, Brad Aldridge Jul 2019

A Constellation Of Benefits And A Universe Of Equal Protection: The Extension Of The Right To Marry Under Pavan V. Smith, Brad Aldridge

Arkansas Law Review

In 2015, the Supreme Court of the United States in Obergefell v. Hodges recognized the constitutional right of all persons, including same-sex couples, to lawfully marry. In 2017, in Pavan v. Smith, the Court recognized that Obergefell extends that right to much more than the act of marriage in itself. Any person who would have been denied the right to marry the person of her choice before Obergefell now enjoys not only the rights of marriage licensing and recognition, but also the full “constellation” of rights and responsibilities that attend marriage among traditional opposite-sex couples. The Court believed that this …


What Fema Should Do After Puerto Rico: Toward Critical Administrative Constitutionalism, Yxta Maya Murray Jul 2019

What Fema Should Do After Puerto Rico: Toward Critical Administrative Constitutionalism, Yxta Maya Murray

Arkansas Law Review

The 200th anniversary of the 1819 Supreme Court decision McCulloch v. Maryland offers scholars a special opportunity to study the shortcomings of the federal The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as they were revealed by FEMA’s failures in Puerto Rico during and after Hurricane Maria. Under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, as it has been interpreted by McCulloch, a law passed by Congress must be necessary and proper for executing its powers. In light of the expansive capacities allotted for disaster relief under the Stafford Act, and the catastrophic failure of FEMA to provide …


Overruling Mcculloch?, Mark A. Graber Jul 2019

Overruling Mcculloch?, Mark A. Graber

Arkansas Law Review

Daniel Webster warned Whig associates in 1841 that the Supreme Court would likely declare unconstitutional the national bank bill that Henry Clay was pushing through the Congress. This claim was probably based on inside information. Webster was a close association of Justice Joseph Story. The justices at this time frequently leaked word to their political allies of judicial sentiments on the issues of the day. Even if Webster lacked first-hand knowledge of how the Taney Court would probably rule in a case raising the constitutionality of the national bank, the personnel on that tribunal provided strong grounds for Whig pessimism. …


M'Culloch In Context, Mark R. Killenbeck Jul 2019

M'Culloch In Context, Mark R. Killenbeck

Arkansas Law Review

M’Culloch v. Maryland is rightly regarded as a landmark opinion, one that affirmed the ability of Congress to exercise implied powers, articulated a rule of deference to Congressional judgments about whether given legislative actions were in fact “necessary,” and limited the ability of the states to impair or restrict the operations of the federal government. Most scholarly discussions of the case and its legacy emphasize these aspects of the decision. Less common are attempts to place M’Culloch within the ebb and flow of the Marshall Court and the political and social realities of the time. So, for example, very few …


The Confusing Language Of Mcculloch V. Maryland: Did Marshall Really Know What He Was Doing (Or Meant)?, Sanford Levinson Jul 2019

The Confusing Language Of Mcculloch V. Maryland: Did Marshall Really Know What He Was Doing (Or Meant)?, Sanford Levinson

Arkansas Law Review

All legal “interpretation” involves confrontation with inherently indeterminate language. I have distinguished in my own work between what I call the Constitution of Settlement and the Constitution of Conversation. The former includes those aspects of the Constitution that do indeed seem devoid of interpretive challenge, such as the unfortunate assignment of two senators to each state or the specification of the terms of office of representatives, senators, and presidents. I am quite happy to concede that “two,” “four,” and “six” have determinate meaning, though my concession is not based on a fancy theory of linguistics. It is, rather, a recognition …


Mcculloch At 200, David S. Schwartz Jul 2019

Mcculloch At 200, David S. Schwartz

Arkansas Law Review

March 6, 2019 marked the 200th anniversary of the Supreme Court’s issuance of its decision in McCulloch v. Maryland, upholding the constitutionality of the Second Bank of the United States, the successor to Alexander Hamilton’s national bank. McCulloch v. Maryland involved a constitutional challenge by the Second Bank of the United States to a Maryland tax on the banknotes issued by the Bank’s Baltimore branch. The tax was probably designed to raise the Second Bank’s cost of issuing loans and thereby disadvantage it relative to Maryland’s own state-chartered banks. Marshall’s opinion famously rejected the Jeffersonian strict-constructionist argument that implied powers …


Too Plain To Be Misunderstood: Sovereign Immunity Under The Arkansas Constitution, Robert C. Dalby Feb 2019

Too Plain To Be Misunderstood: Sovereign Immunity Under The Arkansas Constitution, Robert C. Dalby

Arkansas Law Review

The framers of the constitution certainly knew that instances of hardship would result from the prohibition of suits against the State, but they nevertheless elected to write that immunity into the constitution. The language is too plain to be misunderstood, and it is our duty to give effect to it. Given the fluid nature of the law, time is often the greatest enemy of clarity in court precedent. From law students to experienced judges, anyone who has tried to research the doctrine of sovereign immunity under the Arkansas Constitution has surely struggled with that enemy as they sift through the …


Medical Marijuana In Arkansas: The Risks Of Rushed Drafting, Carol Goforth, Robyn Goforth Feb 2019

Medical Marijuana In Arkansas: The Risks Of Rushed Drafting, Carol Goforth, Robyn Goforth

Arkansas Law Review

Arkansas voters passed the Arkansas Medical Marijuana Amendment to the state constitution in late 2016. Almost certainly, the vast majority of voters did so without reading or understanding the intricacies of the initiative, and instead voted simply to affirm their desire to permit the medical use of marijuana in the state. Among many other provisions, the amendment imposed a 120 day time limit (later extended by the Arkansas legislature to 180 days) within which the Arkansas Department of Health and other agencies were to adopt rules implementing the voter mandate. While six months might seem like plenty of time in …


The Constitutional Rights Of Advanced Robots (And Of Human Beings), R. George Wright Feb 2019

The Constitutional Rights Of Advanced Robots (And Of Human Beings), R. George Wright

Arkansas Law Review

Constitutional rights create and destroy otherwise available options for the rights-bearer, for governments, and for affected third parties. Thus, conferring a constitutional right always requires at least some minimal defense. But conferring a constitutional right can certainly be appropriate if the recipient of the right seems to deserve or otherwise qualify for the right in question, or if conferring the right makes sense on other, perhaps partly pragmatic, grounds.