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Articles 1 - 30 of 69
Full-Text Articles in Constitutional Law
The Roberts Court’S Anti-Democracy Jurisprudence And The Reemergence Of State Authoritarian Enclaves, Reginald Oh
The Roberts Court’S Anti-Democracy Jurisprudence And The Reemergence Of State Authoritarian Enclaves, Reginald Oh
Journal of Race, Gender, and Ethnicity
This Essay argues that the Roberts Court has been a pivotal institutional player in destabilizing constitutional democracy. It has enabled states to freely pursue agendas that are authoritarian in nature. And because authoritarianism is contrary to core principles of the Constitution, the Roberts Court’s constitutional jurisprudence has no basis in the Constitution and must ultimately be rejected.
Instead of taking steps to block authoritarian legislation and promote a fair and open political process, the Court has issued rulings catalyzing and reinforcing the authoritarian impulses of the former Jim Crow states. The Roberts Court has engaged in judicial review reinforcing authoritarianism, …
The Global Rise Of Judicial Review Since 1945, Steven G. Calabresi
The Global Rise Of Judicial Review Since 1945, Steven G. Calabresi
Catholic University Law Review
This article expands upon the theory put forth in Professor Bruce Ackerman’s book, Revolutionary Constitutions: Charismatic Leadership and the Rule of Law, in which he posits that twentieth century revolutions in a variety of countries led to the constitutionalization of charisma, thus binding countries to the written constitutions established by their revolutionary leaders.
Constitutional law scholar, Steven G. Calabresi, argues here that world constitutionalism, in fact, existed prior to 1945, and what is especially striking about the post-1945 experience is that the constitutionalism of charisma included not only the adoption of written constitutions, but also the adoption of meaningful …
The Constitution And Democracy In Troubled Times, John M. Greabe
The Constitution And Democracy In Troubled Times, John M. Greabe
Law Faculty Scholarship
Does textualism and originalism approach positively impact democracy?
Coronavirus, Civil Libertities, And The Courts: The Case Against Suspending Judicial Review, Lindsay Wiley
Coronavirus, Civil Libertities, And The Courts: The Case Against Suspending Judicial Review, Lindsay Wiley
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
Introduction: For obvious reasons, local and state orders designed to help “flatten the curve” of novel coronavirus infections (and conserve health care capacity to treat coronavirus disease) have provoked a series of constitutional objections — and a growing number of lawsuits attempting to have those orders modified or overturned. Like the coronavirus crisis itself, much of that litigation remains ongoing as we write this Essay. But even in these early days, the emerging body of case law has rather elegantly teed up what we have previously described as “the central (and long-running) normative debate over emergency powers: Should constitutional constraints …
Bans, Joseph Blocher
Bans, Joseph Blocher
Faculty Scholarship
In the universe of legal restrictions subject to judicial review, those characterized as fully denying some aspect of a constitutional right—bans—are often subject to per se rules of invalidity. Whether the subject of the restriction is a medium of expression, the valuable use of property, or a class of weapons, courts in such cases will often short-circuit the standard doctrinal machinery and strike down the law, even if it might have survived heightened scrutiny. Identifying laws as bans can thus provide an end run around the tiers of scrutiny and other familiar forms of means-ends analysis.
And yet it is …
Mcculloch V. Marbury, Kermit Roosevelt Iii, Heath Khan
Mcculloch V. Marbury, Kermit Roosevelt Iii, Heath Khan
All Faculty Scholarship
This article builds on recent scholarship about the origins and creation of “our Marbury”—the contemporary understanding of the case and its significance—to argue that Marbury is in fact wholly unsuited for the role it plays in Supreme Court rhetoric and academic instruction. While Marbury is generally understood to support aggressive judicial review, or actual invalidation of a government act, it offers no guidance at all for how judicial review should be employed in particular cases—in particular, whether review should be aggressive or deferential. The actual opinion in Marbury makes no effort to justify its lack of deference to the …
Reconsidering Judicial Independence: Forty-Five Years In The Trenches And In The Tower, Stephen B. Burbank
Reconsidering Judicial Independence: Forty-Five Years In The Trenches And In The Tower, Stephen B. Burbank
All Faculty Scholarship
Trusting in the integrity of our institutions when they are not under stress, we focus attention on them both when they are under stress or when we need them to protect us against other institutions. In the case of the federal judiciary, the two conditions often coincide. In this essay, I use personal experience to provide practical context for some of the important lessons about judicial independence to be learned from the periods of stress for the federal judiciary I have observed as a lawyer and concerned citizen, and to provide theoretical context for lessons I have deemed significant as …
African Courts And Separation Of Powers: A Comparative Study Of Judicial Review In Uganda & South, Joseph M. Isanga
African Courts And Separation Of Powers: A Comparative Study Of Judicial Review In Uganda & South, Joseph M. Isanga
Joseph Isanga
Achieving political stability in a transitional democracy is a fundamental goal, the resoluteness of which is in part maintained by courts of judicial review that are independent from political bias and devoid of deference to traditionally more powerful branches of government. The recent democratic transitions occurring in the African nations of South Africa and Uganda provide a unique, contemporary insight into the formation of a constitutional jurisprudence. This study is an examination of pivotal cases decided by the Constitutional Courts of South Africa and Uganda, the roles that these decisions play in political stability, and the potential for political bias …
African Judicial Review, The Use Of Comparative African Jurisprudence, And The Judicialization Of Politics, Joseph M. Isanga
African Judicial Review, The Use Of Comparative African Jurisprudence, And The Judicialization Of Politics, Joseph M. Isanga
Joseph Isanga
This Article examines African constitutional courts’ jurisprudence—that is, jurisprudence of courts that exercise judicial review—and demonstrates the increasing role of sub-Saharan Africa’s constitutional courts in the development of policy, a phenomenon commonly referred to as 'judicialization of politics' or a country’s 'judicialization project.' This Article explores the jurisprudence of constitutional courts in select African countries and specifically focuses on the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law, and presupposes that although judges often take a positivist approach to adjudication, they do impact policy nevertheless. The use of judicial review in Africa has been painfully slow, …
Still Living After Fifty Years: A Census Of Judicial Review Under The Pennsylvania Constitution Of 1968, Seth F. Kreimer
Still Living After Fifty Years: A Census Of Judicial Review Under The Pennsylvania Constitution Of 1968, Seth F. Kreimer
All Faculty Scholarship
The year 2018 marked the fiftieth anniversary of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1968. The time seems ripe, therefore, to explore the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s exercise of judicial review under the 1968 Pennsylvania Constitution. This Article constitutes the first such comprehensive exploration.
The Article begins with an historical overview of the evolution of the Pennsylvania Constitution, culminating in the Constitution of 1968. It then presents a census of the 372 cases in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has vindicated distinctive Pennsylvania Constitutional rights under the Constitution of 1968.
Analysis of these cases leads to three conclusions:
1. Exercise of independent constitutional …
High-Stakes Interpretation, Ryan D. Doerfler
High-Stakes Interpretation, Ryan D. Doerfler
All Faculty Scholarship
Courts look at text differently in high-stakes cases. Statutory language that would otherwise be ‘unambiguous’ suddenly becomes ‘less than clear.’ This, in turn, frees up courts to sidestep constitutional conflicts, avoid dramatic policy changes, and, more generally, get around undesirable outcomes. The standard account of this behavior is that courts’ failure to recognize ‘clear’ or ‘unambiguous’ meanings in such cases is motivated or disingenuous, and, at best, justified on instrumentalist grounds.
This Article challenges that account. It argues instead that, as a purely epistemic matter, it is more difficult to ‘know’ what a text means—and, hence, more difficult to regard …
From Parliamentary To Judicial Supremacy: Reflections In Honour Of The Constitutionalism Of Justice Moseneke, Peter G. Danchin
From Parliamentary To Judicial Supremacy: Reflections In Honour Of The Constitutionalism Of Justice Moseneke, Peter G. Danchin
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
An Empirical Study Of Implicit Takings., James E. Krier, Stewart E. Sterk
An Empirical Study Of Implicit Takings., James E. Krier, Stewart E. Sterk
Articles
Takings scholarship has long focused on the niceties of Supreme Court doctrine, while ignoring the operation of takings law "on the ground" in the state and lower federal courts, which together decide the vast bulk of all takings cases. This study, based primarily on an empirical analysis of more than 2000 reported decisions ovcr the period 1979 through 2012, attempts to fill that void. This study establishes that the Supreme Court's categorical rules govern almost no state takings cases, and that takings claims based on government regulation almost invariably fail. By contrast, when takings claims arise out of government action …
Majoritarian Difficulty And Theories Of Constitutional Decision Making, Michael C. Dorf
Majoritarian Difficulty And Theories Of Constitutional Decision Making, Michael C. Dorf
Michael C. Dorf
Recent scholarship in political science and law challenges the view that judicial review in the United States poses what Alexander Bickel famously called the "counter-majoritarian difficulty." Although courts do regularly invalidate state and federal action on constitutional grounds, they rarely depart substantially from the median of public opinion. When they do so depart, if public opinion does not eventually come in line with the judicial view, constitutional amendment, changes in judicial personnel, and/or changes in judicial doctrine typically bring judicial understandings closer to public opinion. But if the modesty of courts dissolves Bickel's worry, it raises a distinct one: Are …
What's A Lower Court To Do? Limiting Lawrence V. Texas And The Right To Sexual Autonomy, John Tuskey
What's A Lower Court To Do? Limiting Lawrence V. Texas And The Right To Sexual Autonomy, John Tuskey
Touro Law Review
No abstract provided.
Democracy-Assisting Judicial Review And The Challenge Of Partisan Polarization, Terri Peretti
Democracy-Assisting Judicial Review And The Challenge Of Partisan Polarization, Terri Peretti
Utah Law Review
This Article recommends abandoning the democracy-assisting idea and instead exploring ways to prevent the Court from being enlisted in extreme and unrepresentative causes. Reform ideas should focus on increasing and regularizing turnover on the Court and encouraging the selection of more representative Justices, an outcome made more likely by increasing the representativeness of the elected officials who choose the Justices. Absent a crisis, of course, it is highly unlikely that any such reforms will be adopted. Nonetheless, it is a worthwhile exercise to think about how to enhance representational and consensus-building processes in the presence of growing partisan polarization. And …
The Puzzling Presumption Of Reviewability, Nicholas Bagley
The Puzzling Presumption Of Reviewability, Nicholas Bagley
Articles
The presumption in favor of judicial review of agency action is a cornerstone of administrative law, accepted by courts and commentators alike as both legally appropriate and obviously desirable. Yet the presumption is puzzling. As with any canon of statutory construction that serves a substantive end, it should find a source in history, positive law, the Constitution, or sound policy considerations. None of these, however, offers a plausible justification for the presumption. As for history, the sort of judicial review that the presumption favors - appellate-style arbitrariness review - was not only unheard of prior to the twentieth century, but …
Reconciling Positivism And Realism: Kelsen And Habermas On Democracy And Human Rights, David Ingram
Reconciling Positivism And Realism: Kelsen And Habermas On Democracy And Human Rights, David Ingram
David Ingram
It is well known that Hans Kelsen and Jürgen Habermas invoke realist arguments drawn from social science in defending an international, democratic human rights regime against Carl Schmitt’s attack on the rule of law. However, despite embracing the realist spirit of Kelsen’s legal positivism, Habermas criticizes Kelsen for neglecting to connect the rule of law with a concept of procedural justice (Part I). I argue, to the contrary (Part II), that Kelsen does connect these terms, albeit in a manner that may be best described as functional, rather than conceptual. Indeed, whereas Habermas tends to emphasize a conceptual connection between …
Reconciling Positivism And Realism: Kelsen And Habermas On Democracy And Human Rights, David Ingram
Reconciling Positivism And Realism: Kelsen And Habermas On Democracy And Human Rights, David Ingram
Philosophy: Faculty Publications and Other Works
It is well known that Hans Kelsen and Jürgen Habermas invoke realist arguments drawn from social science in defending an international, democratic human rights regime against Carl Schmitt’s attack on the rule of law. However, despite embracing the realist spirit of Kelsen’s legal positivism, Habermas criticizes Kelsen for neglecting to connect the rule of law with a concept of procedural justice (Part I). I argue, to the contrary (Part II), that Kelsen does connect these terms, albeit in a manner that may be best described as functional, rather than conceptual. Indeed, whereas Habermas tends to emphasize a conceptual connection between …
The October 2008 Term: First Amendment And Then Some, Burt Neuborne
The October 2008 Term: First Amendment And Then Some, Burt Neuborne
Touro Law Review
Liberals must acknowledge a dirty little secret about American constitutional law; a secret that the Warren Court made apparent, though it had existed from the day John Marshall asserted the power of judicial review in a Constitution that says nothing about it. The secret is that there is no serious theory explaining or justifying what courts actually do when they strike down a statute as unconstitutional.
The Warren years were enormously important in moving the country forward. I do not know what we would have done without the wisdom and courage of the Court. But when you start looking for …
A Comment On "Legisprudence", Vlad F. Perju
Majoritarian Difficulty And Theories Of Constitutional Decision Making, Michael C. Dorf
Majoritarian Difficulty And Theories Of Constitutional Decision Making, Michael C. Dorf
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
Recent scholarship in political science and law challenges the view that judicial review in the United States poses what Alexander Bickel famously called the "counter-majoritarian difficulty." Although courts do regularly invalidate state and federal action on constitutional grounds, they rarely depart substantially from the median of public opinion. When they do so depart, if public opinion does not eventually come in line with the judicial view, constitutional amendment, changes in judicial personnel, and/or changes in judicial doctrine typically bring judicial understandings closer to public opinion. But if the modesty of courts dissolves Bickel's worry, it raises a distinct one: Are …
Constitutionalism: A Skeptical View, Jeremy Waldron
Constitutionalism: A Skeptical View, Jeremy Waldron
Philip A. Hart Memorial Lecture
On March 17, 2010, Professor Waldron, University Professor and Professor of Law at New York University, Chichele Chair of Social and Political Theory at All Souls College, Oxford delivered the Georgetown Law Center’s thirtith annual Philip A. Hart Lecture: “ Constitutionalism: A Skeptical View.”
Professor Waldron teaches legal and political philosophy at New York University School of Law. He was previously University Professor in the School of Law at Columbia University. He holds his NYU position conjointly with his position as Chichele Professor of Social and Political Theory at the University of Oxford (All Souls College). For 2011-2013, he is …
“To Remand, Or Not To Remand”: Ventura’S Ordinary Remand Rule And The Evolving Jurisprudence Of Futility, Patrick J. Glen
“To Remand, Or Not To Remand”: Ventura’S Ordinary Remand Rule And The Evolving Jurisprudence Of Futility, Patrick J. Glen
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
It is a foundational principle of administrative law that a reviewing court should not dispose of a petition for review or appeal on grounds not relied upon by the agency, and should not reach issues in the first instance not addressed administratively. In such circumstances, there is a strong presumption that the reviewing court should remand the case to the agency for further proceedings rather than reach out to decide the disputed issues. The United States Supreme Court explicitly extended operation of the “ordinary remand rule” to the immigration context in its 2002 decision in INS v. Ventura. Notwithstanding subsequent …
Deliberative Democracy And Weak Courts: Constitutional Design In Nascent Democracies, Edsel F. Tupaz
Deliberative Democracy And Weak Courts: Constitutional Design In Nascent Democracies, Edsel F. Tupaz
Edsel F Tupaz
This Article addresses the question of constitutional design in young and transitional democracies. It argues for the adoption of a “weak” form of judicial review, as opposed to “strong” review which typifies much of contemporary adjudication. It briefly describes how the dialogical strain of deliberative democratic theory might well constitute the normative predicate for systems of weak review. In doing so, the Article draws from various judicial practices, from European supranational tribunals to Canadian courts and even Indian jurisprudence. The Article concludes with the suggestion that no judicial apparatus other than the weak structure of judicial review can better incite …
The Myth And The Reality Of American Constitutional Exceptionalism, Stephen Gardbaum
The Myth And The Reality Of American Constitutional Exceptionalism, Stephen Gardbaum
Michigan Law Review
This Article critically evaluates the widely held view inside and outside the United States that American constitutional rights jurisprudence is exceptional. There are two dimensions to this perceived American exceptionalism: the content and the structure of constitutional rights. On content, the claim focuses mainly on the age, brevity, and terseness of the text and on the unusually high value attributed to free speech. On structure, the claim is primarily threefold. First, the United States has a more categorical conception of constitutional rights than other countries. Second, the United States has an exceptionally sharp public/private division in the scope of constitutional …
Under-The-Table Overruling, Christopher J. Peters
Under-The-Table Overruling, Christopher J. Peters
All Faculty Scholarship
In this contribution to a Wayne Law Review symposium on the first three years of the Roberts Court, the author normatively assesses the Court's practice of "under-the-table overruling," or "underruling," in high-profile constitutional cases involving abortion, campaign-finance reform, and affirmative action. The Court "underrules" when it renders a decision that undercuts a recent precedent without admitting that it is doing so. The author contends that underruling either is not supported by, or is directly incompatible with, three common rationales for constitutional stare decisis: the noninstrumental rationale, the predictability rationale, and the legitimacy rationale. In particular, while the latter rationale - …
Process Theory, Majoritarianism, And The Original Understanding, William Michael Treanor
Process Theory, Majoritarianism, And The Original Understanding, William Michael Treanor
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
In Radicals in Robes, Cass Sunstein posits that there are four primary approaches to constitutional interpretation: perfectionism, majoritarianism, minimalism, and fundamentalism.' The purpose of his eloquent and compelling book is twofold: Sunstein argues for minimalism, an approach that he contends makes most sense for America today; and with even greater force, Sunstein argues against fundamentalism, which he finds "wrong, dangerous, radical, and occasionally hypocritical."' The "Radicals in Robes" who are the targets of Sunstein's book are judges who embrace fundamentalism, which, in his view, embodies "the views of the extreme wing of [the] Republican Party."'
In Securing Constitutional Democracy: The …
Brief Of Law Professors David D. Cole Et Al. As Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner (Geneva-Enforceability), Hamdan V. Rumsfield, No. 05-184 (U.S. Jan. 6, 2006), David Cole, Julie R. O'Sullivan, Carlos Manuel Vázquez
Brief Of Law Professors David D. Cole Et Al. As Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner (Geneva-Enforceability), Hamdan V. Rumsfield, No. 05-184 (U.S. Jan. 6, 2006), David Cole, Julie R. O'Sullivan, Carlos Manuel Vázquez
U.S. Supreme Court Briefs
No abstract provided.
Constitutional Culture Or Ordinary Politics: A Reply To Reva Siegel, Robin West
Constitutional Culture Or Ordinary Politics: A Reply To Reva Siegel, Robin West
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
Reva Siegel's lecture, ‘Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the de Facto ERA,’ explores the interaction between the courts and social movements in creating constitutional meaning. In the primary part of this response I focus my comments on Siegel's three major contributions: First, the historical explanation of the source of the Court's authority in the development of the so-called de facto ERA; second, the articulation of a general, jurisprudential thesis regarding social contestation as a source of constitutional authority apart from text, history, and principle; and third, the quasi-sociological descriptive account of the form social …