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Articles 1 - 12 of 12
Full-Text Articles in Constitutional Law
Legitimate Interpretation – Or Legitimate Adjudication?, Thomas W. Merrill
Legitimate Interpretation – Or Legitimate Adjudication?, Thomas W. Merrill
Faculty Scholarship
Current debate about the legitimacy of lawmaking by courts focuses on what constitutes legitimate interpretation. The debate has reached an impasse in that originalism and textualism appear to have the stronger case as a matter of theory while living constitutionalism and dynamic interpretation provide much account of actual practice. This Article argues that if we refocus the debate by asking what constitutes legitimate adjudication, as determined by the social practice of the parties and their lawyers who take part in adjudication, it is possible to develop an account of legitimacy that produces a much better fit between theory and practice. …
Coordinating Injunctions, Bert I. Huang
Coordinating Injunctions, Bert I. Huang
Faculty Scholarship
Consider this scenario: Two judges with parallel cases are each ready to issue an injunction. But their injunctions may clash, ordering incompatible actions by the defendant. Each judge has written an opinion justifying her own intended relief, but the need to avoid conflicting injunctions presses her to make a further choice – “Should I issue the injunction or should I stay it for now?” Each must make this decision in anticipation of what the other will do.
This Article analyzes such a judicial coordination problem, drawing on recent examples including the DACA cases and the “sanctuary cities” cases. It then …
Hardball And/As Anti-Hardball, David E. Pozen
Hardball And/As Anti-Hardball, David E. Pozen
Faculty Scholarship
Talk of constitutional hardball is in the air. Ever since Brett Kavanaugh’s confirmation to the Supreme Court, liberal commentators have been pondering tactics such as impeachment, jurisdiction stripping, and especially “packing the court” to a degree that would have been unthinkable a few years ago. Senate Republicans have played vigorous hardball on Supreme Court appointments in the past two Congresses, most obviously by refusing to consider Merrick Garland’s nomination, and there is a strong desire among many Democrats to respond with equal or greater vigor.
A Nonoriginalism For Originalists, Jamal Greene
A Nonoriginalism For Originalists, Jamal Greene
Faculty Scholarship
Originalism is an ideology, not a practice. It is a brand, an affiliation, a set of background principles, an often unstated set of restorative commitments. As James Fleming says in his book, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, originalism is an "ism." As an "ism," Fleming writes, originalism did not exist before the 1970s: "Constitutional interpretation in light of original understanding did exist, but original understanding was seen as merely one source of constitutional decision-making among several-not as a general theory of constitutional interpretation, much less the exclusive legitimate theory."
This brief Comment on Fleming's book takes the practice Fleming identifies---"constitutional …
Constitutional Rhetoric, Jamal Greene
Constitutional Rhetoric, Jamal Greene
Faculty Scholarship
For close to a century, students of judicial behavior have suggested that what judges think is not altogether the same as what they say. Within the legal academy, this claim has long been associated with legal realists who have argued that the formal legal rules explicated in judicial opinions are at least partly epiphenomenal, masking the influence that the personal characteristics and dispositions of adjudicators exercise over legal outcomes. Political scientists have argued, variously, that such outcomes are determined by ideology, social background, or political, professional, or other institutional constraints.
The notion that at least some “extralegal” factors influence judicial …
Justice Stevens And The Obligations Of Judgment, David Pozen
Justice Stevens And The Obligations Of Judgment, David Pozen
Faculty Scholarship
How to sum up a corpus of opinions that spans dozens of legal fields and four decades on the bench? How to make the most sense of a jurisprudence that has always been resistant to classification, by a jurist widely believed to have "no discernible judicial philosophy"? These questions have stirred Justice Stevens' former clerks in recent months. Since his retirement, many of us have been trying to capture in some meaningful if partial way what we found vital and praiseworthy in his approach to the law. There may be something paradoxical about the attempt to encapsulate in a formula …
What Happened In Iowa?, David Pozen
What Happened In Iowa?, David Pozen
Faculty Scholarship
Reply to Nicole Mansker & Neal Devins, Do Judicial Elections Facilitate Popular Constitutionalism; Can They?, 111 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 27 (2011).
November 2, 2010 is the latest milestone in the evolution of state judicial elections from sleepy, sterile affairs into meaningful political contests. Following an aggressive ouster campaign, voters in Iowa removed three supreme court justices, including the chief justice, who had joined an opinion finding a right to same-sex marriage under the state constitution. Supporters of the campaign rallied around the mantra, “It’s we the people, not we the courts.” Voter turnout surged to unprecedented levels; the national …
Judicial Elections As Popular Constitutionalism, David E. Pozen
Judicial Elections As Popular Constitutionalism, David E. Pozen
Faculty Scholarship
One of the most important recent developments in American legal theory is the burgeoning interest in "popular constitutionalism." One of the most important features of the American legal system is the selection of state judges – judges who resolve thousands of state and federal constitutional questions each year – by popular election. Although a large literature addresses each of these subjects, scholarship has rarely bridged the two. Hardly anyone has evaluated judicial elections in light of popular constitutionalism, or vice versa.
This Article undertakes that thought experiment. Conceptualizing judicial elections as instruments of popular constitutionalism, the Article aims to show, …
The Best Defense: Why Elected Courts Should Lead Recusal Reform, Deborah Goldberg, James J. Sample, David Pozen
The Best Defense: Why Elected Courts Should Lead Recusal Reform, Deborah Goldberg, James J. Sample, David Pozen
Faculty Scholarship
In recent years, we have seen an escalation of attacks on the independence of the judiciary. Government officials and citizens who have been upset by the substance of judicial decisions are increasingly seeking to rein in the courts by limiting their jurisdiction over controversial matters, soliciting pre-election commitments from judicial candidates, and drafting ballot initiatives with sanctions for judges who make unpopular rulings. Many of these efforts betray ignorance at best, or defiance at worst, of traditional principles of separation of powers and constitutional protections against tyranny of the majority.
The attacks are fueled in part by the growing influence …
Originalism, Stare Decisis And The Promotion Of Judicial Restraint, Thomas W. Merrill
Originalism, Stare Decisis And The Promotion Of Judicial Restraint, Thomas W. Merrill
Faculty Scholarship
If we consider constitutional law as a practice, it is clear that both originalism and precedent play an important role. Neither one is going to vanquish the other, at least not any time soon. We can engage in academic debate about originalism versus stare decisis, as if they were rival modes of interpretation that could operate to the exclusion of the other. But the question of practical importance is one of degree and emphasis: in cases where these two sources of authority arguably point in different directions, which one should have a greater claim to our allegiance?
Originalism – interpreting …
Judicial Campaign Codes After Republican Party Of Minnesota V. White, Richard Briffault
Judicial Campaign Codes After Republican Party Of Minnesota V. White, Richard Briffault
Faculty Scholarship
The vast majority of judicial offices in the United States are subject to election. The votes of the people select or retain at least some judges in thirty-nine states, and all judges are elected in twenty-one states. By one count, 87% of the state and local judges in the United States have to face the voters at some point if they want to win or remain in office. Judicial elections, however, differ from elections for legislative or executive offices in a number of significant ways. In nineteen states, most judges are initially appointed but must later go before the voters …
Comment On Professor Van Alstyne's Paper, Henry P. Monaghan
Comment On Professor Van Alstyne's Paper, Henry P. Monaghan
Faculty Scholarship
My major difficulty with Professor Van Alstyne's paper is its incomplete character. In the end, he makes only two points: first, judges are authorized to apply "this Constitution," not to do justice; and second, judges should not lie about what they are doing. The danger is that after a while the first point sounds somewhat empty, while the actual content of the second point seems entirely parasitic on the first.