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Articles 1 - 11 of 11

Full-Text Articles in Constitutional Law

The Power Of Dignity, Elizabeth B. Cooper Oct 2015

The Power Of Dignity, Elizabeth B. Cooper

Fordham Law Review

This Essay juxtaposes the historical and judicial equating of homosexuality and stigma with the Court’s development of a jurisprudence of dignity for gay men and lesbians, culminating in its decision in Obergefell v. Hodges. The language of Obergefell reflects an acceptance of and respect for gay men and lesbians that—regardless of one’s actual desire to marry or attitudes toward the institution of marriage—will profoundly change not only how the law treats LGB individuals, but also how we are treated by others, as well as how we perceive ourselves. I do not mean to assert that Obergefell is without its …


Perspectives On Marriage Equality And The Supreme Court, The Editors Oct 2015

Perspectives On Marriage Equality And The Supreme Court, The Editors

Fordham Law Review

On June 26, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Obergefell v. Hodges, one of the most significant civil rights decisions in recent years. For many of our generation, the Court’s conclusion that same-sex couples enjoy the constitutional right to marry simply confirmed deeply held beliefs about the importance of marriage equality and inclusion for all. We recognize, however, that for American society more broadly, the decision has evoked strong feelings on both sides of the marriage equality debate. For some, Obergefell delivered a unique gift that was unimaginable even a few decades ago: the ability of same-sex couples to …


Hail Marriage And Farewell, Ethan J. Leib Oct 2015

Hail Marriage And Farewell, Ethan J. Leib

Fordham Law Review

My conclusion in what follows is that, notwithstanding much rhetoric in the opinion, states have some room to rethink marriage in light of marriage equality. And with some intellectual jujitsu, this opening to rethink the state’s place in relational ordering gives marriage-skeptics another bite at the apple to get something they wanted all along: to decenter the largely religious, gendered, and bourgeois institution of marriage. Justice Kennedy’s opinion has the unfortunate result of reaffirming marriage at the top of a relational hierarchy, yet there are surely other ways we can have civil rights and equality for gay people without marriage …


Up From Marriage: Freedom, Solitude, And Individual Autonomy In The Shadow Of Marriage Equality, Catherine Powell Oct 2015

Up From Marriage: Freedom, Solitude, And Individual Autonomy In The Shadow Of Marriage Equality, Catherine Powell

Fordham Law Review

Obergefell v. Hodges represents a tremendous victory for those of us who believe that each individual has the right to love, form bonds, and create families with whomever one so desires. Through Obergefell and the line of cases from Griswold v. Connecticut and Loving v. Virginia onward, the Court has now repeatedly affirmed the freedoms to plan, to choose, and to create one’s own family as fundamental.


Roberts, Kennedy, And The Subtle Differences That Matter In Obergefell, Joseph Landau Oct 2015

Roberts, Kennedy, And The Subtle Differences That Matter In Obergefell, Joseph Landau

Fordham Law Review

By upholding a nationwide right to marry for same-sex couples in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court’s enormously significant decision resolves a major civil rights question that has percolated through our legal system and coursed through our culture for some time. The ruling was not an unforeseen outcome, but it brings welcome clarity by ensuring marriage rights for same-sex couples throughout all fifty states. Building on United States v. Windsor—a 2013 decision striking down section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which prevented gay and lesbian married couples from receiving federal benefits—Obergefell is an important and …


Appellate Division, Fourth Department, People V. Allen, Joaquin Orellana Apr 2015

Appellate Division, Fourth Department, People V. Allen, Joaquin Orellana

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.


Does The Public Care How The Supreme Court Reasons? Empirical Evidence From A National Experiment And Normative Concerns In The Case Of Same-Sex Marriage, Courtney Megan Cahill, Geoffrey Christopher Rapp Jan 2015

Does The Public Care How The Supreme Court Reasons? Empirical Evidence From A National Experiment And Normative Concerns In The Case Of Same-Sex Marriage, Courtney Megan Cahill, Geoffrey Christopher Rapp

Scholarly Publications

Can the Supreme Court influence the public’s reception of decisions vindicating rights in high-salience contexts, like samesex marriage, by reasoning in one way over another? Will the people’s disagreement with those decisions—and, by extension, societal backlash against them—be dampened if the Court deploys universalizing liberty rationales rather than essentializing equality rationales? Finally, even if Supreme Court reasoning does resonate with the people as a descriptive matter, should the Court minimize anxiety-producing characteristics in decisions vindicating civil rights—such as homosexuality in the marriage-equality context—simply in order to assuage the people?

This Article combines constitutional theory and empirical legal analysis to ask …


Preventing Balkanization Or Facilitating Racial Domination: A Critique Of The New Equal Protection, Darren L. Hutchinson Jan 2015

Preventing Balkanization Or Facilitating Racial Domination: A Critique Of The New Equal Protection, Darren L. Hutchinson

Faculty Articles

The Supreme Court requires that equal protection plaintiffs prove defendants acted with discriminatory intent. The intent rule has insulated from judicial invalidation numerous policies that harmfully impact racial and ethnic minorities. Court doctrine also mandates that state actors generally remain colorblind. The colorblindness doctrine has led to the judicial invalidation of policies designed to ameliorate the conditions of racial inequality. Taken together, these two equality doctrines facilitate racial domination. The Court justifies this outcome on the ground that the Constitution does not protect "group rights. "

Constitutional law theorists have criticized these aspects of equal protection doctrine. Recently, however, some …


Obergefell'S Conservatism: Reifying Familial Fronts, Clare Huntington Jan 2015

Obergefell'S Conservatism: Reifying Familial Fronts, Clare Huntington

Fordham Law Review

I am delighted with the result in Obergefell v. Hodges, but I am unhappy with the Court’s reasoning. In lieu of a straightforward, and far more defensible, decision based purely on the Equal Protection Clause, Justice Kennedy’s reliance on the Due Process Clause is deeply problematic.


Race, Dignity, And The Right To Marry, Robin A. Lenhardt Jan 2015

Race, Dignity, And The Right To Marry, Robin A. Lenhardt

Fordham Law Review

Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges asserts legal marriage’s capacity to afford same-sex couples a measure of “equal dignity” and belonging too long denied. In this Essay, I ask whether there is any reason to believe that marriage could do the same for African Americans. Could broader entrance into marriage, as some conservatives suggest, provide Blacks—gay and straight—a measure of belonging that has been frustratingly elusive, even as the nation prepares to celebrate the one hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the Thirteenth Amendment’s ratification?


Bait And Switch: Why United States V. Morrison Is Wrong About Section Five, Kermit Roosevelt Iii Jan 2015

Bait And Switch: Why United States V. Morrison Is Wrong About Section Five, Kermit Roosevelt Iii

All Faculty Scholarship

As the title suggests, the article examines Morrison’s creation of the rule that the Section Five power cannot be used to regulate private individuals. This is one of the most meaningful and, thus far, durable constraints that the Court has placed on federal power. It is the more surprising, then, that it turns out to be based on essentially nothing at all. The Morrison Court asserted that its rule was derived by—indeed, “controlled by”—precedent, but a closer reading of the Reconstruction-era decisions it cites shows that this is simply not the case. An independent evaluation of the rule against regulation …