Constitutional Law Commons^™

Religion In The Workplace: A Report On The Layers Of Relevant Law In The United States, William W. Van Alstyne

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

The Public's Domain In Trademark Law: A First Amendment Theory Of The Consumer, Laura A. Heymann

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Tinker And Viewpoint Discrimination, John E. Taylor

Law Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Nobody's Fools: The Rational Audience As First Amendment Ideal, Lyrissa Lidsky

Faculty Publications

Assumptions about audiences shape the outcomes of First Amendment cases. Yet the Supreme Court rarely specifies what its assumptions about audiences are, much less attempts to justify them. Drawing on literary theory, this Article identifies and defends two critical assumptions that emerge from First Amendment cases involving so-called "core" speech. The first is that audiences are capable of rationally assessing the truth, quality, and credibility of core speech. The second is that more speech is generally preferable to less. These assumptions, which I refer to collectively as the rational audience model, lie at the heart of the "marketplace of ideas" …

Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government's Control Of Its Workers' Speech To Protect Its Own Expression, Helen Norton

Publications

This Article identifies a key doctrinal shift in courts' treatment of public employees' First Amendment claims--a shift that imperils the public's interest in transparent government as well as the free speech rights of more than twenty million government workers. In the past, courts interpreted the First Amendment to permit governmental discipline of public employee speech on matters of public interest only when such speech undermined the government employer's interest in efficiently providing public services. In contrast, courts now increasingly focus on--and defer to--government's claim to control its workers' expression to protect its own speech.

More specifically, courts increasingly permit government …

House Of Wisdom Or A House Of Cards? Why Teaching Islam In U.S. Foreign Detention Facilities Violates The Establishment Clause, Scott Thompson

Publications

In an attempt to erase Islamic-fundamentalist sentiments held by detainees apprehended in the course of the "war on terror," the United States government began teaching and preaching a more moderate version of the Qur'an and Islam to detainees in Iraq. One such detention program in Iraq was dubbed the House of Wisdom. But the wisdom of such a practice is highly suspect--both because it likely runs afoul of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and because it may be doing more harm than good to the American effort to defuse Islamic-extremism and anti-American sentiment. This Article examines the practice …

Justice Sutherland Reconsidered, 62 Vand. L. Rev. 639 (2009), Samuel R. Olken

UIC Law Open Access Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Words "Which By Their Very Utterance Inflict Injury": Evolving Treatment Of Inherently Dangerous Speech In Free Speech Law And Theory, Rodney A. Smolla

Scholarly Articles

Not available.

Religion In The Workplace: A Report On The Layers Of Relevant Law In The United States, William W. Van Alstyne

Faculty Scholarship

This article reports on the thick layers of law applicable to claims of religious exception to public and private employment workplaces in the United States. It reviews the Supreme Court's First and Fourteenth Amendment salient holdings, distinguishing public sector (government) workplaces, and the extent to which legislative bodies may and may not oblige private employers to "accommodate" religiously-asserted requirements. It also provides exhaustive footnote analyses of all major federal statutes (plus some representative state and local law variations) pertinent to the topic. Its principal conclusions are these: In the currently prevailing view of the U.S. Supreme Court, neither public nor …

Excluding Religion: A Reply, Nelson Tebbe

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

This short piece replies to three prominent scholars who have offered thoughtful responses to my article, Excluding Religion. It first takes up their invitation to explore some of the ramifications of the article for legal and political theory, albeit in a limited way. Second, it revisits the article’s central argument - namely, that governments ought to have greater constitutional leeway to deny aid to religious actors and entities than is commonly thought - and shows how that proposal emerges from the conversation intact. Third, the reply defends certain limits on the practice of excluding religion, particularly the presumptive prohibition on …

Judicial Review, Local Values, And Pluralism, Richard W. Garnett

Journal Articles

At the Federalist Society's 2008 National Student Symposium, a panel of scholars was asked to consider the question, does pervasive judicial review threaten to destroy local identity by homogenizing community norms? The answer to this question is yes, pervasive judicial review certainly does threaten local identity, because such review can homogenize[e] community norms, either by dragging them into conformity with national, constitutional standards or (more controversially) by subordinating them to the reviewers' own commitments. It is important to recall, however, that while it is true that an important feature of our federalism is local variation in laws and values, it …

"Duty-Defining Power" And The First Amendment's Civil Domain, Timothy Zick

Faculty Publications

In Rethinking Free Speech and Civil Liability,1 Daniel Solove and Neil Richards attempt something truly ambitious. The authors seek to map coherent boundaries for the First Amendment’s vast civil domain. Their project merits serious attention. Currently, different rules apply to civil liability for speech depending on whether the liability arises in tort, contract, or property. Solove and Richards claim that these boundaries are unworkable, under-theorized, and in some cases destined to collide. They develop a framework for mapping the First Amendment’s civil domain that is based upon a distinction regarding the type of power the state exercises in various civil …

Guns As Smut: Defending The Home-Bound Second Amendment, Darrell A. H. Miller

Faculty Scholarship

In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment guarantees a personal, individual right to keep and bear arms. But the Court left lower courts and legislatures adrift on the fundamental question of scope. While the Court stated in dicta that some regulation may survive constitutional scrutiny, it left the precise contours of the right, and even the method by which to determine those contours, for 'future evaluation."

This Article offers a provocative proposal for tackling the issue of Second Amendment scope, one tucked in many dresser drawers across the nation: Treat the Second Amendment …

The First Amendment And Commercial Speech, C. Edwin Baker

All Faculty Scholarship

After a quick summary of constitutional treatment of commercial speech, this essay outlines four reasons why commercial speech should be denied First Amendment protection. Working from the claim that the primary rationale for constitutional protection of speech is the mandate that government respect individual freedom or autonomy, the essay argues: 1) that the individual does not choose, but rather the market dictates the content of commercial speech; 2) that the commercial speech should be attributed to an artificial, instrumentally entity – the business enterprise – rather than the flesh and blood person whose liberty merits protection; 3) market exchanges involve …

A 'Ho New World: Raced And Gendered Insult As Ersatz Carnival And The Corruption Of Freedom Of Expression Norms, Lolita Buckner Inniss

Publications

Carnivalization, a concept developed by literary theorist Mikhail Bakhtin and later employed in broad social and cultural contexts, is the tearing down of social norms, the elimination of boundaries, and the inversion of established hierarchies. It is the world turned upside down. Ersatz carnival is a pernicious, inverted form of carnival, one wherein counter-discourses propounded by outsiders are appropriated by elites and frequently redeployed to silence and exclude those same outsiders. The use of the slur "'ho" by gangsta' rappers in the performance of songs that articulate a vision of urban culture is an example of carnivalization. Thus, when words …

Smith, Stormans, And The Future Of Free Exercise: Applying The Free Exercise Clause To Targeted Laws Of General Applicability, Mark L. Rienzi

Scholarly Articles

Does the Free Exercise Clause extend to situations where the legislature deliberately targets a religious practice, but does so for neutral reasons and is willing to extend the ban to people who happen to engage in the same practice for non-religious reasons? While one can imagine reasonable arguments on both sides about the constitutionality of the Sunday morning alcohol ban, it seems absurd to say that the Free Exercise Clause is not part of the equation. Yet under the First Amendment analysis presently employed by many courts, that result is entirely likely.

No Tears For Creon, Marc O. Degirolami

Scholarly Articles

This essay critiques Professor Martha Nussbaum's book, Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America's Tradition of Religious Equality (2008). Nussbaum's thesis is that the entire tradition of religious liberty in America can be both best understood (as a historical exercise) and justified (as a philosophical one) by recourse to the overarching principle of equal respect-that "[a]ll citizens have equal rights and deserve equal respect from the government under which they live." Nussbaum insists that equal respect pervades the tradition and that all other values of religious liberty are subordinate to it. She examines various free-exercise and establishment issues in light …

Religious Freedom, Church Autonomy, And Constitutionalism, Richard W. Garnett

Journal Articles

Our topic at this symposium is "religion, the state, and constitutionalism"-not "the Constitution," or "the First Amendment," but "constitutionalism." Countless conferences, cases, books, and articles have wrestled with one version or another of the question, "how does our Constitution, with its First Amendment and its religion clauses, promote, protect, or perhaps restrain religion?" We are considering, it seems to me, a question that is different, and that is different in interesting and important ways: What are connections between religion and religious freedom, on the one hand, and constitutionalism, on the other?