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Articles 1 - 23 of 23
Full-Text Articles in Constitutional Law
Knick V. Township Of Scott, Alizabeth A. Bronsdon
Knick V. Township Of Scott, Alizabeth A. Bronsdon
Public Land & Resources Law Review
The Supreme Court overruled a 34-year-old precedent and sparked a sharp dissent by holding that a landowner impacted by a local ordinance requiring public access to an unofficial cemetery on her property could bring a takings claim directly in federal court. The decision eliminated a Catch-22 state-litigation requirement that effectively barred local takings plaintiffs from federal court, but raised concerns about government land use and regulation, judicial federalism, and the role of stare decisis.
Table Of Contents, Seattle University Law Review
Table Of Contents, Seattle University Law Review
Seattle University Law Review
No abstract provided.
Establishing Climate Change Standing: A New Approach, Ian R. Curry
Establishing Climate Change Standing: A New Approach, Ian R. Curry
Pace Environmental Law Review
Climate change is one of the thorniest political, legal, and economic issues of our time. Therefore, a new legal approach to the issue is required. This Note proposes a streamlined approach for climate change standing, one that assumes injury in fact and causation for a class of discernible climate change harms. A streamlined approach will enable litigants harmed by climate change to seek redress in court, providing an outlet for redress where there has previously been none. Part II of this Note discusses the constitutional doctrine of standing. It begins with a summary of Article III and the logic behind …
Due Process Supreme Court Rockland County
Due Process Supreme Court Appellate Division Third Department
Due Process Supreme Court Appellate Division Third Department
Touro Law Review
No abstract provided.
Due Process Supreme Court Appellate Division Second Department
Due Process Supreme Court Appellate Division Second Department
Touro Law Review
No abstract provided.
Due Process Supreme Court Appellate Division
Due Process Pringle V. Wolfe (Decided 28, 1996)
Due Process Pringle V. Wolfe (Decided 28, 1996)
Touro Law Review
No abstract provided.
Double Jeopardy Supreme Court Appellate Division Second Department
Double Jeopardy Supreme Court Appellate Division Second Department
Touro Law Review
No abstract provided.
Overruling Mcculloch?, Mark A. Graber
Overruling Mcculloch?, Mark A. Graber
Arkansas Law Review
Daniel Webster warned Whig associates in 1841 that the Supreme Court would likely declare unconstitutional the national bank bill that Henry Clay was pushing through the Congress. This claim was probably based on inside information. Webster was a close association of Justice Joseph Story. The justices at this time frequently leaked word to their political allies of judicial sentiments on the issues of the day. Even if Webster lacked first-hand knowledge of how the Taney Court would probably rule in a case raising the constitutionality of the national bank, the personnel on that tribunal provided strong grounds for Whig pessimism. …
M'Culloch In Context, Mark R. Killenbeck
M'Culloch In Context, Mark R. Killenbeck
Arkansas Law Review
M’Culloch v. Maryland is rightly regarded as a landmark opinion, one that affirmed the ability of Congress to exercise implied powers, articulated a rule of deference to Congressional judgments about whether given legislative actions were in fact “necessary,” and limited the ability of the states to impair or restrict the operations of the federal government. Most scholarly discussions of the case and its legacy emphasize these aspects of the decision. Less common are attempts to place M’Culloch within the ebb and flow of the Marshall Court and the political and social realities of the time. So, for example, very few …
The Confusing Language Of Mcculloch V. Maryland: Did Marshall Really Know What He Was Doing (Or Meant)?, Sanford Levinson
The Confusing Language Of Mcculloch V. Maryland: Did Marshall Really Know What He Was Doing (Or Meant)?, Sanford Levinson
Arkansas Law Review
All legal “interpretation” involves confrontation with inherently indeterminate language. I have distinguished in my own work between what I call the Constitution of Settlement and the Constitution of Conversation. The former includes those aspects of the Constitution that do indeed seem devoid of interpretive challenge, such as the unfortunate assignment of two senators to each state or the specification of the terms of office of representatives, senators, and presidents. I am quite happy to concede that “two,” “four,” and “six” have determinate meaning, though my concession is not based on a fancy theory of linguistics. It is, rather, a recognition …
Categorical Confusion In Personal Jurisdiction Law, Todd Peterson
Categorical Confusion In Personal Jurisdiction Law, Todd Peterson
Washington and Lee Law Review
In Part I, the Article discusses the history of the U.S. Supreme Court’s substantive due process limitations on personal jurisdiction and, in particular, the standards for corporate-activities-based jurisdiction before the Court’s recent cases on that issue. Part II discusses the Court’s failure to provide a convincing theoretical justification for imposing substantive due process limitations on personal jurisdiction. It also discusses the consequences of that failure in three doctrinal areas of personal jurisdiction law, the traditional basis of service on an individual in the forum state, specific jurisdiction and corporate-activities-based jurisdiction. Part III then analyzes in detail the four recent Supreme …
The Forgotten Property Right: The Unconstitutionality Of The At Home Standard In Assertions Of General Personal Jurisdiction Over Corporations, Peter Kuylen
Texas A&M Journal of Property Law
With its move to the “at home” standard in Goodyear, Daimler, and BNSF, the Supreme Court significantly restricted the exercise of general personal jurisdiction over nonresident corporation defendants. This restriction offers questionable actual benefits to corporate defendants, but its rigid focus on defendant’s rights has impacted the ability of certain plaintiffs to bring a cause of action against those defendants. Because the at home standard infringes on this group of plaintiffs’ ability to assert their property right of redress in violation of the Due Process Clauses of the Constitution (Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments), the Court should return to the previous …
The Federal Courts’ Rulemaking Buffer, Jordan M. Singer
The Federal Courts’ Rulemaking Buffer, Jordan M. Singer
William & Mary Law Review
Procedural rulemaking is often thought of as a second-order task for the federal court system, relevant to the courts’ work but not essential to their function. In reality, rulemaking plays an integral role in the court system’s operation by actively insulating the courts from environmental pressure. This Article explains how power over procedural rulemaking protects the federal courts from environmental uncertainty and describes the court system’s efforts to maintain the effectiveness of the rulemaking buffer in response to historical and contemporary challenges.
If The Shoe Fits: Rethinking Minimum Contacts And The Fsia Commercial Activity Exception, Jacqueline M. Fitch
If The Shoe Fits: Rethinking Minimum Contacts And The Fsia Commercial Activity Exception, Jacqueline M. Fitch
Washington and Lee Law Review Online
The question explored in this Note is whether, under the direct effect clause of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act commercial activities exception, a foreign sovereign must have minimum contacts with the United States in order for a U.S. court to assert personal jurisdiction over the entity. Examining personal jurisdiction over foreign states under the direct effect clause requires exploring the interaction between constitutional law and principles of international law. The minimum contacts analysis highlights the tension between applying constitutional due process protection to a foreign state, while simultaneously asserting jurisdiction over its commercial activities. Denying jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign …
O’Neill, Oh O’Neill, Wherefore Art Thou O’Neill: Defining And Cementing The Requirements For Asserting Deliberative Process Privilege, Andrew Scott
Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)
The government may invoke the deliberative process privilege to protect the communications of government officials involving policy-driven decision-making. The privilege protects communications made before policy makers act upon the policy decision to allow government officials to speak candidly when deciding a course of action without fear of their words being used against them.
This privilege is not absolute and courts recognize the legitimate countervailing interest the public has in transparency. The Supreme Court in United States v. Reynolds held that someone with control over the protected information should personally consider the privilege before asserting it but did not provide definitive …
The Past And The Present: Stare Decisis In Wisconsin Law, Daniel R. Suhr, Kevin Leroy
The Past And The Present: Stare Decisis In Wisconsin Law, Daniel R. Suhr, Kevin Leroy
Marquette Law Review
None
Table Of Contents, Seattle University Law Review
Table Of Contents, Seattle University Law Review
Seattle University Law Review
No abstract provided.
Consequences For Patent Owners If A Patent Is Unconstitutionally Invalidated By The Patent Trial And Appeal Board, Mark Magas
Chicago-Kent Law Review
There have been many constitutional challenges against the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) since it was created by the America Invents Act in 2011. While the merits of these challenges have been widely debated, there has been little analysis of what would happen if one of these challenges succeeded and patents are found to have been unconstitutionally invalidated. This note examines how issues with waiver, retroactivity, and finality may prevent patent owners from getting their patent rights back, considering the type of constitutional challenge and the different stages of the PTAB process. While the odds are stacked against patent …