Computer Law Commons^™

Facebook, Welfare, And Natural Monopoly: A Quantitative Analysis Of Antitrust Remedies, Felix B. Chang, Seth Benzell

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

This Article advances a novel theoretical model for assessing policy interventions against Facebook. As prosecutors barrel forward against digital platforms, soon it will fall upon courts and, eventually, regulators to devise remedies. We argue that any sensible solution must include quantification of the welfare effects on the platform’s various constituents. Our model prioritizes the effects upon total societal welfare—or, in economists’ terms, social welfare. Applied to Facebook, the model calculates social welfare as the sum of four components: (i) consumer welfare; (ii) advertising profits; (iii) tax revenues; and (iv) the value of a large user base.

Drawing on surveys of …

Speech, Innovation, And Competition, Greg Day

Scholarly Works

Critics contend that concentrated power in digital markets has generated threats to free speech. For a variety of reasons, market power is naturally thought to concentrate in digital markets. The consequence is that “big tech” is said to face little competition; Facebook controls 72 percent of the social media market while the parent of YouTube (72 percent of the video market) is Google (92 percent of the search market). This landscape has potentially vested private companies with unprecedented power over the flow of information. If Facebook, for example, decides to ban certain types of speech or ideas, it would potentially …

Industry Concentration And Information Technology, James Bessen

Faculty Scholarship

Industry concentration has been rising in the US since 1980. Does this signal declining competition and need for a new antitrust policy? Or are other factors causing concentration to rise? This paper explores the role of proprietary information technology (IT), which could increase the productivity of top firms relative to others and raise their market share. Instrumental variable estimates find a strong link between proprietary IT and rising industry concentration, accounting for much of its growth. Moreover, the top four firms in each industry benefit disproportionately. Large investments in proprietary software—$250 billion per year—appear to significantly impact industry structure.

Predictive Analytics, Daryl Lim

Faculty Scholarly Works

“Predictive Analytics” blends the latest research in behavioral economics with artificial intelligence to address one of the most important legal questions at the heart of intellectual property law and antitrust law – how do courts and agencies make judgments about innovation and competition policies? How can they better predict the consequences of intervention or non-intervention?

The premise of this Article is that we should not continue to build doctrine at the IP-antitrust on theoretical neoclassical assumptions alone but also on the reality of markets using all that AI has to offer us. Behavioral economics and AI do not replace traditional …

Antitrust, The Internet, And The Economics Of Networks, Christopher S. Yoo, Daniel F. Spulber

All Faculty Scholarship

Network industries, including the Internet, have shown significant growth, substantial competition, and rapid innovation. This Chapter examines antitrust policy towards network industries. The discussion considers the policy implications of various concepts in the economics of networks: natural monopoly, network economic effects, vertical exclusion, and dynamic efficiency. Our analysis finds that antitrust policy makers should not presume that network industries are more subject to monopolization than other industries. We find that deregulation and the strength of competition in network industries have removed justifications for structural separation as a remedy. Also, we argue that that deregulation and competition have effectively eliminated support …

Search Neutrality As An Antitrust Principle, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

Given the Internet's designation as "the great equalizer,"' it is unsurprising that nondiscrimination has emerged as a central aspiration of web governance.2 But, of course, bias, discrimination, and neutrality are among the slipperiest of regulatory principles. One person's bias is another person's prioritization. Fresh on the heels of its initial success in advocating a net neutrality principle,' Google is in the uncomfortable position of trying to stave off a corollary principle of search neutrality.' Search neutrality has not yet coalesced into a generally understood principle, but at its heart is some idea that Internet search engines ought not to prefer …

As Antitrust Case Ends, Microsoft Is Victorious In Defeat, Norman Hawker, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

As the final judgment in the celebrated Microsoft case ends, this piece very briefly assesses the impact of its remedy. When evaluated in terms of its most important goals, the remedy has proven to be a failure. Microsoft's monopoly power in the PC operating systems market is now as great as it was when the case was brought in 1998 or the remedy was ordered in 2002. The article also very briefly discusses the implications of this remedy for Google and AT&T.

Are Those Who Ignore History Doomed To Repeat It?, Peter Decherney, Nathan Ensmenger, Christopher S. Yoo

All Faculty Scholarship

In The Master Switch, Tim Wu argues that four leading communications industries have historically followed a single pattern that he calls “the Cycle.” Because Wu’s argument is almost entirely historical, the cogency of its claims and the force of its policy recommendations depends entirely on the accuracy and completeness of its treatment of the historical record. Specifically, he believes that industries begin as open, only to be transformed into closed systems by a great corporate mogul until some new form of ingenuity restarts the Cycle anew. Interestingly, even taken at face value, many of the episodes described in the …

The Intel And Microsoft Settlements, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

This article briefly compares and contrasts the recent U.S. Federal Trade Commission's antitrust settlement with Intel, and the antitrust cases brought against Microsoft. The article praises the FTC's settlement with Intel, and predicts that history will judge it very favorably compared to the settlement by the U.S. Department of Justice of its antitrust case against Microsoft.

The Price Of Abuse: Intel And The European Commission Decision, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

The May 13, 2009 decision by the European Commission ('EC') holding that Intel violated Article 82 of the Treaty of Rome and should be fined a record amount and prohibited from engaging in certain conduct, set off a predictable four part chorus of denunciations:

1. Intel did nothing wrong and was just competing hard;
2. Intel's discounts were good for consumers;;
3. The entire matter is just another example of Europeans protecting their own against a more efficient U.S. company; and;
4. Even if Intel did engage in anticompetitive activity, the fine was much too large. These assertions will be addressed in turn.;

Measuring Compliance With Compulsory Licensing Remedies In The American Microsoft Case, William H. Page, Seldon J. Childers

UF Law Faculty Publications

Section III.E of the final judgments in the American Microsoft case requires Microsoft to make available to software developers certain communications protocols that Windows client operating systems use to interoperate with Microsoft's server operating systems. This provision has been by far the most difficult and costly to implement, primarily because of questions about the quality of Microsoft's documentation of the protocols. The plaintiffs' technical experts, in testing the documentation, have found numerous issues, which they have asked Microsoft to resolve. Because of accumulation of unresolved issues, the parties agreed in 2006 to extend Section III.E for up to five more …

Is Europe Unfairly Attacking Another U.S. High Technology Company?, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

This short piece considers whether the EU antitrust action against Intel constitutes an example of European regulators attacking a successful US company in order to protect a European competitor, or whether it instead is an example of legitimate law enforcement.

World War 4.0: The Intel Antitrust Wars, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

This short piece gives an overview of antitrust actions filed around the world against Intel for allegedly undertaking anticompetitive actions in the market for X 86 PC chips.

Software Development As An Antitrust Remedy: Lessons From The Enforcement Of The Microsoft Communications Protocol Licensing Requirement, William H. Page, Seldon J. Childers

UF Law Faculty Publications

An important provision in each of the final judgments in the government's Microsoft antitrust case requires Microsoft to "make available" to software developers the communications protocols that Windows client operating systems use to interoperate "natively" (that is, without adding software) with Microsoft server operating systems in corporate networks or over the Internet. The short-term goal of the provision is to allow developers, as licensees of the protocols, to write applications for non-Microsoft server operating systems that interoperate with Windows client computers in the same ways that applications written for Microsoft's server operating systems interoperate with Windows clients. The long-term goal …

No Wonder They Dislike Us: Us Admonishes Europe For Protecting Itself From Microsoft's Predation, Albert A. Foer, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

This short article applauds the European Commission for holding that Microsoft violated European competition laws, and admonishes the U.S. for criticizing the Europeans for protecting themselves from Microsoft's anticompetitive activity.

Ub Viewpoint – Aol/Microsoft Settlement Could Harm Consumers, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The European Union’S Microsoft Case: No Time For Jingoism, Albert A. Foer, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Why Are We So Reluctant To "Execute" Microsoft?, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

On June 28, 2001, the D.C. Court of Appeals held that Microsoft has violated the antitrust laws repeatedly, relentlessly, and over a multi-year period. The court ruled eight separate times that Microsoft engaged in conduct that illegally maintained its monopoly in PC operating systems. Despite these strongly worded conclusions concerning Microsoft’s liability, the court was extremely cautious when it considered whether to break up the company. It held that divestiture was a “radical” remedy that should be imposed with “great caution.”

The Perfect Caper?: Private Damages And The Microsoft Case, Robert H. Lande, James Langenfeld

All Faculty Scholarship

As readers of crime novels know, there are many definitions of the perfect caper. Under most, the perpetrator gets to keep its ill-gotten gains and goes unpunished. Even if the perpetrator is arrested and brought to trial, he or she still typically escapes punishment completely due to a variety of unusual circumstances. This is essentially what Professors John E. Lopatka and William H. Page are arguing about Microsoft's actions. They assert that even though Microsoft has violated the antitrust laws, it will not be made to pay for its anticompetitive conduct, at least not by private plaintiffs.

Virtual Constitutions: The Creation Of Rules For Governing Private Networks, Michael I. Meyerson

All Faculty Scholarship

This article discusses the legal issues involving the owners of private computer networks. These issues include public/private network distinctions, First Amendment free speech issues, liability for computer network owners for improper speech posted on their networks, and anti-trust questions. The article analyzes the complexities that result from different forms of network ownership and the relationship of such networks to governmental entities.