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Articles 1 - 4 of 4
Full-Text Articles in Computer Law
Measuring Compliance With Compulsory Licensing Remedies In The American Microsoft Case, William Page, Seldon Childers
Measuring Compliance With Compulsory Licensing Remedies In The American Microsoft Case, William Page, Seldon Childers
William H. Page
Section III.E of the final judgments in the American Microsoft case requires Microsoft to make available to software developers certain communications protocols that Windows client operating systems use to interoperate with Microsoft's server operating systems. This provision has been by far the most difficult and costly to implement, primarily because of questions about the quality of Microsoft's documentation of the protocols. The plaintiffs' technical experts, in testing the documentation, have found numerous issues, which they have asked Microsoft to resolve. Because of accumulation of unresolved issues, the parties agreed in 2006 to extend Section III.E for up to five more …
Bargaining In The Shadow Of The European Microsoft Decision: The Microsoft-Samba Protocol License, William H. Page, Seldon J. Childers
Bargaining In The Shadow Of The European Microsoft Decision: The Microsoft-Samba Protocol License, William H. Page, Seldon J. Childers
William H. Page
The Microsoft-Samba agreement is by far the most important tangible outcome of the European Microsoft case. The EC’s other remedial order in the case, which required Microsoft to create a version of Windows without Windows Media Player, was an embarrassing failure. The Samba agreement, however, is significant because it requires Microsoft to provide, to its most important rival in the server market, detailed documentation of its communications protocols, under terms that allow use of the information in open source development and distribution. There is good reason to believe that Samba will be able to use the information to compete more …
Software Development As An Antitrust Remedy: Lessons From The Enforcement Of The Microsoft Communications Protocol Licensing Requirement, William H. Page, Seldon J. Childers
Software Development As An Antitrust Remedy: Lessons From The Enforcement Of The Microsoft Communications Protocol Licensing Requirement, William H. Page, Seldon J. Childers
William H. Page
An important provision in each of the final judgments in the government's Microsoft antitrust case requires Microsoft to "make available" to software developers the communications protocols that Windows client operating systems use to interoperate "natively" (that is, without adding software) with Microsoft server operating systems in corporate networks or over the Internet. The short-term goal of the provision is to allow developers, as licensees of the protocols, to write applications for non-Microsoft server operating systems that interoperate with Windows client computers in the same ways that applications written for Microsoft's server operating systems interoperate with Windows clients. The long-term goal …
Internet Regulation And Consumer Welfare: Innovation, Speculation, And Cable Bundling, John E. Lopatka, William H. Page
Internet Regulation And Consumer Welfare: Innovation, Speculation, And Cable Bundling, John E. Lopatka, William H. Page
William H. Page
The goal of telecommunications policy has shifted from the control of natural monopoly to the promotion of competition. But the question remains how extensive and persistent the government's regulatory role should be in the operation of communications markets. One might think that regulators could find the answer to this question in antitrust law. But antitrust has itself been torn between interventionist and laissez-faire tendencies. Over the past two decades, the dominant Chicago School approach to antitrust has focused on economic efficiency, a standard that has led to the abandonment or contraction of some categories of liability. More recently, however, post-Chicago …