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Full-Text Articles in Comparative and Foreign Law
China's 'Corporatization Without Privatization' And The Late 19th Century Roots Of A Stubborn Path Dependency, Nicholas Howson
China's 'Corporatization Without Privatization' And The Late 19th Century Roots Of A Stubborn Path Dependency, Nicholas Howson
Articles
This Article analyzes the contemporary program of “corporatization without privatization” in the People's Republic of China (PRC) directed at China's traditional state-owned enterprises (SOEs) through a consideration of long ago precursor enterprise establishments--starting from the last Chinese imperial dynasty's creation of “government-promoted/-supervised, merchant-financed/-operated” (guandu shangban) firms in the latter part of the nineteenth century. While analysts are tempted to see the PRC corporations with listings on international exchanges that dominate the global economy and capital markets as expressions of “convergence,” this Article argues that such firms in fact show deeply embedded aspects of path dependency unique to the Chinese context …
The Yukos Money Laundering Case: A Never-Ending Story, Dmitry Gololobov
The Yukos Money Laundering Case: A Never-Ending Story, Dmitry Gololobov
Michigan Journal of International Law
The Yukos case has unveiled the possible dangers of money laundering legislation in the hands of governments with transitional economies and weak democratic traditions. Even if the anti-money laundering laws of the country comply with international pronouncements to the letter, there are still a number of ways the laws could be used for the sole purpose of persecuting political opponents. In the Yukos case, the money laundering charges were interrelated with the charges of corporate tax evasion, which, taken separately, in Russia, represent a rather weak tool for suppressing the political opponents, but taken together they are perfect for the …
A Property Theory Perspective On Russian Enterprise Reform, Michael Heller
A Property Theory Perspective On Russian Enterprise Reform, Michael Heller
Book Chapters
Why have Russian enterprises performed so poorly since privatization? This is a problem with many answers, each independently sufficient: the bleak mix includes vacillating macroeconomic policy, endemic corruption, a corrosive tax structure, poor human capital, and so forth. Even well-performing companies must hide good results because visible profits or dividends provoke confiscatory taxation and mafia visits. In such a difficult environment, the rule of law generally, and corporate governance in particular, may seem not to count. Macroeconomic implosions dwarf subtle distinctions in corporate dividend rules or minority voting rights.
Corporate Governance Lessons From Russian Enterprise Fiascos, Merritt B. Fox, Michael A. Heller
Corporate Governance Lessons From Russian Enterprise Fiascos, Merritt B. Fox, Michael A. Heller
Articles
This Article draws on a rich array of deviant behavior in Russian enterprises to craft lessons for corporate governance theory. First, Professors Fox and Heller define corporate governance by looking to the economic functions of the firm. Based on this definition, they develop a typology that comprehensively shows all the channels through which bad corporate governance can inflict damage on a country's real economy. Second, they explain the causes of Russian enterprise fiascoes by looking to the particular initial conditions prevailing at privatization-untenable firm boundaries and insider allocation of firm shares-and the bargaining dynamics that have followed. This focus offers …
Reforming The State-Enterprise Property Relationship In The People's Republic Of China: The Corporatization Of State-Owned Enterprises, Deborah Kay Johns
Reforming The State-Enterprise Property Relationship In The People's Republic Of China: The Corporatization Of State-Owned Enterprises, Deborah Kay Johns
Michigan Journal of International Law
Part I of this Note first describes the problems that have prodded China to restructure its SOEs and then explains the root of those problems - the state-enterprise property relationship. This part concludes with a description of the unsuccessful attempts to date to reform that relationship. To understand why these efforts have met with little success, Part II explores the way in which most transition economies have attempted to address the ambiguity in the state-enterprise property relationship, by abolishing it through privatization. Although privatization is neither economically nor ideologically suited to China, experience with privatization does hold one lesson for …