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Articles 1 - 9 of 9

Full-Text Articles in Comparative and Foreign Law

Unraveling China's Capital Market Growth: A Political Economy Account, Tamar Groswald Ozery Jan 2019

Unraveling China's Capital Market Growth: A Political Economy Account, Tamar Groswald Ozery

SJD Dissertations

With modern, successful firms that operate globally and a capital market that is the second largest in the world, corporate governance in China has long passed the point of an “adjust or perish” prognostic. Yet its firm governance and capital market functions maintain strong idiosyncrasies that go against many fundamentals in economics and legal thought. These idiosyncrasies are products of the underlying configurations of China’s political economy and the shifts within it. Political economy in China has a determinant role on the ways corporate ownership is organized, firms operate, and the capital market functions. It is responsible for many of …


'Quack Corporate Governance' As Traditional Chinese Medicine – The Securities Regulation Cannibalization Of China's Corporate Law And A State Regulator's Battle Against Party State Political Economic Power, Nicholas C. Howson Jan 2014

'Quack Corporate Governance' As Traditional Chinese Medicine – The Securities Regulation Cannibalization Of China's Corporate Law And A State Regulator's Battle Against Party State Political Economic Power, Nicholas C. Howson

Articles

From the start of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) “corporatization ” project in the late 1980s, a Chinese corporate governance regime subject to increasingly enabling legal norms has been determined by mandatory regulations imposed by the PRC securities regulator, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). Indeed, the Chinese corporate law system has been cannibalized by all - encompassing securities regulation directed at corporate governance, at least for companies with listed stock. This Article traces the path of that sustained intervention and makes a case — wholly contrary to the “quack corporate governance” critique much aired in the United States …


Administrative Governance As Corporate Governance: A Partial Explanation For The Growth Of China's Stock Markets, David A. Caragliano Jan 2009

Administrative Governance As Corporate Governance: A Partial Explanation For The Growth Of China's Stock Markets, David A. Caragliano

Michigan Journal of International Law

This Note argues that during the first decade of stock market development (roughly 1990-2000) Chinese institutions, which emphasized administrative direction and control, functioned in lieu of legal and financial institutions. Preexisting modes of administrative governance introduced incentives that mitigated information asymmetry problems inherent in initial public offerings (IPOs) and contributed to enhanced market valuation during the post-IPO phase. The author focuses on two sui generis Chinese institutions employed during this time period: the quota system for equity share issuance and the Special Treatment (ST) system for underperforming issuers. In short, the thesis is that administrative governance substituted for corporate governance.


London As Delaware?, Adam C. Pritchard Jan 2009

London As Delaware?, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

Jurisdictional competition in corporate law has long been a staple of academic-and sometimes, political-debate in the United States. State corporate law, by long-standing tradition in the United States, determines most questions of internal corporate governance-the role of boards of directors, the allocation of authority between directors, managers and shareholders, etc.-while federal law governs questions of disclosure to shareholders-annual reports, proxy statements, and periodic filings. Despite substantial incursions by Congress, most recently in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, this dividing line between state and federal law persists, so state law arguably has the most immediate impact on corporate governance outcomes.


London As Delaware?, Adam C. Pritchard Jan 2009

London As Delaware?, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

In the United States, state corporate law determines most questions of internal corporate governance - the role of directors; the allocation of authority between directors, managers, and shareholders; etc. - while federal law governs questions of disclosure to shareholders - annual reports, proxy statements, and periodic filings. Despite substantial incursions by Congress, most recently with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, this dividing line between state and federal law persists, so state law arguably has the most immediate effect on corporate governance outcomes.


Corporate Taxation And International Charter Competition, Mitchell A. Kane, Edward B. Rock May 2008

Corporate Taxation And International Charter Competition, Mitchell A. Kane, Edward B. Rock

Michigan Law Review

Corporate charter competition has become an increasingly international phenomenon. The thesis of this Article is that this development in corporate law requires a greater focus on corporate tax law. We first demonstrate how a tax system's capacity to distort the international charter market depends both upon its approach to determining corporate location and upon the extent to which it taxes foreign source corporate profits. We also show, however, that it is not possible to remove all distortions through modifications to the tax system alone. We present instead two alternative methods for preserving an international charter market. The first-best solution involves …


A Property Theory Perspective On Russian Enterprise Reform, Michael Heller Jan 2001

A Property Theory Perspective On Russian Enterprise Reform, Michael Heller

Book Chapters

Why have Russian enterprises performed so poorly since privatization? This is a problem with many answers, each independently sufficient: the bleak mix includes vacillating macroeconomic policy, endemic corruption, a corrosive tax structure, poor human capital, and so forth. Even well-performing companies must hide good results because visible profits or dividends provoke confiscatory taxation and mafia visits. In such a difficult environment, the rule of law generally, and corporate governance in particular, may seem not to count. Macroeconomic implosions dwarf subtle distinctions in corporate dividend rules or minority voting rights.


Whither The Future Of Japanese Industrial Development Policies?, Merit E. Janow Jan 1984

Whither The Future Of Japanese Industrial Development Policies?, Merit E. Janow

Michigan Journal of International Law

This article describes past and present Japanese industrial policies. After discussing the evolution of Japanese industrial policies generally, it addresses the specific instruments of those policies including those intended to assist declining industries as well as those intended to promote the development of new industries. Finally, this article suggests that government guidance of Japan's industrial sector has decreased and is likely to decrease further still in the future.


Technology Diffusion And The Performance Of American Manufacturing: A Propsal For An Industrial Extension Service, Frank Ostroff Jan 1984

Technology Diffusion And The Performance Of American Manufacturing: A Propsal For An Industrial Extension Service, Frank Ostroff

Michigan Journal of International Law

The purpose of this article is to propose an Industrial Extension Service modeled upon the Agricultural Extension Service, and suggest how it might effectively address certain fundamental problems hindering the performance of the American manufacturing sector. Part I highlights some probable causes of American manufacturing's declining relative performance. Part II discusses why firms may adopt new technology more slowly than would be optimal. Part III considers the model of the Agricultural Extension Service, pointing out those features that make it attractive and those features that would have to be changed in applying it to the industrial sector. Part III also …