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Articles 1 - 11 of 11

Full-Text Articles in Communications Law

Market Power And Switching Costs: An Empirical Study Of Online Networking Market, Shin-Ru Cheng Oct 2021

Market Power And Switching Costs: An Empirical Study Of Online Networking Market, Shin-Ru Cheng

University of Cincinnati Law Review

In recent years, states have launched several antitrust investigations targeting digital platforms. A major difficulty in these investigations is demonstrating the extent of a digital platform’s market power. Market power is defined as the control of the output or the price without the loss of business to competitors. As will be explored in this Article, market power is a critical component in an antitrust analysis. On several occasions, courts have adopted the switching costs approach in their analysis of market power. According to this approach, market power may be inferred when the costs of switching from one supplier to another …


Apple And Amazon’S Antitrust Antics: Two Wrongs Don’T Make A Right, But Maybe They Should, Kerry Gutknecht Jan 2014

Apple And Amazon’S Antitrust Antics: Two Wrongs Don’T Make A Right, But Maybe They Should, Kerry Gutknecht

CommLaw Conspectus: Journal of Communications Law and Technology Policy (1993-2015)

No abstract provided.


Antitrust Review Of The At&T/Tmobile Transaction, Allen P. Grunes, Maurice E. Stucke Dec 2011

Antitrust Review Of The At&T/Tmobile Transaction, Allen P. Grunes, Maurice E. Stucke

Federal Communications Law Journal

In August 2011, the United States brought a landmark antitrust lawsuit to prevent the merger of two of the nation's four largest mobile wireless telecommunications services providers, AT&T Inc. and T-Mobile USA, Inc. But why are so many elected officials asking the Obama administration to intercede in the Department of Justice's lawsuit to force a settlement? Why are they approving a merger that would likely lead to higher prices, fewer jobs, less innovation, and higher taxes for their constituents? Does it have anything to do with the money they are receiving from AT&T and T-Mobile? This Article examines the recent …


Unfit For Prime Time: Why Cable Television Regulations Cannot Perform Trinko's 'Antitrust Function', Keith Klovers Dec 2011

Unfit For Prime Time: Why Cable Television Regulations Cannot Perform Trinko's 'Antitrust Function', Keith Klovers

Michigan Law Review

Until recently, regulation and antitrust law operated in tandem to safeguard competition in regulated industries. In three recent decisions-Trinko, Credit Suisse, and Linkline-the Supreme Court limited the operation of the antitrust laws when regulation "performs the antitrust function." This Note argues that cable programming regulations-which are in some respects factually similar to the telecommunications regulations at issue in Trinko and Linkline-do not perform the antitrust function because they cannot deter anticompetitive conduct. As a result, Trinko and its siblings should not foreclose antitrust claims for damages that arise out of certain cable programming disputes.


Essential Facilities And Trinko: Should Antitrust And Regulation Be Combined?, Timothy J. Brennan Dec 2008

Essential Facilities And Trinko: Should Antitrust And Regulation Be Combined?, Timothy J. Brennan

Federal Communications Law Journal

"The Enduring Lessons of the Breakup of AT&T: A Twenty-Five Year Retrospective."' Conference held at the University of Pennsylvania Law School on April 18-19, 2008.

The Supreme Court's 2004 decision in Trinko represented a radical change from prior doctrine ensuring that antitrust laws applied in regulated industries. The change resulted from a failure to appreciate that regulation and antitrust can be complements. Regulation can boost the value of antitrust by creating incentives to refuse to deal in order to reap monopoly profit otherwise proscribed by regulation. Ironically, the essential facilities doctrine rejected by the Trinko court and the Trinko decision …


Joint Statement Of Sumner M. Redstone Chairman And Chief Executive Officer Viacom Inc. And Mel Karmazin President And Chief Executive Officer Of Cbs Corp., Summer M. Redstone, Mel Karmazin May 2000

Joint Statement Of Sumner M. Redstone Chairman And Chief Executive Officer Viacom Inc. And Mel Karmazin President And Chief Executive Officer Of Cbs Corp., Summer M. Redstone, Mel Karmazin

Federal Communications Law Journal

No abstract provided.


Copyright And Antitrust: The Effects Of The Digital Performance Rights In Sound Recordings Act Of 1995 In Foreign Markets, Connie C. Davis Mar 2000

Copyright And Antitrust: The Effects Of The Digital Performance Rights In Sound Recordings Act Of 1995 In Foreign Markets, Connie C. Davis

Federal Communications Law Journal

The licensing of copyrighted nondramatic works by performance rights societies has long been recognized as a potential source of antitrust violations. In 1995, the Congress passed the Digital Performance Rights in Sound Recordings Act in an effort to deal with the licensing problems associated with nondramatic musical works. The DPRSRA created a right in sound recordings to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission as well as establishing compulsory licensing scheme. However, the DPRSRA failed to address the problem of licensing of nondramatic works in foreign markets. This Note identifies the anticompetitive licensing scheme practiced …


Antitrust And Communications: Changes After The Telecommunications Act Of 1996, Douglas B. Mcfadden Feb 1997

Antitrust And Communications: Changes After The Telecommunications Act Of 1996, Douglas B. Mcfadden

Federal Communications Law Journal

The 1996 Telecommunications Act is a return to competition in telephony which existed at the beginning of the century. The enactment of the '96 Act will significantly change the application of the antitrust laws to communications activities. Prior to the enactment of the '96 Act, telecommunications companies were somewhat immunized from full application of the antitrust laws regarding mergers and acquisitions because of regulation by the Federal Communications Commission and the state public utility commissions. Now, telephone companies will be fully subject to antitrust scrutiny under three schemes: the Clayton Act, the Hart-Scott- Rodino Act, and the FCC public interest …


Telecommunications In Transition: Unbundling, Reintegration, And Competition, David J. Teece Jun 1995

Telecommunications In Transition: Unbundling, Reintegration, And Competition, David J. Teece

Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review

The world economy is experiencing a technological revolution, fueled by rapid advances in microelectronics, optics, and computer science, that in the 1990s and beyond will dramatically change the way people everywhere communicate, learn, and access information and entertainment. This technological revolution has been underway for about a decade. The emergence of a fully-interactive communications network, sometimes referred to as the "Information Superhighway," is now upon us. This highway, made possible by fiber optics and the convergence of several different technologies, is capable of delivering a plethora of new interactive entertainment, informational, and instructional services that are powerful and user-friendly. The …


Five Conflicts Over Income Distribution In The Motion Picture-Television Industry, John Cirace Jan 1980

Five Conflicts Over Income Distribution In The Motion Picture-Television Industry, John Cirace

Villanova Law Review

No abstract provided.


Antitrust Enforcement, Freedom Of The Press, And The "Open Market": The Supreme Court On The Structure And Conduct Of Mass Media, William E. Lee Nov 1979

Antitrust Enforcement, Freedom Of The Press, And The "Open Market": The Supreme Court On The Structure And Conduct Of Mass Media, William E. Lee

Vanderbilt Law Review

This Article examines the Supreme Court's attempts to foster open markets by altering either the structure or the conduct of mass media enterprises." Structure and conduct are the two main determinants of market performance. Market structure "means those characteristics of the organization of a market that seem to exercise a strategic influence on the nature of competition and pricing within the market." Some characteristics of market structure include degree of buyer concentration, degree of seller concentration, degree of product differentiation, and entry conditions. Market conduct, on the other hand, comprises the practices, policies, and devices which firms employ in adjusting …