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Full-Text Articles in Commercial Law

Relational Contract Theory And Management Contracts: A Paradigm For The Application Of The Theory Of The Norms, Michael Diathesopoulos Jun 2010

Relational Contract Theory And Management Contracts: A Paradigm For The Application Of The Theory Of The Norms, Michael Diathesopoulos

Michael Diathesopoulos

This paper examines management contracts as a paradigm for the application of relational contracts theory and especially of the theory of contractual and relational norms. This theory, deriving from Macauley's implications, but structured and analysed by I.R. MacNeil gives us a framework for the explanation and understanding of contractual obligations and business relations' rules and practice. After presenting the key literature about the norms theory and especially defining the content of MacNeil's norms, we define management contracts as relations, characterised by a high relational element and we explain why, investigating all their features, which make them a suitable object for …


Bailment Or Lease: A Legal And Economic Analysis, Wei Zhang Jan 2010

Bailment Or Lease: A Legal And Economic Analysis, Wei Zhang

Wei Zhang

When customers temporarily deposit their personal properties with a business which collects a fee, either directly or by incorporating the charge into the price of its goods or services (such as a locker at the supermarket, a parking garage, or a bank safe deposit box), it has long been disputed whether a bailment or a lease contract arises between the two parties. In this paper, I tried to approach this problem from a law and economics perspective. Efficiency-oriented judges should establish rules motivating parties to take optimal precautions to minimize the social costs associated with the loss of the property. …


Relational Governance And Contract Damages: Evidence From Franchising, Adam B. Badawi Dec 2009

Relational Governance And Contract Damages: Evidence From Franchising, Adam B. Badawi

Adam B. Badawi

The literature on contract theory expects parties to use incentive mechanisms that minimize the costs of verifying breach in court if these mechanisms can effectively deter breach. This paper tests this hypothesis about relational governance in the context of franchising, an organizational form that provides parties with a suite of governance choices that span the range from those that require little or no verification to those that entail expensive and uncertain litigation. While relational governance options may be inexpensive, they may not be as effective as using incentives that require enforcement of written contracts, such as the threat of contract …