Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons™
Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Civil Rights and Discrimination
The Long-Term Implications Of Gonzaga V. Doe, Bradford Mank
The Long-Term Implications Of Gonzaga V. Doe, Bradford Mank
Faculty Articles and Other Publications
State and local governments are often responsible for disbursing federal medical, educational, and welfare benefits. What happens when they deny or revoke them unfairly? Some recipients have used 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a way to enforce the underlying statutes. The Supreme Court decision in Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002), made this more difficult. In doing so, the Court adopted stringent rules for the use of § 1983 to enforce any federal laws, including the nation’s civil rights laws.
Bait And Switch: Why United States V. Morrison Is Wrong About Section Five, Kermit Roosevelt Iii
Bait And Switch: Why United States V. Morrison Is Wrong About Section Five, Kermit Roosevelt Iii
All Faculty Scholarship
As the title suggests, the article examines Morrison’s creation of the rule that the Section Five power cannot be used to regulate private individuals. This is one of the most meaningful and, thus far, durable constraints that the Court has placed on federal power. It is the more surprising, then, that it turns out to be based on essentially nothing at all. The Morrison Court asserted that its rule was derived by—indeed, “controlled by”—precedent, but a closer reading of the Reconstruction-era decisions it cites shows that this is simply not the case. An independent evaluation of the rule against regulation …
A Deer In Headlights: The Supreme Court, Lgbt Rights, And Equal Protection, Nan D. Hunter
A Deer In Headlights: The Supreme Court, Lgbt Rights, And Equal Protection, Nan D. Hunter
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
In this essay, I argue that the problems with how courts apply Equal Protection principles to classifications not already recognized as suspect reach beyond the most immediate example of sexual orientation. Three structural weaknesses drive the juridical reluctance to bring coherence to this body of law: two doctrinal and one theoretical. The first doctrinal problem is that the socio-political assumptions that the 1938 Supreme Court relied on in United States v. Carolene Products, Inc. to justify strict scrutiny for “discrete and insular minorities” have lost their validity. In part because of Roe v. Wade-induced PTSD, the courts have …