Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Civil Procedure Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Civil Procedure

Religion And Procedure, Robert E. Rodes Nov 2013

Religion And Procedure, Robert E. Rodes

Robert Rodes

God has no use for procedural rules since He knows the full truth and is able to exercise absolute justice simultaneously alongside complete mercy. This paper discusses the religious significance of legal rules of procedure in light of this truth. It finds that since we, unlike God, are inherently fallible, we are forced to implement procedures in the legal pursuit of our goals of truth, justice, and mercy. These procedures remain imperfect in implementing these goals, as compromises must often be made between competing values such as mercy on one hand and justice on the other. Nevertheless, though legal procedure …


Intellectual Property Defenses, Alex Stein, Gideon Parchomovsky Oct 2013

Intellectual Property Defenses, Alex Stein, Gideon Parchomovsky

Alex Stein

This Article demonstrates that all intellectual property defenses fit into three conceptual categories: general, individualized, and class defenses. A general defense challenges the validity of the plaintiff’s intellectual property right. When raised successfully, it annuls the plaintiff’s right and relieves not only the defendant, but also the entire world of the duty to comply with it. An individualized defense is much narrower in scope: Its successful showing defeats the specific infringement claim asserted by the plaintiff, but leaves the plaintiff’s right intact. Class defenses form an in-between category: They create an immunity zone for a certain group of users to …


Evidence, Probability, And The Burden Of Proof, Ronald J. Allen, Alex Stein Dec 2012

Evidence, Probability, And The Burden Of Proof, Ronald J. Allen, Alex Stein

Alex Stein

This Article analyzes the probabilistic and epistemological underpinnings of the burden-of-proof doctrine. We show that this doctrine is best understood as instructing factfinders to determine which of the parties’ conflicting stories makes most sense in terms of coherence, consilience, causality, and evidential coverage. By applying this method, factfinders should try—and will often succeed—to establish the truth, rather than a statistical surrogate of the truth, while securing the appropriate allocation of the risk of error. Descriptively, we argue that this understanding of the doctrine—the “relative plausibility theory”—corresponds to our courts’ practice. Prescriptively, we argue that the relative-plausibility method is operationally superior …