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Articles 1 - 29 of 29
Full-Text Articles in Business Organizations Law
Are Passive Index Funds Active Owners? Corporate Governance Consequences Of Passive Investing, Giovanni Strampelli
Are Passive Index Funds Active Owners? Corporate Governance Consequences Of Passive Investing, Giovanni Strampelli
San Diego Law Review
The exponential rise of mutual funds designed to track stock indices has been one of the drivers behind the re-concentration of ownership of listed companies in the United States. Because of the high concentration of the passive index funds industry, the three leading passive fund managers—BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street—make up an increasingly important component of the shareholder base of listed companies. In spite of this however, it remains questionable whether they are actually interested in playing an active role in the corporate governance of investee companies. In fact, although passive investors are, by definition, focused on the long term …
The Public Cost Of Private Equity, William Magnuson
The Public Cost Of Private Equity, William Magnuson
William J. Magnuson
This Article presents a theory of the corporate governance costs of private equity. In doing so, it challenges the common view that private equity’s governance structure has resolved, or at least significantly mitigated, one of the fundamental tensions in corporate law, that is, the conflict between management and ownership. The Article argues that this widespread perception about the corporate governance benefits of private equity overlooks the many ways in which the private equity model, far from eliminating agency costs, in fact exacerbates them. These governance costs include compensation structures that incentivize excessive risk-taking, governance rights that provide investors with few …
The Diminishing Duty Of Loyalty, Julian Velasco
The Diminishing Duty Of Loyalty, Julian Velasco
Journal Articles
Fiduciary duties comprise an integral part of corporate law. It is generally understood that directors owe the corporation and its shareholders two fiduciary duties: the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. Although both duties are firmly established in corporate law, they are not treated equally. It is generally understood that the duty of loyalty is enforced far more rigorously than the duty of care. The justification for this dichotomy is twofold. First, differential treatment is appropriate because of the relative urgencies of the underlying subject matter: loyalty issues pose greater risks than do care issues. Second, the deference …
Trapped In A Metaphor: The Limited Implications Of Federalism For Corporate Governance, Robert B. Ahdieh
Trapped In A Metaphor: The Limited Implications Of Federalism For Corporate Governance, Robert B. Ahdieh
Robert B. Ahdieh
Trapped in a metaphor articulated at the founding of modern corporate law, the study of corporate governance has - for some thirty years - been asking the wrong questions. Rather than a singular race among states, whether to the bottom or the top, the synthesis of William Cary and Ralph Winter’s famous exchange is better understood as two competitions, each serving distinct normative ends. Managerial competition advances the project that has motivated corporate law since Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means - effective regulation of the separation of ownership and control. State competition, by contrast, does not promote a race to …
The (Misunderstood) Genius Of American Corporate Law, Robert B. Ahdieh
The (Misunderstood) Genius Of American Corporate Law, Robert B. Ahdieh
Robert B. Ahdieh
In this Reply, I respond to comments by Bill Bratton, Larry Cunningham, and Todd Henderson on my recent paper - Trapped in a Metaphor: The Limited Implications of Federalism for Corporate Governance. I begin by reiterating my basic thesis - that state competition should be understood to have little consequence for corporate governance, if (as charter competition's advocates assume) capital-market-driven managerial competition is also at work. I then consider some of the thoughtful critiques of this claim, before suggesting ways in which the comments highlight just the kind of comparative institutional analysis my paper counsels. Rather than a stark choice …
The Law And Finance Of Initial Coin Offerings, Aurelio Gurrea-Martinez, Nydia Remolina Leon
The Law And Finance Of Initial Coin Offerings, Aurelio Gurrea-Martinez, Nydia Remolina Leon
Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law
The rise of new technologies is changing the way companies raise funds. Along with the increase of crowdfunding in recent years, the use of Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) has emerged more recently as a new form to raise capital. Companies in the United States raised more than $4 billion in 2017 and over $6.3 billion were raised through ICOs in the first three months of 2018. In a typical ICO, a company receives cryptocurrencies in exchange for certain rights embodied in “tokens”, whose nature, treatment and implications are generating controversy among securities regulators around the world.
Whistling In The Wind: Why Federal Whistleblower Protections Fall Short Of Their Corporate Governance Goals, Meera Khan
Whistling In The Wind: Why Federal Whistleblower Protections Fall Short Of Their Corporate Governance Goals, Meera Khan
University of Miami Business Law Review
Teetering on the line between hero and villain, whistleblowers have a remarkably unusual role in contemporary American society. Those who blow the whistle on public sector activities, like Edward Snowden and the Watergate Scandal’s “Deep Throat”, are often vilified in history as treasonous and unprincipled rogues. In the private sector, however, whistleblowers are seen as moral compasses for corporate behavior, and are even afforded federal protections for speaking out against internal malfeasance. The piecemeal evolution of whistleblower legislation including the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 and the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 created regulatory and enforcement …
Do Institutional Owners Monitor? Evidence From Voting On Connected Transaction Proposals In Hong Kong-Listed Companies, Félix E. Mezzanotte, Simon Fung
Do Institutional Owners Monitor? Evidence From Voting On Connected Transaction Proposals In Hong Kong-Listed Companies, Félix E. Mezzanotte, Simon Fung
Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review
The conventional view in Hong Kong has been that institutional owners tend to be passive owners and that they do little to monitor the companies’ management. We investigated whether the presence of institutional owners in Hong Kong-listed companies was associated with greater monitoring of management through dissent voting by hand-collecting information for a sample (n= 96) of connected transaction proposals (“CT proposals”) and of their voting outcomes, as announced in the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong during the period from 2012–14. Our study shows that voting approval rates on CT proposals were lower (i.e. greater dissent voting) when institutional owners …
The Public Cost Of Private Equity, William Magnuson
The Public Cost Of Private Equity, William Magnuson
Faculty Scholarship
This Article presents a theory of the corporate governance costs of private equity. In doing so, it challenges the common view that private equity’s governance structure has resolved, or at least significantly mitigated, one of the fundamental tensions in corporate law, that is, the conflict between management and ownership. The Article argues that this widespread perception about the corporate governance benefits of private equity overlooks the many ways in which the private equity model, far from eliminating agency costs, in fact exacerbates them. These governance costs include compensation structures that incentivize excessive risk-taking, governance rights that provide investors with few …
Third-Party Institutional Proxy Advisors: Conflicts Of Interest And Roads To Reform, Matthew Fagan
Third-Party Institutional Proxy Advisors: Conflicts Of Interest And Roads To Reform, Matthew Fagan
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
With the rise of institutional activist investors in recent decades—including a purported 495 activist campaigns against U.S. corporations in 2016 alone—the role that third-party institutional proxy advisors play in corporate governance has greatly increased. The United States Office of Government Accountability estimates that clients of the top five proxy advisory firms account for about $41.5 trillion in equity throughout the world. For several years, discussions have developed regarding conflicts of interest faced by proxy advisors. For example, Institutional Shareholder Services, the top proxy advisory firm in the world, frequently provides advice to institutional investors on how to vote proxies while …
To Understand Us V. Microsoft, Consider 'Acme V. Shamrock', Peter B. Rutledge, Amanda W. Newton
To Understand Us V. Microsoft, Consider 'Acme V. Shamrock', Peter B. Rutledge, Amanda W. Newton
Popular Media
The February 27, 2018, Supreme Court argument in United States v. Microsoft Corp. raises profound questions about issues of executive power, corporate governance, technology, judicial power and international affairs. At stake for the government is the scope of its investigative authority to obtain information located in a foreign country, irrespective of that country’s laws. At stake for Microsoft is its ability to organize its international corporate affairs and the predictability of the laws that will govern those affairs. This article analyzes the potential effects of this critical Supreme Court case.
Contested Visions: The Value Of Systems Theory For Corporate Law, Tamara Belinfanti, Lynn A. Stout
Contested Visions: The Value Of Systems Theory For Corporate Law, Tamara Belinfanti, Lynn A. Stout
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
Despite the dominant role corporations play in our economy, culture, and politics, the nature and purpose of corporations remains hotly contested. This conflict was brought to the fore in the recent Supreme Court opinions in Citizens United and Hobby Lobby. Although the prevailing narrative for the past quarter-century has been that corporations “belong” to shareholders and should pursue “shareholder value,” support for this approach, which has been justified as essential for managerial accountability, is eroding. It persists today primarily in the form of the argument that corporations should seek “long-term” shareholder value. Yet, as this Article shows, when shareholder value …
The Cambridge Handbook Of Social Enterprise Law, Lloyd Histoshi Mayer, Paul B. Miller
The Cambridge Handbook Of Social Enterprise Law, Lloyd Histoshi Mayer, Paul B. Miller
Books
Book Chapters
Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Creating a Tax Space for Social Enterprise, in The Cambridge Handbook of Social Enterprise Law 157 (Benjamin Means & Joseph W. Yockey eds., 2018)
While still relatively few in number compared to traditional nonprofit and for-profit organizations, the rise of social enterprises represents a possible disruption of not only existing models of doing business but also areas of law that in many respects have seen little fundamental change for decades. One such area is domestic tax law, where social enterprises currently find themselves subject to the rules of for-profit activities and entities. Here, both scholars …
Greater Expectations: Strategies For Effective Board Meeting Preparation, Jonathan Kim, Marcel Bucsescu
Greater Expectations: Strategies For Effective Board Meeting Preparation, Jonathan Kim, Marcel Bucsescu
Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership
Directors face an increasingly complex environment in which their businesses operate. That complexity can present opportunities for corporations that adapt, and also places new pressures on boards to respond effectively. One strategy for directors to consider is to adapt their approaches to preparing for board meetings by focusing not just on company specific reporting and decisions, but also by acting as the “eyes and ears” for management on key issues for the company. This article makes practical suggestions for directors to consider as they approach their board meeting preparation with this broader view in mind.
Environmental And Social Sustainability In The Boardroom, Jon Lukomnik
Environmental And Social Sustainability In The Boardroom, Jon Lukomnik
Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership
The last 10 years has seen a remarkable shift in the attention and importance of social and environmental issues for public corporations. This has meant an increased focus by boards on these important matters.
Climate change, human rights, corporate political influence, and inequality are just some of the issues that are being raised by shareholders and other stakeholders. As calls for corporate transparency grow, how boards incorporate these issues into their decision making processes, disclose them, and address them from a risk perspective will continue to garner attention.
The Changing Landscape Of The Capital Markets, Barbara Krumsiek
The Changing Landscape Of The Capital Markets, Barbara Krumsiek
Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership
Much has been made of the rise of activist hedge funds over the past five years. But the shifts in the makeup of the investor community run much deeper than that, impacting both capital formation and capital deployment.
From the proliferation of hedge funds and the emergence of SRI and other new investment strategies, to the massive shift of funds to passive investors, the intermediation of the investment chain, and the concentration of ownership in the largest institutional investors, understanding the trend lines in the capital markets is integral to understanding where governance and the performance of public corporations goes …
The Shifting Tides Of Merger Litigation, Matthew D. Cain, Jill E. Fisch, Steven Davidoff Solomon, Randall S. Thomas
The Shifting Tides Of Merger Litigation, Matthew D. Cain, Jill E. Fisch, Steven Davidoff Solomon, Randall S. Thomas
All Faculty Scholarship
In 2015, Delaware made several important changes to its laws concerning merger litigation. These changes, which were made in response to a perception that levels of merger litigation were too high and that a substantial proportion of merger cases were not providing value, raised the bar, making it more difficult for plaintiffs to win a lawsuit challenging a merger and more difficult for plaintiffs’ counsel to collect a fee award.
We study what has happened in the courts in response to these changes. We find that the initial effect of the changes has been to decrease the volume of merger …
Too-Big-To-Fail Shareholders, Yesha Yadav
Too-Big-To-Fail Shareholders, Yesha Yadav
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
To build resilience within the financial system, post-Crisis regulation relies heavily on banks to fund themselves more fully by issuing equity. This reserve of value should buttress failing banks by providing a mechanism to pay off creditors and depositors and preserve the health of financial markets. In the process, shareholders are wiped out. Scholars and policymakers, however, have neglected to examine which equity investors, in fact, are purchasing bank equity and taking on the default risk of U.S. banks. This Article addresses this question. First, it shows that five asset managers - BlackRock, Vanguard, State Street Global Advisors, Fidelity and …
Individual Autonomy In Corporate Law, Elisabeth De Fontenay
Individual Autonomy In Corporate Law, Elisabeth De Fontenay
Faculty Scholarship
The field of corporate law is riven with competing visions of the corporation. This Article seeks to identify points of broad agreement by negative implication. It examines two developments in corporate law that have drawn widespread criticism from corporate law scholars: the Supreme Court's recognition of corporate religious rights in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby and the Nevada legislature's decision to eliminate mandatory fiduciary duties for corporate directors and officers. Despite their fundamental differences, both resulted in expanding individual rights or autonomy within the corporation-for shareholders and managers, respectively.
The visceral critiques aimed at these two developments suggest a broadly shared …
Distributed Ledgers, Traceable Shares, And The Division Of Power In Corporate Law, Christopher M. Bruner
Distributed Ledgers, Traceable Shares, And The Division Of Power In Corporate Law, Christopher M. Bruner
Scholarly Works
Review of Traceable Shares and Corporate Law, 113 Nw. U. L. Rev. __ by George S. Geis (forthcoming 2018)
Does Shareholder Voting Matter? Evidence From The Takeover Market, Paul Mason, Usha Rodrigues, Mike Stegemoller, Steven Utke
Does Shareholder Voting Matter? Evidence From The Takeover Market, Paul Mason, Usha Rodrigues, Mike Stegemoller, Steven Utke
Scholarly Works
Voting rights are a basic shareholder-protection mechanism. Outside of the core voting requirements state law imposes (election of directors and votes on fundamental changes), federal law grants shareholders additional voting rights. But these rights introduce concomitant costs into corporate governance. Each grant of a voting right thus invites the question: is the benefit achieved worth the cost the vote imposes?
The question is not merely a theoretical one. Recently the SEC, concerned about Nasdaq’s potential weakening of shareholder voting protections, has lamented that little evidence exists on the value of the shareholder vote. This Article provides that evidence. It examines …
From Corporate Law To Corporate Governance, Ronald J. Gilson
From Corporate Law To Corporate Governance, Ronald J. Gilson
Faculty Scholarship
In the 1960s and 1970s, corporate law and finance scholars gave up on their traditional approaches. Corporate law had become “towering skyscrapers of rusted girders, internally welded together and containing nothing but wind.” In finance, the theory of the firm was recognized as an “empty box.” This essay tracks how corporate law was reborn as corporate governance through three examples of how we have usefully complicated the inquiry into corporate behavior. Part I frames the first complication, defining governance broadly as the company’s operating system, a braided framework of legal and non-legal elements. Part II adds a second complication by …
Delaware's Retreat: Exploring Developing Fissures And Tectonic Shifts In Delaware Corporate Law, James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas
Delaware's Retreat: Exploring Developing Fissures And Tectonic Shifts In Delaware Corporate Law, James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Governance By Contract: The Implications For Corporate Bylaws, Jill E. Fisch
Governance By Contract: The Implications For Corporate Bylaws, Jill E. Fisch
All Faculty Scholarship
Boards and shareholders are increasing using charter and bylaw provisions to customize their corporate governance. Recent examples include forum selection bylaws, majority voting bylaws and advance notice bylaws. Relying on the contractual conception of the corporation, Delaware courts have accorded substantial deference to board-adopted bylaw provisions, even those that limit shareholder rights.
This Article challenges the rationale for deference under the contractual approach. With respect to corporate bylaws, the Article demonstrates that shareholder power to adopt and amend the bylaws is, under Delaware law, more limited than the board’s power to do so. As a result, shareholders cannot effectively constrain …
Corporate Governance, Capital Markets, And Securities Law, Adam C. Pritchard
Corporate Governance, Capital Markets, And Securities Law, Adam C. Pritchard
Book Chapters
This chapter explores the dividing line between corporate governance and securities law from both historical and institutional perspectives. Section 2 examines the origins of the dividing line between securities law and corporate governance in the United States, as well as the efforts of the SEC to push against that boundary. That history sets the stage for section 3, which broadens the inquiry by examining the institutional connections between capital markets and corporate governance. Are there practical limits to the connection between securities law and corporate governance? The US again illustrates the point, as Congress has increasingly crossed the traditional boundary …
The Rise Of Foreign Ownership And Corporate Governance, Merritt B. Fox
The Rise Of Foreign Ownership And Corporate Governance, Merritt B. Fox
Faculty Scholarship
This chapter explores the link between corporate governance and the rise of foreign ownership. It presents statistics that illustrate the dramatic rise in foreign ownership over the last few decades and then seeks to explain this rise and its relationship to corporate governance. In order to situate the subject under study within its larger context, this explanation starts with an exploration of the factors independent of corporate-governance considerations that favor a global market for securities and those that impede it. It will be shown that the rise in foreign ownership globally can be explained in significant part by the weakening …
Is Corporate Governance A First Order Cause Of The Current Malaise?, Jeffrey N. Gordon
Is Corporate Governance A First Order Cause Of The Current Malaise?, Jeffrey N. Gordon
Faculty Scholarship
The US has evolved a regime of high-powered corporate governance in which managerial performance is disciplined through shareholder value metrics. This paper argues against over-stating the importance of this regime in creating problems of inequality, greater economic insecurity, and slower economic growth. Corporate governance acts principally as the transmission mechanism to the behaviour of the particular firm of changes in the global and domestic competitive environment. The critical problem is a risk-shift from shareholders, who now have access to robust diversification against firm-specific risks, and towards employees, whose concentrated firm-specific investments are hard to protect or diversify. The paper argues …
The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, Dorothy S. Lund
The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, Dorothy S. Lund
Faculty Scholarship
American investors have begun to embrace the reality that academics have been championing for decades — that a broad-based, passive indexing strategy is superior to picking individual stocks or investing in actively managed funds. But there are several reasons to believe that the rise of passive investing will have harmful consequences for firm governance, shareholders, and the economy. First, because passive funds seek only to match the performance of an index — not outperform it — they lack a financial incentive to ensure that each of the companies in their very large portfolios are well-run. Second, passive funds face an …
Quacks Or Bootleggers: Who’S Really Regulating Hedge Funds?, Jeremy Kidd
Quacks Or Bootleggers: Who’S Really Regulating Hedge Funds?, Jeremy Kidd
Articles
Influential scholars of corporate law have questioned previous federal interventions into corporate governance, calling it quackery. Invoking images of medical malpractice, these critiques have argued persuasively that Congress, in responding to crises, makes policy that disrupts efficient private rules and established state laws. This Article applies the Bootleggers and Baptists theory to show that Dodd–Frank’s hedge fund rules are more than just negligent or reckless, but designed to benefit special interests that compete with the hedge fund model. Those rules offer no solutions to any real or perceived risks arising from hedge fund investing, but might offer an advantage to …