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Full-Text Articles in Business Organizations Law

"Flaw-Backs:" Executive Compensation Clawbacks And Their Costly Flaw, Connor Douglas Maag Dec 2018

"Flaw-Backs:" Executive Compensation Clawbacks And Their Costly Flaw, Connor Douglas Maag

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

Saving money should not be expensive. Compensation “clawbacks” are a legal mechanism for companies to reclaim employee compensation, but the legislative framework is complex and disorganized. There are four primary federal claw-back provisions: Sarbanes-Oxley § 304, Dodd-Frank § 954, 12 U.S.C.A. § 5221(TARP), and Dodd-Frank § 956—as well as voluntary contractual clawback policies. This comment untangles the web of clawback legislation by overlaying each clawback mechanism to extract a single, clear, and concise description of executive compensation clawbacks, called the “Comprehensive Clawback Coverage.” The Comprehensive Clawback Coverage reveals a major flaw in the legal and regulatory framework: clawbacks increase agency …


Proxy Access Voting: Evaluating Proxy Access And The Recent Phenomenon Of Corporations Adopting Shareholder Protective Policies, Danielle Vukovich Jun 2018

Proxy Access Voting: Evaluating Proxy Access And The Recent Phenomenon Of Corporations Adopting Shareholder Protective Policies, Danielle Vukovich

San Diego International Law Journal

Shareholders hold a financial stake in a corporation, and therefore are often viewed as owners of the corporation and believed to be in control for all corporate actions. However, their powers are circumscribed. Board of directors committees nominate directors to serve the corporation and these directors have the power to select the corporation’s officers. The committees provide shareholders a slate of proposed directors that are voted on and approved at the annual shareholder meeting. Shareholders may also propose their own slate of directors, but this typically requires a proxy contest, which can be expensive due to the costs both associated …


The Cambridge Handbook Of Social Enterprise Law, Lloyd Histoshi Mayer, Paul B. Miller Jan 2018

The Cambridge Handbook Of Social Enterprise Law, Lloyd Histoshi Mayer, Paul B. Miller

Books

Book Chapters

Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Creating a Tax Space for Social Enterprise, in The Cambridge Handbook of Social Enterprise Law 157 (Benjamin Means & Joseph W. Yockey eds., 2018)

While still relatively few in number compared to traditional nonprofit and for-profit organizations, the rise of social enterprises represents a possible disruption of not only existing models of doing business but also areas of law that in many respects have seen little fundamental change for decades. One such area is domestic tax law, where social enterprises currently find themselves subject to the rules of for-profit activities and entities. Here, both scholars …


Tax Havens As Producers Of Corporate Law, William J. Moon Jan 2018

Tax Havens As Producers Of Corporate Law, William J. Moon

Faculty Scholarship

This Review Essay situates Christopher Bruner’s new book, Re-imagining Offshore Finance, within the literature examining the regulation of cross-border finance and highlights its import for thinking about the complicated (and contested) relationship between territorially-configured domestic laws and the increasingly liberal movement of capital. Part I sets out the book’s central thesis. In addition to highlighting Bruner’s novel framework identifying the factors that propel certain small jurisdictions into becoming magnets for cross-border finance, I outline the limits of the framework in accounting for the stability in the overall demand for the commercialization of sovereignty, only one of which is facilitating …


From Corporate Law To Corporate Governance, Ronald J. Gilson Jan 2018

From Corporate Law To Corporate Governance, Ronald J. Gilson

Faculty Scholarship

In the 1960s and 1970s, corporate law and finance scholars gave up on their traditional approaches. Corporate law had become “towering skyscrapers of rusted girders, internally welded together and containing nothing but wind.” In finance, the theory of the firm was recognized as an “empty box.” This essay tracks how corporate law was reborn as corporate governance through three examples of how we have usefully complicated the inquiry into corporate behavior. Part I frames the first complication, defining governance broadly as the company’s operating system, a braided framework of legal and non-legal elements. Part II adds a second complication by …