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Business Organizations Law Commons

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Full-Text Articles in Business Organizations Law

Agents Without Principals: Regulating The Duty Of Loyalty For Nonprofit Corporations Through The Intermediate Sanctions Tax Regulations, Carly B. Eisenberg, Kevin Outterson Oct 2012

Agents Without Principals: Regulating The Duty Of Loyalty For Nonprofit Corporations Through The Intermediate Sanctions Tax Regulations, Carly B. Eisenberg, Kevin Outterson

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

Delaware corporate law imposes a duty of loyalty on officers and directors as a mechanism to regulate and deter self-dealing transactions. In nonprofit corporations, however, there are generally no shareholders with direct financial incentives to monitor against self-dealing. In the absence of shareholders and other principals, Congress and the IRS have articulated duty of loyalty rules for nonprofits that reach far beyond those applied to the for-profit world--most prominently the § 4958 intermediate sanctions. This article identifies the persons who owe a duty of loyalty to a nonprofit corporation, the applicable fiduciary standards for violating the duty of loyalty, and …


Delaware’S Balancing Act, John Armour, Bernard S. Black, Brian R. Cheffins Oct 2012

Delaware’S Balancing Act, John Armour, Bernard S. Black, Brian R. Cheffins

Indiana Law Journal

Delaware’s courts and well-developed case law are widely seen as integral elements of Delaware’s success in attracting incorporations. However, as we show using empirical evidence involving reported judicial decisions and filed cases concerning large mergers and acquisitions, leveraged buyouts, and options backdating, Delaware’s popularity as a venue for corporate litigation is under threat. Today, a majority of shareholder suits involving Delaware companies are being brought and decided elsewhere. We examine in this Article the implications of this “out-of-Delaware” trend, emphasizing a difficult balancing act that Delaware faces. If Delaware accommodates litigation too readily, companies, fearful of lawsuits, may incorporate elsewhere. …


The Real Error In Citizens United, Joanna M. Meyer Sep 2012

The Real Error In Citizens United, Joanna M. Meyer

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.


Addressing The Tension Between Directors' Duties And Shareholder Rights - A Tale Of Two Regimes, Sean Vanderpol, Edward J. Waitzer Jul 2012

Addressing The Tension Between Directors' Duties And Shareholder Rights - A Tale Of Two Regimes, Sean Vanderpol, Edward J. Waitzer

Osgoode Hall Law Journal

There is a basic tension inherent in the regulation of corporations between the role to be played by boards and that to be played by shareholders. Boards have the statutory responsibility to manage the business and affairs of the corporation, and owe an express duty to act in the best interests of the corporation. Shareholders, however, are the ultimate ‘owners’ of the corporation, and have the ability to elect and remove directors. Canadian courts and securities regulators have long struggled with this tension in determining the roles to be played by each in transactions that pose the potential for conflicts …


Corporate Criticism On The Internet: The Fine Line Between Anonymous Speech And Cybersmear, Scot Wilson May 2012

Corporate Criticism On The Internet: The Fine Line Between Anonymous Speech And Cybersmear, Scot Wilson

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.