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Full-Text Articles in Business Organizations Law
Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (Spacs) And The Sec, Neal Newman, Lawrence J. Trautman
Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (Spacs) And The Sec, Neal Newman, Lawrence J. Trautman
Faculty Scholarship
Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs) are simply enterprises that raise money from the public with the intention of purchasing an existing business and becoming publicly traded in the securities markets. If the SPAC is successful in raising money and the acquisition takes place, the target company takes the SPAC’s place on a stock exchange in a transaction that resembles a public offering. Also known as “blank-check” or “reverse merger” companies, this process avoids many of the pitfalls of a traditional initial public offering.
During late 2020 and 2021 an unprecedented surge in the popularity and issuance of Special Purpose Acquisition …
The Specter Of The Giant Three, Scott Hirst, Lucian Bebchuk
The Specter Of The Giant Three, Scott Hirst, Lucian Bebchuk
Faculty Scholarship
This Article examines the large, steady, and continuing growth of the Big Three index fund managers — BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street Global Advisors. We show that there is a real prospect that index funds will continue to grow, and that voting in most significant public companies will come to be dominated by the future “Giant Three.”
We begin by analyzing the drivers of the rise of the Big Three, including the structural factors that are leading to the heavy concentration of the index funds sector. We then provide empirical evidence about the past growth and current status of the …
Nonvoting Shares And Efficient Corporate Governance, Dorothy S. Lund
Nonvoting Shares And Efficient Corporate Governance, Dorothy S. Lund
Faculty Scholarship
A growing number of technology companies, including Google, Zillow, and Snap, have issued stock that does not allow investors to vote on corporate decisions. But there is fundamental disagreement among scholars and investors about whether nonvoting stock is beneficial or harmful. Critics argue that nonvoting shares perpetually insulate corporate insiders from influence and oversight, and therefore increase agency costs. By contrast, proponents contend that nonvoting shares may provide benefits that exceed these agency costs, such as enabling corporate insiders to pursue their long-term vision for the company without interference from outside shareholders.
This Article offers a novel perspective on this …