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Full-Text Articles in Business Organizations Law

Legitimacy And Corporate Law: The Case For Regulatory Redundancy, Renee M. Jones Nov 2011

Legitimacy And Corporate Law: The Case For Regulatory Redundancy, Renee M. Jones

Renee Jones

This article provides a democratic assessment of the corporate law making structure in the United States. It draws upon the basic democratic principle that those affected by legal rules should have a voice in determining the substance of those rules. Although other commentators have noted certain undemocratic aspects of corporate law, this Article is the first to present a comprehensive assessment of the corporate regulatory structure from the perspective of democracy. It departs from prior accounts by looking past the states' role to consider the ways that federal regulation shores up the legitimacy of the overarching structure. This focus on …


Citizens United And Forced Speech: Why Protecting The Dissenting Shareholder Necessitates Disclosure Of Corporate Political Expenditures After Citizens United V. Fec, Sabina Bunt Thaler Apr 2011

Citizens United And Forced Speech: Why Protecting The Dissenting Shareholder Necessitates Disclosure Of Corporate Political Expenditures After Citizens United V. Fec, Sabina Bunt Thaler

Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice

No abstract provided.


The Model Business Corporation Act At Sixty: Shareholders And Their Influence, Lisa Fairfax Jan 2011

The Model Business Corporation Act At Sixty: Shareholders And Their Influence, Lisa Fairfax

All Faculty Scholarship

In the sixty years since the Committee on Corporate Laws (Committee) promulgated the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA), there have been significant changes in corporate law and corporate governance. One such change has been an increase in shareholder activism aimed at enhancing shareholders’ voting power and influence over corporate affairs. Such increased shareholder activism (along with its potential for increase in shareholder power) has sparked considerable debate. Advocates of increasing shareholder power insist that augmenting shareholders’ voting rights and influence over corporate affairs is vital not only for ensuring board and managerial accountability, but also for curbing fraud and other …


Insider Trading, Congressional Officials, And Duties Of Entrustment, Donna M. Nagy Jan 2011

Insider Trading, Congressional Officials, And Duties Of Entrustment, Donna M. Nagy

Articles by Maurer Faculty

This article refutes what has become the conventional wisdom that insider trading by members of Congress and legislative staffers is “totally legal” because such congressional officials are immune from federal insider trading law. It argues that this well-worn claim is rooted in twin misconceptions based on: (1) a lack of regard for the broad and sweeping duties of entrustment which attach to public office and (2) an unduly restrictive view of Supreme Court precedents, which have interpreted Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act to impose liability whenever a person trades securities on the basis of material nonpublic information in …


A Behavioral Framework For Securities Risk, Tom C.W. Lin Jan 2011

A Behavioral Framework For Securities Risk, Tom C.W. Lin

UF Law Faculty Publications

This article provides the first critical analysis and redesign of the existing securities risk disclosure framework given new insights from the emerging, interdisciplinary field of behavioral economics. Disclosure is the principle at the heart of federal securities regulation. Beneath that core principle of disclosure is the basic assumption that the reasonable investor is the idealized über-rational person of neoclassical economic theory. Therefore, once armed with the requisite information investors presumably can protect themselves through rational choice. Descriptively, however, real investors are not like their rational, neoclassical kin. This article examines this incongruence between the idealized rational investor and the imperfect …