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Full-Text Articles in Business Organizations Law
Corportations - Cumulative Voting, Classified Boards And Proportional Representation, William R. Luney S.Ed.
Corportations - Cumulative Voting, Classified Boards And Proportional Representation, William R. Luney S.Ed.
Michigan Law Review
In two recent decisions, Wolfson v. Avery and Janney v. Philadelphia Transportation Co., a constitutional provision guaranteeing to every corporate shareholder the right to cumulate his votes in an election of directors was construed in light of a statute authorizing the classification of directors and the election of only one class annually. In both, it was argued by a minority shareholder that the constitutional provision guaranteed him representation on the board proportional to his stock holdings, and that the classification statute, authorizing a reduction of the number of directors to be elected at each election, required a greater number …
Corporations - Officers And Directors - Agreement Interfering With Management By Board Of Directors, Edward H. Hoenicke S.Ed.
Corporations - Officers And Directors - Agreement Interfering With Management By Board Of Directors, Edward H. Hoenicke S.Ed.
Michigan Law Review
Plaintiffs, minority stockholders in a closely held corporation, asked that the court declare invalid an agreement between the majority stockholders and their "agent-directors" for the management of the business. The agreement provided that for ten years the stock of the parties to the agreement would be voted as a unit as any seven of the agents should direct or, if they could not agree, as directed by an arbitrator chosen by them. The agents were to be elected to the board of directors by the stockholders who appointed them. Under a cumulative voting provision, the parties to the agreement had …
Corporations - "Personal Interst" Of Directors In Corporate Transactions, Richard R. Dailey
Corporations - "Personal Interst" Of Directors In Corporate Transactions, Richard R. Dailey
Michigan Law Review
Serious dissension had developed between two factions of the seven member board of directors of defendant corporation. Group A, consisting of four members, represented a working majority of the outstanding stock recently acquired by a group of investors. Group B, consisting of three members, had constituted the active management of the corporation for a number of years. The resignation of group B was probable if group A continued to dominate the board. It was proposed that stock of the defendant be exchanged for stock in another corporation. Under the overall plan, group A was to resign and two …