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Full-Text Articles in Business Organizations Law
#Metoo And The Corporation In Popular Culture, Brenda Cossman
#Metoo And The Corporation In Popular Culture, Brenda Cossman
Seattle University Law Review
#MeToo’s initial virtual explosion in the fall of 2017 was very much about Hollywood, with famous actresses speaking out against famous producers, media moguls and celebrities, exposing the ubiquity of sexual harassment and sexual violence in and around the entertainment industry. Since then, #MeToo has made its way into Hollywood representations without much irony. Films and television shows have explicitly taken up the #MeToo themes, exploring issues of sexual harassment and violence and its afterlives. Many television shows, from the relaunched version of Murphy Brown to Brooklyn Nine-Nine to The Good Fight have incorporated #MeToo themes into episodes exploring the …
Penyampaian Informasi Mengenai Pemilik Manfaat Dari Korporasi Sebagai Upaya Pencegahan Tindak Pidana Pencucian Uang Dan Pendanaan Terorisme, Trisha Dayanara
Penyampaian Informasi Mengenai Pemilik Manfaat Dari Korporasi Sebagai Upaya Pencegahan Tindak Pidana Pencucian Uang Dan Pendanaan Terorisme, Trisha Dayanara
"Dharmasisya” Jurnal Program Magister Hukum FHUI
Indonesia’s government makes some efforts to be FATF’s member in order to be more accepted in international business. Therefore, Indonesia should comply to The FATF Recommendations, international standards on combating money laundering, and the financing of terrorism and proliferation. One of the government’s focus is on Recommendation 24 and 25 about Transparency and Beneficial Ownership of Legal Persons and Legal Arrangements. The implementation of Recommendation 24 and 25 can be seen at some Indonesia’s regulations. This article’s aim is to explain the regulations about transparency of beneficial ownership of corporation, using normative legal research by literature review. The conclusion of …
Penyampaian Informasi Mengenai Pemilik Manfaat Dari Korporasi Sebagai Upaya Pencegahan Tindak Pidana Pencucian Uang Dan Pendanaan Terorisme, Trisha Dayanara
Penyampaian Informasi Mengenai Pemilik Manfaat Dari Korporasi Sebagai Upaya Pencegahan Tindak Pidana Pencucian Uang Dan Pendanaan Terorisme, Trisha Dayanara
"Dharmasisya” Jurnal Program Magister Hukum FHUI
Indonesia’s government makes some efforts to be FATF’s member in order to be more accepted in international business. Therefore, Indonesia should comply to The FATF Recommendations, international standards on combating money laundering, and the financing of terrorism and proliferation. One of the government’s focus is on Recommendation 24 and 25 about Transparency and Beneficial Ownership of Legal Persons and Legal Arrangements. The implementation of Recommendation 24 and 25 can be seen at some Indonesia’s regulations. This article’s aim is to explain the regulations about transparency of beneficial ownership of corporation, using normative legal research by literature review. The conclusion of …
On The Origins Of The Modern Corporation And Private Property, Bernard C. Beaudreau
On The Origins Of The Modern Corporation And Private Property, Bernard C. Beaudreau
Seattle University Law Review
The Modern Corporation and Private Property (MCPP) by Adolf A. Berle Jr. and Gardiner Means, published in 1932, is undisputedly the most influential work ever written in the field of corporate governance. In a nutshell, Berle and Means argued that corporate control had been usurped by a new class of managers, the result of which included (1) shareholder loss of control (a basic property right), (2) questionable corporate objectives and behavior, and (3) the potential breakdown of the market mechanism. In this paper, I examine the origins of MCPP, paying particular attention to the authors’ underlying motives. I argue that …
Berle X: Berle And His World: An Homage To William W. Bratton, Charles R. T. O'Kelley
Berle X: Berle And His World: An Homage To William W. Bratton, Charles R. T. O'Kelley
Seattle University Law Review
An introduction to the Berle X symposium, honoring William W. (Bill) Bratton.
“In Time Of Stress, A Civilization Pauses To Take Stock Of Itself”: Adolf A. Berle And The Modern Corporation From The New Era To 1933, Mark Hendrickson
“In Time Of Stress, A Civilization Pauses To Take Stock Of Itself”: Adolf A. Berle And The Modern Corporation From The New Era To 1933, Mark Hendrickson
Seattle University Law Review
This Article demonstrates three things. First, an examination of Berle’s work and thinking in this critical period reveals the ways in which public problems and the need to “know capitalism,” to borrow a phrase from Mary Furner, converged in the post-WWI era in remarkable and unprecedented ways that would shape New Deal and post-New Deal politics and policy. Berle’s gift for synthesizing evidence and constructing narratives that explained complex events were particularly well suited to this era that prized the expert. Second, identifying a problem and developing a persuasive narrative is one thing, but finding solutions is another. Berle joined …
The ‘Berle And Means Corporation’ In Historical Perspective, Eric Hilt
The ‘Berle And Means Corporation’ In Historical Perspective, Eric Hilt
Seattle University Law Review
This Article presents new evidence on the evolution of the business corporation in America and on the emergence of what is commonly termed the “Berle and Means corporation.” Drawing on a wide range of sources, I investigate three major historical claims of The Modern Corporation: that large corporations had displaced small ones by the early twentieth century; that the quasi-public corporations of the 1930s were much larger than the public corporations of the nineteenth century; and that ownership was separated from control to a much greater extent in the 1930s compared to the nineteenth century. I address each of these …
Collected Lectures And Talks On Corporate Law, Legal Theory, History, Finance, And Governance, William W. Bratton
Collected Lectures And Talks On Corporate Law, Legal Theory, History, Finance, And Governance, William W. Bratton
Seattle University Law Review
A collection of eighteen speeches and lectures, from 2003 to 2018, discussing and expanding on the writings and theories of Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means.
Quasi Governments And Inchoate Law: Berle’S Vision Of Limits On Corporate Power, Elizabeth Pollman
Quasi Governments And Inchoate Law: Berle’S Vision Of Limits On Corporate Power, Elizabeth Pollman
Seattle University Law Review
This Berle X Symposium essay gives prominence to distinguished corporate law scholar Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and his key writings of the 1950s and 1960s. Berle is most famous for his work decades earlier, in the 1930s, with Gardiner Means on the topic of the separation of ownership and control, and for his great debate of corporate social responsibility with E. Merrick Dodd. Yet the world was inching closer to our contemporary one in terms of both business and technology in Berle’s later years and his work from this period deserves attention.
“All Lawyers Are Somewhat Suspect”: Adolf A. Berle And The Modern Legal Profession, Harwell Wells
“All Lawyers Are Somewhat Suspect”: Adolf A. Berle And The Modern Legal Profession, Harwell Wells
Seattle University Law Review
Adolf A. Berle was perhaps the preeminent scholar of the modern corporation. He was also an occasional scholar of the modern legal profession. This Article surveys his writings on the legal profession from the 1930s to the 1960s, from the sharp criticisms he leveled at lawyers, particularly corporate lawyers, during the Great Depression, to his sunnier account of the lawyer’s role in the postwar era. I argue that Berle’s views were shaped both by the reformist tradition he inherited from Louis Brandeis and his writings on the corporation, which left him convinced that the fate of the legal profession would …
Brain Perspectives On Investor Behavior And Decision-Making Errors, Owen D. Jones
Brain Perspectives On Investor Behavior And Decision-Making Errors, Owen D. Jones
Seattle University Law Review
I want to start off with what I consider to be the statement of the problem. As I understand it, you’re concerned that the time horizons for maximizing the value of an investment vary among individuals in surprisingly wide, imperfectly predictable, and often seemingly irrational ways. And, if I understand your target here, the idea is that a deeper understanding of the causes of this variation might aid in the planning and design of legal and corporate policies. To jump into this, I’m going to give a little bit of an introduction about behavioral biases, and something that I’ve called …
An Identity Theory Of The Short- And Long-Term Investor Debate, Claire A. Hill
An Identity Theory Of The Short- And Long-Term Investor Debate, Claire A. Hill
Seattle University Law Review
Economics famously treats market actors as homogeneous. People are homo economicus, rational self-interested maximizers of their own utility. So far, so good, notwithstanding supposed behavioral “deviations” from rationality (more on those later). That people can view their own utility very differently from one another is recognized in theory, but not so much in practice. Also not sufficiently recognized is the extent to which people’s views of their own utility reflect their theories of who they are and how the world works, and that they hold such views and theories not just atomistically, but also collectively—that is, socially.
Federalism Of Personal Finance: State & Federal Retirement Plans, William A. Birdthistle
Federalism Of Personal Finance: State & Federal Retirement Plans, William A. Birdthistle
Seattle University Law Review
In this Article, I consider possible approaches that attempt to improve the plans through which millions of Americans tend to their life savings. I begin by considering the inadequacies of our current system of defined contribution accounts and then address two possible alternatives: the first being a federal account universally available to Americans based largely on the model of the Thrift Savings Plan; the second being a system of statebased retirement accounts like those that have already been developed in a handful of states. Though I conclude that a single, federal plan would be superior, either alternative approach would be …
Wrong-Termism, Right-Termism, And The Liability Structure Of Investor Time Horizons, Andrew Verstein
Wrong-Termism, Right-Termism, And The Liability Structure Of Investor Time Horizons, Andrew Verstein
Seattle University Law Review
Do investor time horizons lead to inefficient business conduct in the real economy? An extensive finance literature analyzes whether particular practices (e.g., high frequency trading and stock buybacks) lead firms to operate with inefficiently myopic investment horizons, and an extensive legal literature considers the appropriateness of policy interventions. This Article joins those debates by charting the space of possibilities: what might be the causes of problematic time horizons? What solutions are available? One implication of this analysis is that there may be unexplored market-based solutions located on the liability side of investors’ balance sheets. This Article also argues that we …
Corporate Governance As Privately-Ordered Public Policy: A Proposal, Lynn Stout, Sergio Gramitto
Corporate Governance As Privately-Ordered Public Policy: A Proposal, Lynn Stout, Sergio Gramitto
Seattle University Law Review
In this Article, we show how our society can use corporate governance shifts to address, if not entirely resolve, a number of currently pressing social and economic problems. These problems include: rising income inequality; demographic disparities in wealth and equity ownership; increasing poverty and income insecurity; a need for greater innovation and investment in solving problems like disease and climate change; the “externalization” of many costs of corporate activity onto third parties such as customers, employees, creditors, and the broader society; the corrosive influence of corporate money in politics; and discontent and loss of trust in the capitalist system among …
20/20 Vision In The Long & Short-Termism Debate, Anne Tucker
20/20 Vision In The Long & Short-Termism Debate, Anne Tucker
Seattle University Law Review
What is an optimal investment time horizon—for institutions, individual shareholders and corporations? This question can evoke emotional, ideological, and theoretical responses. The answers usually deeply entrenched debates over the fundamental roles of markets versus regulation and between the appropriate loci of corporate power: the board of directors versus the shareholders. Too long-term and it is myopia; too near-term and is it short-termism. Neither label is inconsequential, so the debates are not tepid, academic, or marginal.
Are Investor Time Horizons Shortening?, Rachelle Sampson, Yuan Shi
Are Investor Time Horizons Shortening?, Rachelle Sampson, Yuan Shi
Seattle University Law Review
The rise in quarterly capitalism in corporate America—increased pressure to meet quarterly earnings predictions and cater to shareholder preferences for short-term returns—has gained significant coverage in the business world and popular press in recent years. Increasingly, popular opinion suggests that firms bow to shareholder pressures, taking steps to smooth earnings and boost share prices in the short-term; firms do so by cutting Research and Development (R&D) investment, engaging in extensive cost-cutting, or increasing dividends and share buybacks. Recent estimates at the industry level show that investor discount rates have increased in recent years, supporting the notion that shorttermism is on …
Flash Traders (Milliseconds) To Indexed Institutions (Centuries): The Challenges Of An Agency Theory Approach To Governance In The Era Of Diverse Investor Time Horizons, Harold Weston, Conrad Ciccotello
Flash Traders (Milliseconds) To Indexed Institutions (Centuries): The Challenges Of An Agency Theory Approach To Governance In The Era Of Diverse Investor Time Horizons, Harold Weston, Conrad Ciccotello
Seattle University Law Review
One aspect of the problem in trying to align a corporate investment horizon (the time period for return on investment) to that of its shareholders is the enormous range of investor time horizons, which can range from milliseconds to centuries. A second aspect of the problem is whether ownership of shares equates to ownership of the corporation. A third aspect of the problem is that, despite the theories and advocacy of shareholders being owners, based on the agency model of corporate finance first developed in the 1970s, the theory is contrary to corporate law. These three aspects will be developed …
Institutional Investors, Corporate Governance, And Firm Value, K.J. Martijn Cremers, Simone M. Sepe
Institutional Investors, Corporate Governance, And Firm Value, K.J. Martijn Cremers, Simone M. Sepe
Seattle University Law Review
In the corporate governance debate, the short-term versus longterm contention has grown into perhaps today’s most controversial topic. In this debate, descriptions of institutional investors tend to present a dichotomic nature. These investors are alternatively portrayed as homogenously short-termist or as consistent “forces for good,” focused on targeting underperforming companies. This Article moves beyond this dichotomy. It shows empirically that aggregate institutional investor behavior presents nuances that depend on a variety of factors, including individual firm characteristics, institutional ownership levels, and institutional propensity toward activism.
The Myth Of The Ideal Investor, Elisabeth De Fontenay
The Myth Of The Ideal Investor, Elisabeth De Fontenay
Seattle University Law Review
Critiques of specific investor behavior often assume an ideal investor against which all others should be compared. This ideal investor figures prominently in the heated debates over the impact of investor time horizons on firm value. In much of the commentary, the ideal is a longterm investor that actively monitors management, but the specifics are typically left vague. That is no coincidence. The various characteristics that we might wish for in such an investor cannot peacefully coexist in practice. If the ideal investor remains illusory, which of the real-world investor types should we champion instead? The answer, I argue, is …
The Long And Short Of It: Are We Asking The Right Questions? Modern Portfolio Theory And Time Horizons, Jim Hawley, Jon Lukomnik
The Long And Short Of It: Are We Asking The Right Questions? Modern Portfolio Theory And Time Horizons, Jim Hawley, Jon Lukomnik
Seattle University Law Review
The heavy shadow of modern portfolio theory (MPT) has had a massive impact on everything from market structure, investment philosophy, and investor behavior, to the research that examines those disciplines. Researchers believe that they are casting light onto investment issues (including, for this purpose, specifically investor time horizons), but generalized acceptance of MPT allows it to continue to darken what should be enlightened.
Good Activist/Bad Activist: The Rise Of International Stewardship Codes, Jennifer G. Hill
Good Activist/Bad Activist: The Rise Of International Stewardship Codes, Jennifer G. Hill
Seattle University Law Review
Shareholder participation in corporate governance and investor activism are topics du jour in the United States and around the world. In the early part of the 20th century, Professors Berle and Means considered that shareholder participation was impossible in the transformed commercial world that they described in The Modern Corporation and Private Property. This was a world characterized by dispersed and vulnerable shareholders, in which owners do not manage, and managers do not own, the corporation. In such an environment, the goal of corporate law became one of protecting shareholder interests rather than providing shareholders with participation rights. The structure …
Specificity And Time Horizons, Frank Partnoy
Specificity And Time Horizons, Frank Partnoy
Seattle University Law Review
This Essay argues that the short-termism debate would benefit from greater clarity and specificity regarding time horizons. I make four points. First, optimal time horizons vary in discernible ways. Second, the potential mismatch between actual and optimal time horizons should generate a range of responses. Third, investors and managers can discern and disclose estimates of actual and optimal time horizons (e.g., using categories such as preconscious, fast conscious, slow conscious, and discounting). Fourth, market participants, policy makers, and scholars should use such estimates to be more precise about time horizons. For example, critics of hedge fund activism could recognize that …
Long-Term Executive Compensation As A Remedy For Corporate Short-Termism, Caroline Flammer
Long-Term Executive Compensation As A Remedy For Corporate Short-Termism, Caroline Flammer
Seattle University Law Review
It is often argued that corporations are too focused on the short term (i.e., they are “short-termist”). For example, during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign, candidate Hillary Clinton urged companies to escape the tyranny of short-termism. Similarly, in the recent policy debate in the United Kingdom on the need to reform corporate governance and executive compensation, Bank of England’s Chief Economist Andy Haldane stated that “[e]xecutive pay is a matter of profound and legitimate public interest. Pay practices can encourage short-term behaviour in ways which harm both firms and the economy.” In this context, a recent article by Flammer and …
Corporations And Political Speech: Should Speech Equal Money?, David Skover, Lisa Danetz, Martin Redish, Scott Thomas
Corporations And Political Speech: Should Speech Equal Money?, David Skover, Lisa Danetz, Martin Redish, Scott Thomas
Seattle University Law Review
Welcome now to the panel on corporations and political speech. We will explore the First Amendment jurisprudence of campaign finance regulation and some of the more controversial issues raised by corporate involvement in the marketplace of political ideas and elections.
Protecting The Polity: Strategies For Reform, Dana Gold, Solange Bitol-Hansen, Charlie Cray, Bruce Freed
Protecting The Polity: Strategies For Reform, Dana Gold, Solange Bitol-Hansen, Charlie Cray, Bruce Freed
Seattle University Law Review
This session is Protecting the Polity: Strategies for Reform, and we frame this as additional strategies that are actually percolating in a concrete way out in the real world, not just in the world of academic theory, to promote citizen participation in a democracy that countenances corporate influence in the political process.
Keynote Speech, Mark Crispin Miller
Keynote Speech, Mark Crispin Miller
Seattle University Law Review
Corporations tend to work against immediate contact. They tend to discourage familial bonds and popular interaction. They are allergic to democracy. Because corporations are usually in the business of selling deviations of various kinds, they tend to want a world in which each one of us is completely walled off in a portable, wonderful land of communication technology. Corporations want a world where everything is done for us. A world where everything is presented to us through a corporate medium, so that what once looked like satire is now commonly represented as an admirable ideal. To that end, I am …