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Business Organizations Law Commons

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Constitutional Law

Michigan Law Review

Equal protection clause

Publication Year

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Full-Text Articles in Business Organizations Law

Constitutional Law-Corporations-Artificial "Persons" And The Fourteenth Amendment, Robert P. Griffin S.Ed. May 1950

Constitutional Law-Corporations-Artificial "Persons" And The Fourteenth Amendment, Robert P. Griffin S.Ed.

Michigan Law Review

That a corporation is a "person" for certain purposes within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore entitled to invoke its protection, is considered by students of constitutional law to be well settled. For that reason the dissent of Justice Douglas in the recent case of Wheeling Steel Corporation v. Glander demands more than passing recognition. Therein he restates and adds his support to the view of Justice Black that the word "person" as used in the Fourteenth Amendment refers exclusively to human beings and affords no protection whatsoever to corporations against arbitrary state action.


Constitutional Law-Usury-Corporations Nov 1930

Constitutional Law-Usury-Corporations

Michigan Law Review

The complainant corporation filed a bill in chancery to set aside the foreclosure of a mortgage on the ground of usury. Public Acts of Michigan, 1927, No. 335, pt. 2, c. 1, sec. 1, and pt. 2, c. 2, sec. 12, amending Public Acts, 1921, No. 84, provided that a corporation could not set up the defense of usury. The complainant contended that this statute was invalid, being class legislation and hence a violation of the "equal protection of the law'' clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution. Held, that the classification was reasonable and did not …


Taxation-Constitutional Law-Classifcation Of Corporations May 1929

Taxation-Constitutional Law-Classifcation Of Corporations

Michigan Law Review

The equal protection clause does not detract from the right of the state justly to exert its taxing power or prevent it from adjusting its legislation to differences in situation or forbid classification in that connection, but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary, but based on a real and substantial difference having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation. Though this is the generally accepted rule as to classification, it has long been recognized by the Supreme Court that the very nature of taxation demands that the legislatures be given the widest sort of …