Business Organizations Law Commons^™

Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (Spacs) And The Sec, Neal Newman, Lawrence J. Trautman

Faculty Scholarship

Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs) are simply enterprises that raise money from the public with the intention of purchasing an existing business and becoming publicly traded in the securities markets. If the SPAC is successful in raising money and the acquisition takes place, the target company takes the SPAC’s place on a stock exchange in a transaction that resembles a public offering. Also known as “blank-check” or “reverse merger” companies, this process avoids many of the pitfalls of a traditional initial public offering.

During late 2020 and 2021 an unprecedented surge in the popularity and issuance of Special Purpose Acquisition …

Potential Competition And Antitrust Analysis: Monopoly Profits Exceed Duopoly Profits, Steven C. Salop

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This short note prepared for an OECD meeting in June 2021 examines several antitrust issues involving analysis of potential competition. While the analysis is not new, it is still useful to collect them together in a unified fashion to show how they are related. In this regard, all the analysis and conclusions flow from the overarching (and obvious) points that exclusionary conduct and agreements that maintain monopoly power very often harm consumers, and that monopoly profits typically exceed the combined duopoly profits earned by the dominant firm and the entrant, if there is successful entry. While this is not inevitably …

Competitive Harm From Vertical Mergers, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

The antitrust enforcement Agencies' 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines introduce a nontechnical application of bargaining theory into the assessment of competitive effects from vertical acquisitions. The economics of such bargaining is complex and can produce skepticism among judges, who might regard its mathematics as overly technical, its game theory as excessively theoretical or speculative, or its assumptions as unrealistic.

However, we have been there before. The introduction of concentration indexes, particularly the HHI, in the Merger Guidelines was initially met with skepticism but gradually they were accepted as judges became more comfortable with them. The same thing very largely happened again …

Horizontal Shareholding And Antitrust Policy, Fiona M. Scott Morton, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

“Horizontal shareholding” occurs when one or more equity funds own shares of competitors operating in a concentrated product market. For example, the four largest mutual fund companies might be large shareholders of all the major United States air carriers. A growing body of empirical literature concludes that under these conditions market output in the product market is lower and prices higher than they would otherwise be.

Here we consider how the antitrust laws might be applied to this practice, identifying the issues that courts are likely to encounter and attempting to anticipate litigation problems. We assume that neither the mutual …

Appraising Merger Efficiencies, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

Mergers of business firms violate the antitrust laws when they threaten to lessen competition, which generally refers to a price increase resulting from a reduction in output. However, a merger that threatens competition may also enable the post-merger firm to reduce its costs or improve its product. Attitudes toward mergers are heavily driven by assumptions about efficiency gains. If mergers of competitors never produced efficiency gains but simply reduced the number of competitors, a strong presumption against them would be warranted. We tolerate most mergers because of a background, highly generalized belief that most or at least many produce cost …

Newsroom: Fcc's Sohn On Consumer Protection, Roger Williams University School Of Law

Life of the Law School (1993- )

No abstract provided.

International Implications Of The 1982 Merger Guidelines, Vincent Draa

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

Potential Competitive Effects Of Vertical Mergers: A How-To Guide For Practitioners, Steven C. Salop, Daniel P. Culley

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The purpose of this short article is to aid practitioners in analyzing the competitive effects of vertical and complementary product mergers. It is also intended to assist the agencies if and when they undertake revision of the 1984 U.S. Vertical Merger Guidelines. Those Guidelines are out of date and do not reflect current enforcement or economic thinking about the potential competitive effects of vertical mergers. Nor do they provide the tools needed to carry out a modern competitive effects analysis. This article is intended to partially fill the gap by summarizing the various potential competitive harms and benefits that can …

Standard Oil And U.S. Steel: Predation And Collusion In The Law Of Monopolization And Mergers, William H. Page

William H. Page

The Supreme Court’s 1911 decision in Standard Oil gave us embryonic versions of two foundational standards of liability under the Sherman Act: the rule of reason under Section 1 and the monopoly power/exclusionary conduct test under Section 2. But a case filed later in 1911, United States v. United States Steel Corporation, shaped the understanding of Standard Oil’s standards of liability for decades. U.S. Steel, eventually decided by the Supreme Court in 1920, upheld the 1901 merger that created "the Corporation," as U.S. Steel was known. The majority found that the efforts of the Corporation and its rivals to control …

When Bigger Is Better: A Critique Of The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index’S Use To Evaluate Mergers In Network Industries, Toby Roberts

Pace Law Review

This Article argues that the current framework used by the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) to evaluate mergers is inadequate in that it fails to account for network benefits. In particular, I argue for abandoning the use of the HHI in analyzing network industry mergers because the index generates little useful information about these mergers’ effect on consumer welfare. Part II describes the HHI’s historical and theoretical underpinnings and its integration into the current Merger Guidelines. Part III considers general objections to the HHI before turning to its problems in evaluating network industries. Part IV presents …

Antitrust’S State Action Doctrine And The Ordinary Powers Of Corporations, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court has now agreed to review the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Phoebe-Putney, which held that a state statute permitting a hospital authority to acquire hospitals implicitly authorized such acquisitions when they were anticompetitive – in this particular case very likely facilitating a merger to monopoly. Under antitrust law’s “state action” doctrine a state may in fact authorize such an acquisition, provided that it “clearly articulates” its desire to approve an action that would otherwise constitute an antitrust violation and also “actively supervises” any private conduct that might fall under the state’s regulatory scheme.

“Authorization” in the context of …

Standard Oil And U.S. Steel: Predation And Collusion In The Law Of Monopolization And Mergers, William H. Page

UF Law Faculty Publications

The Supreme Court’s 1911 decision in Standard Oil gave us embryonic versions of two foundational standards of liability under the Sherman Act: the rule of reason under Section 1 and the monopoly power/exclusionary conduct test under Section 2. But a case filed later in 1911, United States v. United States Steel Corporation, shaped the understanding of Standard Oil’s standards of liability for decades. U.S. Steel, eventually decided by the Supreme Court in 1920, upheld the 1901 merger that created "the Corporation," as U.S. Steel was known. The majority found that the efforts of the Corporation and its …

Markets In Merger Analysis, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

Antitrust merger policy suffers from a disconnect between its articulated concerns and the methodologies it employs. The Supreme Court has largely abandoned the field of horizontal merger analysis, leaving us with ancient decisions that have never been overruled but whose fundamental approach has been ignored or discredited. As a result the case law reflects the structuralism of a bygone era, focusing on industrial concentration and market shares, largely to the exclusion of other measures of competitive harm, including price increases. Only within the last generation has econometrics developed useful techniques for estimating the price impact of specific mergers in differentiated …

Mergers, Market Dominance And The Lundbeck Case, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

In Lundbeck the Eighth Circuit affirmed a district court’s judgment that a merger involving the only two drugs approved for treating a serious heart condition in infants was lawful. Although the drugs treated the same condition they were not bioequivalents. The Eighth Circuit approved the district court’s conclusion that they had not been shown to be in the same relevant market.

Most mergers that are subject to challenge under the antitrust laws occur in markets that exhibit some degree of product differentiation. The Lundbeck case illustrates some of the problems that can arise when courts apply ideas derived from models …

Escrow Mechanism Under Foreign Direct Investment, Mubashshir Sarshar

Mubashshir Sarshar

No abstract provided.

Mergers And Market Dominance, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

Mergers involving dominant firms legitimately receive close scrutiny under the antitrust laws, even if they involve tiny firms. Further, they should be examined closely even in markets that generally exhibit low entry barriers. Many of the so-called "unilateral effects" cases in current merger law are in fact mergers that create dominant firms. The rhetoric of unilateral effects often serves to disguise this fact by presenting the situation as if it involves the ability of a small number of firms (typically two or three) in a much larger market to increase their price to unacceptable levels. In fact, if such a …

Antitrust & Hospital Mergers: Does The Nonprofit Form Affect Competitive Substance?, Thomas L. Greaney

All Faculty Scholarship

Following a string of government losses in cases challenging hospital mergers in federal court, the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice issued their report on competition in health care seeking to set the record straight on a number of issues that underlie the judiciary's resolution of these cases. One such issue is the import of nonprofit status for applying antitrust law. This essay describes antitrust's role in addressing the consolidation in the hospital sector and the subtle influence that the social function of the nonprofit hospital has had in merger litigation. Noting that the political and social context …

When Good Mergers Go Bad: Controlling Corporate Managers Who Suffer A Change Of Heart, Celia R. Taylor

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

Mergers And Acquisitions In The European Community And The United States: A Movement Toward A Uniform Enforcement Body, David Snyder

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

No abstract provided.

Fringe Firms And Incentives To Innovate, Jonathan Baker

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

No abstract provided.

Price Effects Of Horizontal Mergers, Alan A. Fisher Ph.D., Frederick I. Johnson Ph.D., Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

When should the government challenge a merger that might increase market power but also generate efficiency gains? The dominant belief has been that the government and courts should evaluate these mergers solely in terms of economic efficiency. Congress, however, wanted the courts to stop any merger significantly likely to raise prices. Substantially likely efficiency gains should therefore affect the legality of mergers to the extent that they are likely to prevent price increases. This standard is more strict than the economic efficiency criterion, because the latter would permit mergers substantially likely to lead to higher prices, if sufficient efficiency gains …

International Implications Of Limitations On "Aggregate Concentration", David Boies

Michigan Journal of International Law

Traditionally, antitrust laws have been concerned with competition and concentration within a single market. In the past few years, however, increasing attention has been given to economywide or aggregate concentration-especially when such concentration is accomplished by merger rather than by internal growth. In 1979 and 1980, Congress considered Senate Bill S. 600 which would limit mergers based on size criteria that are unrelated, at least directly, to proof of a lessening of competition within any given market. The international implications of applying this principle are complex and difficult, and have yet to be fully addressed. It is the purpose of …

Doctrines And Problems Relating To U.S. Control Of Transnational Corporate Concentration, Douglas E. Rosenthal, Stuart E. Benson, Lisa Chiles

Michigan Journal of International Law

It is the principal thesis of this article that important recent case decisions in U.S. antitrust law reflect just this conflict over the extent to which intraindustry (horizontal) concentration is economically harmful. We are at a point where the future direction of the law is difficult to discern. Until there is greater U.S. policy agreement, and consistency within U.S. law itself, it is unlikely that any common transnational response will emerge to even horizontal corporate concentration. Ironically, it may not be possible to clarify U.S. antitrust law as long as the underlying policy conflict remains so sharp. For the present, …

The "Economic" Analysis Of Transnational Mergers, William James Adams

Michigan Journal of International Law

No congregation of lawyers can be considered complete without a token economist. The role of the economist consists of describing the economic mode of analyzing the legal problem under consideration. Unfortunately from the standpoint of the token, economists rarely agree on criteria appropriate for the appraisal of economic phenomena. With respect to transnational corporate mergers, four modes of analysis may be described legitimately as economic.

United Kingdom Regulation Of Transnational Corporate Concentration, J. Denys Gribbin

Michigan Journal of International Law

This article begins by describing the United Kingdom's policy toward outward and inward direct investment and then sets out the essentials of the competition laws that are among the major, nondiscriminatory regulatory mechanisms that affect corporate behavior and planning. The article also analyzes the development of competition policy as a microeconomic instrument along with its application to monopoly, oligopoly, and cartels involving transnational corporations. Competition policy, except for cartels, is shown to be relatively benign toward mergers until recently, and with respect to monopoly and oligopoly has sought remedies in regulation of prices and behavior rather than through structural change. …

Reflections On Recent Oecd Activities: Regulation Of Multinational Corporate Conduct And Structure, Kurt Stockmann

Michigan Journal of International Law

In recent, years, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has repeatedly addressed, in a variety of forms, the problem of transnational corporate concentration. In the field of restrictive business practices, it has made suggestions on specific antitrust problems, issued council recommendations, and promulgated the 1976 Concil Guidelines for multinational enterprises. Not surprisingly for an organization that adheres to the principle of unanimity and, consequently, is governed by the law of the smallest common denominator, these efforts have thus far focused more on procedure than on substance. Even where quasisubstantive rules have been adopted, such as in competition guideline …

Regulation Of Concentration Through Merger Control: Germany's Continuing Efforts, Kurt Stockmann

Michigan Journal of International Law

The Federal Republic of Germany's Law Against Restraints on Competition (the ARC), establishes an extensive regime for regulating market-dominating enterprises. Therefore, large corporations, both national and multinational, are the subject of particular scrutiny in the Federal Republic. Rather than identify and address all the provisions pertinent to corporate concentration (a task whose tedium would be matched only by its enormity), this analysis will undertake three tasks: (1) briefly describe the general scope of West German merger law, (2) discuss the application of the law to cases of transnational concentration, and (3) explain the proposed Fourth Amendment to the ARC as …

Regulating Multinational Corporate Concentration-The European Economic Community, John Temple Lang

Michigan Journal of International Law

It is the purpose of this article to discuss the policies and goals of the efforts of the European Communities to regulate multinational corporate concentration. For reasons that will become clear in the course of the article, it is necessary to start by outlining the means available to the European Communities, both presently and potentially, to promote these policies. It is not possible to see what those policies might be or how they are likely to develop without understanding the practical implications of the various legal rules on which the Community might rely in the future. This article does not …

German Merger Control: A European Approach To Anticompetitive Takeovers, Rolf Belke, W. David Braun

Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business

European free-market countries recently have begun to enact more laws regulating mergers and joint-ventures, with Germany at the forefront. In this article, Messrs. Belke and Braun intensively analyze the German merger control law, including the criteria that necessitate a report to the German Cartel Office, its application of the substantive merger control rules, and possible exceptions to an anti-merger ruling. They also explore the impact of the German law on international mergers and joint-ventures. Finally, they discuss in detail the first two German Supreme Court decisions that construed the substantive rules and contrast them with similar American cases.

United States V. Falstaff Brewing Corporation: Potential Competition Re-Examined, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

This Note will examine and criticize the perceived potential competition doctrine suggested by the Court. Then, it will discuss the questions raised in the concurrences concerning the use of subjective evidence and the role of incipient competitive effects. Finally, an alternative approach that focuses on the acquisition of or the possibility of acquiring small, "toehold" firms will be proposed.